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For the purpose of pricing the life cycle costs
of the low cost avionics system, we examined all Work
Breakdown Structure elements that contain any
avionics related effort.
In addition to the basic "onboard" avionics
and electrical power systems, the vehicle WBS in-
cludes the analytical, testing, and integration
effort for these systems. The design and pro-
curement of special test equipment and main-
tenance and repair equipment is included in Systems
Support.
The Program Management associated with the
above efforts has also been included.
The Flight Test WBS includes flight test
spares and all labor and materials associated with
the operations and maintenance of the avionics
systems throughout the horizontal flight test
programs.
Operations includes the same type of effort
for the operational phase based on the traffic
model specified by Technical Directive GAC-4.
SHUTTLE AVIONICS WBS
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On-Board Software
Elect. Pwr System
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Space
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Main Eng Fit Test
'ype of Effort
• Maintenance
• Spares
• Fit Test Support
• Data Acquisition
• Data Reduction
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Ops
Maintenance
Spares
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Mission Support
Data Acquisition
Data Reduction
To provide NASA with costs which may be
compared between contractors and between alter-
nate configurations, we made every attempt to
standardize costing "ground rules" and assump-
tions.
The accompanying table summarizes the
key assumptions that were used.
These ground rules and the program master
and sub system schedules were supplied to the
subcontractors who estimated specific equipment,
to assure uniformity of response.
Several subcontractors indicated that there
could be substantial savings realized through a
learning curve, but this impact cannot be
assessed at the present time.
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KEY COSTING ASSUMPTIONS
• Constant 1970 Dollars
• No Learning Curve
• Cost Through G&A • No Fee/Profit Included
• Fleet Size - Orbiter 2 + 3 Booster 2 +2
• Traffic Model per Tech Directive GAC-4
• Commonality - Development Charged to Orbiter
• Hardware to Each Vehicle
• Detail Costs for Recommended Configuration Only
The costs of the hardware for the first two
flight articles are included in the Mk I column for
the orbiter and the DDT&E column for the booster.
Orbiter Mk II includes only those development
changes for the additional or unique Mk II hardware
and software.
"Production" includes the costs associated
with the 3rd, 4th, and 5th orbiter, and 3rd and 4th
Flyback booster. In the case of the orbiter it in-
cludes the Mk II hardware for these three vehicles,
but not the retrofit Mk II hardware for the first two
flight articles. (Retrofit costs have been included in
this study in another WBS, and do not appear on
this chart.)
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LOW COST AVIONIC EQUIPMENT, $M
GN&C
Data Mgmt
Instrumentation
Telecom
Displays &
Controls
Subsys Integ
Software
Total Avionics
Elect. Power
(Subtotal)
Total Vehicle
Orbiter
DDT&E
Mkl
40.1
23.6
22.2
12.6
31.7
24.9
36.7
191.8
71.2
Mkll
—
—
— .
6.3
5.0
—
10.7
22.0
285.0
Prod.
3Veh
15.1
11.1
6.5
11.8
13.7
18.3
-
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17.5
94.0
379.0
Flvbac
DDT&E
26.2
4.7
12.5
1.1
6.2
3.5
6.7
60.9
59.0
119.9
( Booster
Prod.
2 Veh
6.8
1.1
7.6
0.5
3.0
1.9
0.4
21.3
10.0
31.3
151.2
Ballistic Booster
DDT&E
3.7
3.7
.5
4.2
Prod.
46 Veh
67.1
67.1
.6
67.7
71.9
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This chart summarizes the "onboard" hardware
and software costs.
Alternate booster configurations are shown.
The orbiter configuration is the same for either
booster. Both development and production costs
are shown for both vehicles.
Comparison has been made with the Phase B
baseline. This base line has been adjusted from the
final report to reflect the addition of the fifth
orbiter and fourth booster.
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LOW COST AVIONICS AND PWR COSTS - DDT&E/PROD
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This chart compares the low cost avionics con-
figuration to the Phase B on an annual funding
basis.
To achieve a better comparison, the Phase
B baseline Option A was respread to conform to
the present program schedule. This respread shows
the "double hump" characteristic of the Mk I/
Mk II concept with delayed production articles.
The total area under the curve is that
shown in the previous chart.
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LOW COST AVIONIC AND POWER ANNUAL FUNDING
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The weight increase of the low cost-risk
avionics over the Phase B avionics is due to the use
of existing hardware, dedicated computers (aero-
flight control, air data, primary and data acquisition
controller), conventional power conditioning and
distribution, and data busing for data acquisition
only. In addition, degraded and dissimilar backup
capability has been provided.
The R-SI-C booster avionics utilizes much of
the same hardware as the orbiter to take advantage
of the cost savings achieved by commonality. The
higher booster weights are due to the additional
surface controls, the stability augmentation, the
greater number of air breathing, and rocket engines
required for a larger vehicle.
The BRB avionics is a reduced complement of
equipment because it is unmanned and recovered in
the ocean. An additional 75 Ib of avionics onboard
the oribiter is required to interface with the BRB.
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WEIGHT COMPARISON, MK I
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WHAT DID WE LEARN?
Cost Savings Can Be Achieved By:
• Using Existing Hardware to
- Reduce Cost Risks
- Reduce Developmental Costs
- Achieve Production-Run Cost Breaks
- Minimize Support Costs for Life of Equipment
• Maximizing Orbiter-Booster Commonality
• Specifying New Equipments to MIL Quality Standards
• Basing Redundancy on Cost Effective Analysis
• Minimizing Software Complexity-Reduce Cross Strapping & Computer-
Managed Functions
• Utilizing Compilers & Floating Point Computers
• Evolving the Design as Dictated by the Horizontal Flight Test, Mk I
and Mk II Schedules
Peak Funding Reqmts can be Minimized by Growing the System Capability
From That Needed for Horizontal Flight Test Reqmts Through Mk I & Mk II.
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UNMANNED FLIGHT TEST
OBJECTIVE: Man Rate Vehicles for Vertical Flight Test Program
MISSION PHASES: Boost, Orbit, Reentry, Landing
ASSUMPTIONS & GROUND RULES:
• Minimum Impact to Mk I Hardware
• All Objectives Can Be Accomplished in One Orbit
• Unmanned Landing Capability Demonstrated
in Horizontal Flight Test Program
• No Special Ground Tracking or Support Equipment Required
• No Single Failure Shall Result in Mission Failure
• Weight is Not Constraint
• Launch at Cape Kennedy
• Landing Site Restricted to Edwards or White Sands for the Orbiter
• Launch Abort Requires Range Safety Destruct
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The block diagram shows the unmanned flight
hardware required and how it interfaces with the
Mk I avionic equipment. The switching functions
are provided by two Program Couplers similar to
the Program Coupler developed for the unmanned
LM flights. The two couplers provide a total capa-
bility of 256 switching functions which is adequate
for the presently identified 208 functions plus some
growth capability. The Program Couplers are es-
sentially relay matrices controlled either by an auto-
matic sequence under computer control or by
direct commands via uplink from the ground. One
coupler is provided for the switching functions
associated with the space portion of the flight and
is under direct control using the existing S-band
command link. The second coupler provides the
switching functions associated with the atmospheric
portion of the flight and is under direct control of
a UHF command link provided especially for the
unmanned flight.
A remote control coupler has been provided
in order to obtain remote flight control capability
during the atmospheric portion of the flight. The
coupler receives commands from the computer
for automatic flight control and from the UHF
command link for remote control. The remote
control coupler provides commands to the aerody-
namic flight control computer and the auto throttle
and auto braking electronics to control the vehicle.
A Range Safety Receiver and Decoder is pro-
vided to activate a destruct system which will destroy
the vehicle upon ground command. This system
must be secure in order to prevent accidental activa-
tion but must also be reliable to insure operation
in the event of an emergency.
The booster modifications necessary for an
unmanned flight are essentially the same as for the
aerodynamic portion of the orbiter system. The
lower half of the diagram defines the avionics changes
necessary for unmanned booster flight .
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UNMANNED FLIGHT CONFIGURATION BLOCK DIAGRAM
i 1 r'
i S-Band . i S-Band |
Uplink Decoder
Space Control
Functions
— ~ —Mark I Baseline Equipment
Special Equipment for Unmanned
Flight
ORBITER SPACE , Primary
ORBITER AERO/BOOSTER ~* Computer
New
Software
Range Safety
Rcvr/Decoder
Destruct
S/S
23
This chart time phases the delta costs
associated with an unmanned launch of the
orbiter.
The higher cost curve represents an
unmanned orbiter launched with a flyback
booster which is also assumed to be un-
manned. The lower curve represents an un-
manned orbiter launched with a ballistic
booster which, by definition, is designed
to be unmanned.
Note that these costs cover only the
"on board" "black boxes" associated with
unmanned flight. Launch, ground tracking,
and automated landing complexities have
not been costed for either hardware or
software impact.
The additional hardware for the unmanned
configuration has been estimated based on similar
developments on other programs. The following
table gives a breakdown for the orbiter and booster
modifications.
Orbiter
Program Coupler - 4 sets
Digital Command Decoder - 3 sets
UHF Command Link - 2 sets
Auto Throttle Electronics - 2 sets
Auto Braking Electronics - 2 sets
Power Distribution Panel - 1 set
Cable Set -1 set
Remote Control Coupler - 2 sets
Range Safety Destruct System - 1 set
Booster
Program Coupler - 2 sets
Digital Command Decoder • 2 sets
UHF Command Link - 2 sets
Auto Throttle Electronics - 2 sets
Auto Braking Electronics - 2 sets
Power Distribution Panel - 1 set
Cable Set -1 set
Remote Control Coupler - 2 sets
Range Safety Destruct System -1 set
24
UNMANNED VERTICAL FLIGHT TEST
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The Grumman/Boeing Low Cost/Risk Avionics
accomplished the separation of functions by selection
of dedicated hardware for many critical functions
rather than the adoption of a complete inflexible
"firewall" approach. Physical separation into two
dedicated crew stations was considered but discarded
in favor of selective functional separation. This
permits the retention of an economical two-man
crew, without relinquishing the essential backup
they provide for each other.
A sharp cleavage is maintained, however,
throughout the Avionics Subsystems between the
aircraft and spacecraft equipment mechanization,
through the use of separate dedicated systems. This
approach permits FHF and subsequent early flight
tests to proceed without being saddled with the
necessity of providing, and operationally maintain-
ing, an additional complex spacecraft system with
accompanying software not relevant to this portion
of the test program. As indicated, the primary flight
controls, communications and landing aids are served
by separate equipments. The Power Distribution
Conditioning and Control, battery, data acquisition,
some G&N common mode functions such as the IMU,
primary computer and the associated display and con-
trol functions are common for both flight regimes.
Major deviations from the separation concept include
the use of a modified conventional aircraft electro-
mechanical FDAI display to include a spacecraft
attitude display mode and also the dual purpose use
of the sidearm controllers.
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ORBITER SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS MK I
LOW COST/RISK SYSTEM
Subsys
Flight
Control
Guid
&Nav
Airplane
• Dedicated Aero
Digital Autopilot
c Elect. Backup System
• ABES Control Elect.
• Subsonic Air
Data Sensors/
Computer
• AHRS(FHFonly)
Common
• MSFN
• IMU
• Pri Computer
• TACAN
Spacecraft
• Dedicated Spacecraft
Digital Autopilot
• ACPS, OMS, MPS
Control Elect.
• Hypersonic Air
Data Sensors
• Optical Tracker
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ORBITER SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS MK I-
LOW COST/RISK SYSTEM (Cont)
Subsys
Telecom
&RF
Aids
Dis-
plays
&
Con-
trols
Data
Mgmt
Elect
Power
Airplane
• UHF-ATC
• Microwave Scanning
Beam
• Dedicated ABES,
APU, Caution
& Warning, MSB,
C-Band Altimeter
• APU-Generator
Common
Displays & Control
• Primary Flight
• ECLS
• Pwr Dist
• Data Acq
• Power Dis-
tribution, Con-
ditioning &
Control
• Battery
Spacecraft
• USB
• Dedicated QMS,
ACPS, MPS, Fuel
Cells, Caution &
Warning.
• Fuel Cells
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The present baseline achieves lower program
cost/risk than our Phase B configuration by reducing
the onboard equipment complexity through a more
judicious mix of ground and vehicle task responsibility
assignment. Increased reliance oh the ground mission
control center for mission and systems management
and a more active role in spacecraft navigation func-
tions relieves some of the higher cost associated with
developing complete vehicle autonomy. Similarly,
detailed checkout, troubleshooting, and trending is
assigned to the vehicle launch center.
Onboard, the system control is primarily re-
legated to manual tasks, with automation retained
basically only for time critical reconfiguration re-
quirements.
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ORBITER ON-BOARD FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY SUMMARY
Function
Mission Mgmt
Systems Mgmt
FltOyn
Mgmt
(Guidance)
Phase B
• Primarily
Autonomous
• Checkout to
LRU
• Automatic
Reconfig
• Primarily
Autonomous
Low Cost/Risk System
FHF
None
• Caution &
Warning
• Manual
Reconfig
• Manual
Subsystem
Control
• Autonomous
Attitude &
Heading only
Mkl
• Primarily
Ground
• Caution &
Warning
• Manual
Reconfig
• Manual
Subsystem
Control
• Ground
Update
Mkll
• Crew
Scheduling
• Contingency
Planning
• Reentry
Scheduling
• Checkout to
LRU
• Computer
aided Re-
config &
Subsystem
Control
• Primarily
Autonomous
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ON-BOARD FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY SUMMARY (Cont)
Function
Displays
&
Controls
Data
Ac-
quisition
Tel-
met ry
COMM
Phase B
• Multi-Purpose
Displays, Manual
Entry Keyboards,
Side Arm Con-
trollers
• Multiplexed
Data&
Command
Bus
• Continuous Gnd
link via TORS
• ATC
• Continuous
Gnd Link via
TORS
• Intervehicle
Low Cost/Risk System
FHF
• Dedicated Aero
D&C
• Multi-Func
Side Arm
Controllers
• Data Acq
bus
• GSE data
bus
• Overlay DFI
Link
• ATC
• FLT Test Site
• Chase Plane
Mkl
• Dedicated Aero
& Space D&C
• Multi-Func
Side Arm
Controllers
• Expanded
Capacity
Data Acq
Sys
• Periodic Gnd
Link via
MSFN
• ATC
• Periodic Gnd
Link via
MSFN
Mkll
Same as Mk 1
Plus
• Multi-Purpose
OBC-CRT
Display
Same as
Mkl
• Continuous
Gnd Link
Via TORS
Same As
Phase B
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ON-BOARD FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY SUMMARY (Cont)
Function
Flight
Controls
Nav
Landing
Phase B
• Centralized
Multiplexed
Fly-By-Wire
• Combined A/C
& S/C Computer
• Primary Gnd
Area Nav &
Tracking
• Autonomous
Cooperative
Rendezvous &
Orbital Nav
• Autoland
Low Cost/Risk System
FHF
• Dedicated
A/C Auto-
Pilot,
Hardwired
• Independent
A/C Elec-
trical Backup
• Autonomous
Attitude &
Heading only
• VFR Landing
Mkl
• Separate A/C
&S/C
Hardwired Auto-
Pilots
• Independent A/C
Electrical
Backup
• Primarily
Ground
• Pilot
Control
Instr
Landing
Mkll
• Same as Mk 1
• Primarily
Ground
• Automatic
Control
Instr
Landing
33

The low cost shuttle avionics system has been
based on a fail-safe (FS) configuration as a minimum,
in accordance with SOW requirements. Where feas-
ible, degraded backup modes have been utilized to
achieve fail-safe capability without the addition of
operational redundancy.
The approach used in determining the redun-
dancy levels for the recommended configuration has
been as follows:
• A minimum configuration was defined for
each subsystem that is fail safe for crew
safety equipments (operational or function-
al redundancy) and single thread for mis-
sion success equipments
• Redundancy was added selectively to this
minimum configuration where economical-
ly justifiable, so as to reduce total program
costs. Abort cost savings were traded off
against the cost penalty of additional re-
dundancy (weight and equipment penalty
costs).
Two models were employed in performing
these tradeoffs; a cost-effectiveness model, and a
payload effectiveness model. Where the abort cost
savings for the program exceeded the costs of the
additional redundancy, the decision was made to add
the redundancy. Based on these economic criteria,
redundancy decisions were made on each equipment
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individually, resulting in the addition of redundancy
selectively to the minimum configuration. As can
be seen by referring to the tables of Equipment Op-
erational Redundancy for each subsystem, in some
cases no redundancy was added, in others one or
even two equipments were added above that in the
minimum (FS) configuration.
Grumman has developed computer programs
and nomographs for exercising the Cost and Payload
Models, which, in addition to mechanizing the basic
calculations, also permit sensitivity analyses and pa-
rametric studies to be made in an efficient manner.
The program cost savings for each program
phase, (Mk I and Mk II), and each booster (R-S-1C
and BRB), were computed for each redundancy lev-
el, FS, FO/FS and F02/FS as well as the selective
redundancy established by both the Cost and Pay-
load models as follows:
ASavings (from FS)=(ANo of Aborts)(Mission Cost)
-(AW)(Co^)-(AEquipment Cost)
(No. of Vehicles)
As shown in subsequent tables, both models
resulted in the highest overall program savings, and
yielded approximately the same results.
The impact of maintenance costs due to the
additional redundancy was also examined during
this study and found to have a negligilbe effect on
total program cost savings.
LOW COST AVIONICS STUDY
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
• Fail-Safe (FS) Configuration Minimum
• Degraded Backup Redundant Modes Permissible
REDUNDANCY RATIONALE
• Baseline Subsystem Design Satisfies:
FS Minimum, Worst Mission Phase
• Add Redundancy When Economically Justifiable
- Minimize Total Program Costs
o Savings-Reduce Aborts
o Penalties-Hardware
-Weight
-Maintenance
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Orbiter Cost/Payload Model Parameters
The accompanying table identifies the mission
parameters utilized in the cost/payload redundancy
selection models. These values utilized in the asso-
ciated computer programs, i.e., number of vehicles,
number of flights, payload weight and mission dura-
tion for both the Mk I and Mk II phases of the mis-
sion are in accordance with NASA SOW requirements.
Cost sensitivities to weight change and mission
costs have been derived based on Operations Analy-
sis considerations as follows:
Weight Cost Sensitivity
The values indicated represent the increase in
total program cost for placing into orbit each pound
of inert weight added to the orbiter. Consequently,
these values are dependent on the phase of the pro-
gram (e.g., Mk I or Mk II) and the booster employed
(R-S-1C or BRB). A fixed payload has been assum-
ed in these calculations, therefore the orbiter must
grow for any additional weight added to the vehicle.
It should be noted that for the orbiter during the
Mk I phase, fixed engines have been assumed, while
for the Mk II phase rubberized engines have been
assumed.
Further for the R-S-1C, only the orbiter grows
for additional weight added, while for the BRB both
the booster and ovbitet grow. For the R-S-1C, the
weight penalty is not severe, since excess lift capa-
bility exists (e.g. R-S-1C is oversized for the orbiter
and therefore does not have to grow). For the BRB
however, since it is an optimized vehicle, the weight
penalty is severe because the BRB must grow (rub-
berized) to accommodate increased orbiter weight.
Mission Cost
Among the more significant elements of mis-
sion costs included in the values indicated for Mk I
and Mk II for both boosters are: orbiter/booster
fuel; ground operations; MSFN support, and orbiter
booster refurbishment (materials + labor) costs.
In addition to normal refurbishment costs,
costs associated with orbiter TPS ablatives refurbish-
ment (Mk I only) and BRB recovery and refurbish-
ment such as tank cleaning/valve replacement have
been included.
Costs associated with launch delays have not
been included in the mission costs.
 v
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COST/PAYLOAD MODEL PARAMETERS, ORBITER
Mkl Mkll
No. of Vehicles 2 3 + retrofit 2 Mk I's
No. of Flights 99 346
Payload, K Lbs 25 65
Mission Time, Days 7 7
R-S-IC BRB R-S-IC BRB
Wt Sensitivity, SK/Lb 9.0 21.7 16.5 32.4
Mission Cost/Fit (1), SM 6.6(2)14.0(2) 4.3 12.0
(1) Includes Orbiter/Booster Fuel & Refurbishment Costs & Mission Operations Costs
(2) Includes Orbiter Ablatives Refurbishment
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Additional redundancy shows significant cost
savings compared to the baseline minimum configura-
tion (FS). For the Mk I, HO/R-S-1C shuttle system
these savings range from $154M to S166M. The largest
contributor to these savings results from the reduc-
tion in anticipated mission aborts (28 for the mini-
mum configuration). While the immediate applica-
tion of an FO/FS approach provides the reduction,
the selective redundancy approach using the Cost
Effective Model or the Payload Effective Model fur-
ther optimizes program costs indicating savings of
several million dollars.
As might be anticipated, the additional redun-
dancy significantly enhances crew safety reliability,
RCS as well as providing the improvement in mis-
sion success, RMS-
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REDUNDANCY SELECTION TRADEOFF, Mk I, HO/R-S-IC
Min Config (FS)
Cost Model
Payload Model
FO/FS
F02/FS
RCS
.99427
.99997
.99984
.99977
.99999
RMS
.71939
.99824
.98234
.99054
.99954
No. of
Aborts
27.8
0.2
1.7
0.9
0.1
AWt/
Veh, Lb
-
1415
720
1305
2611
AEq Cost/
Veh, $M
-
1.60
1.23
1.39
2.78
Cost
Savings, $M
-
166
163
163
154
ASavings (From FS) = (A No. of Aborts) (Mission Cost) - (AW)
(A Eq Cost) (No. of Vehicles)
RMS = '>robaD'''tY °f Mission Success
Rpe= Probability of Crew Survival
Lb
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The Mk II, HO/R-S-1C shuttle system has even
greater sensitivity to the improvement in anticipated
costs as a function of redundancy due largely to the
significantly greater number of missions planned as
compared to those for the Mk I system. The full ad-
vantage of the large reduction in potential aborts is
inhibited by the greater sensitivity to the increased
weight penalties, $16.5 K/lb vs. $9.0 K/lb for the
Mk I. Therefore, this sensitivity to the weight pen-
alty makes the FQ2/FS even less attractive when
compared to the selective redundancy approach.
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REDUNDANCY SELECTION TRADEOFF, Mk II, HO/R-S-1C
Min Config (FS)
Cost Model
Payload Model
FO/FS
F02/FS
RCS
.99427
.99997
.99997
.99977
.99999
RMS
.71939
.99824
.99824
.99054
.99954
No. of
Aborts
97.1
0.6
0.6
3.3
0.2
AWt/
Veh, Lb
-
1415
1415
1305
2611
AEq Cost/
Veh, $M
-
1.60
1.60
1.39
2.78
Cost
Savings, $M
-
387
387
378
364
ASavings (From FS) =(ANo. of Aborts) (Mission Cost) - (AW) (—— I -
(A Eq Cost) (No. of Vehicles)
"MS = Viability of Mission Success
RQO= Probability of Crew Survival
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The application of the selective redundancy
approach for the Mk I, HO/BRB shuttle system
confirms the conclusions reached from the pre-
vious tables relating to the shuttle configurations
employing the R-S-1C booster. However, the
sensitivity to mission costs (cost of an abort)
which are higher for the BRB, increase the cost
savings substantially when redundancy is applied.
These savings range from $326M to $35 3M with the
costs associated with the large weight penalty of
the FQ2/FS causing the spread of $27M.
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REDUNDANCY SELECTION TRADEOFF, MK I, HO/BRB
Min Config (FS)
Cost Model
Payload Model
FO/FS
F02/FS
RCS
.99427
.99997
.99984
.99977
.99999
RMS
.71939
.99824
.98234
.99054
.99954
No. of
Aborts
27.8
0.2
1.7
0.9
0.1
AWt/
Veh
—
1415
720
1305
2611
AEq Cost/
Veh, SM
-
1.60
1.23
1.39
2.78
Cost
Savings, $M
-
353
347
346
326
Cost
ASavings (From FS) =(A No. of Aborts) (Mission Cost) - (AW) (-j-jj-
(A Eq Cost) (No. of Vehicles)
RMS = ProDability of Mission Success
RCS = Probability of Crew Survival
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Savings associated with the additional re-
dundancy become even more significant when
examiining the Mk II, HO/BRB shuttle config-
uration. The basic savings in program costs are
over $ IB.
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REDUNDANCY SELECTION TRADEOFF, MK II, HO/BRB
Min Config(FS)
Cost Model
Payload Model
FO/FS
F02/FS
RCS
.99427
.99998
.99997
.99977
.99999
RMS
.71939
.99840
.99824
.99054
.99954
No. of
Aborts
97.1
0.6
O.S
3.3
0.2
AWt/
Veh. Lbs
-
1428
1415
1305
2611
AEq Cost/
Veh, $M
-
1.65
1.60
1.39
2.78
ACost
Savings, $M
-
1108
1107
1079
1070
A Savings (From FS) = (A No. of Aborts) (Mission Cost) - (AW) (—) -
Lb
(A Eq Cost) (No. of Vehicles)
RMS = Probab'l'tv °f Mission Success
Rrc = Probability of Crew Survival
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The equipments which perform the guidance,
navigation and flight control functions are con-
sidered necessary for either crew safety (CS) or
mission success (MS).
In general, equipments which have been identi-
fied as necessary for crew safety require a minimum
configuration of two in order to be fail safe (FS).
Mission success equipments require a minimum config-
uration of one. The quantity identified as "required
additional redundancy", based upon the operational
redundancy model (ORM), when added to the mini-
mum configuration, results in general in the GAC rec-
ommended configuration.
The following was used for operational redun-
dancy selection:
• Each of the flight control equipments is nec-
essary for crew safety during de-orbit and
landing
• The fly-by-wire flight control system (FEW
PCS) and the direct electrical manual back-
up FCS were each considered necessary for
mission success. An alternate assumption,
to consider a crew safety FBW FCS without
a backup FCS, was discarded. This accounts
for the apparent discrepancy indicated in
the table by note D.
• Where additional redundancy was indicated
as necessary for equipments which exist in
each crew station, the redundancy was added
to each in order to maintain identical stations
• Future analysis will reconsider the recom-
mendation to use three IMU's rather than
four as indicated. Either a decrease in
duty cycle or an increase in reliability re-
sults in a model recommendation of one
rather than two additional IMU's.
• Either the lower or the upper rudder surfaces
and a right and left elevon surface were con-
sidered sufficient for crew safety
• The actuator configurations considered and
recommended require some clarification.
Each actuator was assumed to be an indepen-
dent non-redundant channel. Based upon the
adjusted weight, cost and MTBF provided for
the ORM, the computer analysis indicated
the need for proper operation of two of four
prime elevon actuators for MS and one of
four for CS, and two of four rudder and one
of two speedbrake secondary actuator for MS
and one of four for CS
As functional and backup operational modes are
identified, and as the design and configuration develop,
and as the mission rules are established, these assump-
tions, along with the reliability models and recommend-
ed levels of redundancy, will be updated and refined.
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FLIGHT CONTROLS G&N SUBSYSTEM,EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY
Equipment
Name
IMU
Pri Computer
ME Cont & ME TVC Elec
Contr: OMES, Sptark, Rudd,
Aero
Reentry AD, AD Computer,
AD Sensors, Sec Act Elev
TTCA & Rotat SS
G&N Sensors -
Rate Gyro & Accel
FBW PCS
Oir Man BU FCS
Sec Act Rud& Spbrk
Prim Act Rud & Spbrk
Aerospace Cont Elect
Prim Actuator Elev
ACPS Cont Elect
Minimum
Config
(FS) (A)
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
(E)
2
(E)
2
Req'd
CS
1
"0
1
1
1
1
0
0
}l)
1
1
0
1
1
Req'd
MS
2
1
2
2
2
2
0
1
H2
o'1
2
1
1
2
Additional Redundancy
Cost Model
Mkl
R-S-1C
2
2
1
1
0
BRB
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Mkll
R-S-1C
2
2
1
1
0
1
1
BRB
2
2
1
1
0
Payload Model
Mkl
R-S-1C/BRB
2
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
>
1
1
1
Mkll
R-S-1C/BRB
2
2
1
1
1
i
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
GAC
Recomm.
Config
' 3 IB)
3
3
4(C)
3
4(C)
1
2
2(0)
2
2
,3
2
2
3
Notes: A. Minimum Configuration Quantities Are for Each Equipment
B. Tentative Value; Further Analyses Are Planned Concerning the No. of IMU
C. Denotes Total Quantity for Both Crew Positions
D. Refer to Text. Three Units Will Be Utilized
E. Refer to Text.
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The concepts and assumptions which were the
basis for this analysis were two-fold. First, it was as-
sumed that all of the data processed by each RAU and
DAC was essential for mission success, i.e., a loss of
any piece of data/information would require termina-
tion of the mission. This assumption is most conser-
vative, for undoubtedly, a portion, yet to be deter-
mined, of the data processed by each RAU/DAC will
not be required for mission success. It was also as-
sumed that loss of all data would not affect crew
safety, i.e., the crew would be able to effect a safe
abort without the Data Acquisition Subsystem.
Secondly, an RAU/DAC was considered as a
single channel, non-redundant entity. The weight,
cost, MTBF, etc. provided for the operational redun-
dancy model were adjusted accordingly. The results
of the computer analysis indicates that each RAU no.
1 through no. 6 and the DAC should be made redun-
dant as a cost effective measure.
The Mass Memory operational redundancy cal-
culation indicates that the addition of two units is
the most cost effective approach, for a total of three
mass memories. Future analyses are planned con-
cerning this finding.
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DATA MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM,EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY
Equipment
Name
Mass Memory
Data Acq Contr*
Remote Acq
Unit 1*
Unit 2*
Unit 3*
Unit 4*
UnitS*
Unit6*
Computer
Minimum
Config
HO G&N
Req'd
CS
(FS)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Req'd
MS
Additional Redundancy
Cost Model
Mkl
R-S-1C
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
BRB
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Mkll
R-S-1C
2
1
BRB
2
1
Payload Model
Mkl
R-S-1C/BRB
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Mkll
R-S1C/BRB
2
1
GAC
Recomm
Config
3(c)
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Notes: A. A Portion of the Data Processed by Each RAU/DAC Is Not Required for Mission
Success. The Model Assumes All Data Is Required
B. The Minimum Configuration Consists of Single Channels.
C. Tentative Value, Future Analyses Are Planned Concerning The No. of Mass Memory • Units
* Denotes a Single Channel
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Functions
The crew safety functions of the Telecommuni-
cations Subsystem (TCS) are voice link, for all mission
phases, and landing aid for the landing phase. The re-
maining functions of the TCS are mission success re-
lated rather than crew safety, except for the VHP bea-
con and the flight recorder, whose functions are not
necessary unless the vehicle has crashed.
Minimum Configuration
Obiter voice links with the ground are estab-
lished with either dual redundant S-band or UHF
equipment, together with an internally redundant
signal processes and audio center. During ascent
and orbital mission phases, primary communica-
tions with the ground MSFN is achieved at S-band.
UHF provides a functional backup during these
mission phases and is prime during atmospheric
flight. Furthermore, UHF is compatible with most
MSFN, ATC and world wide ground stations, thus
enhancing voice communications coverage. Ade-.
quate fail safe voice communications is provided
via UHF and S-band.
The most important function of the Command
Decoder is to provide to the computer, via the S-band
link, information to update the inertial navigation sys-
tem prior to re-entry. Since the same data can be
transmitted by voice link and inserted into the com-
puter by the crew by means of the keyboard, the Com-
mand Decoder is not a crew safety item.
The TAC AN Transceiver provides rendezvous
capability in the orbital phase, and conventional
TACAN navigation functions (range and bearing to a
known site) in the post re-entry phase. The rendez-
vous function does not impact crew safety, and the
post re-entry navigation can be accomplished, although
in a degraded manner, by using the voice link to pro-
vide navigation cues.
The Ku-band Microwave Scanning Beam (MSB)
Transceiver/Decoder provides the alignment and glide
slope landing aid information to the crew for the land-
ing phase. This function affects crew safety, and the
fail-safe requirement is met by providing duplicate
equipment. The C-Band Altimeter provides height-
above-terrain data to the crew and is used as a confi-
dence check on the MSB. In the event of an abort to
an alternate landing site which does not provide MSB
compatibility, the altimeter becomes an essential in-
strument in landing safely. The altimeter is not in-
cluded in fail-safe considerations since it comes into
play only after the first failure has occurred. The an-
tenna systems are considered to be fail safe, since
failure results in degraded but acceptable antenna pat-
tern coverage.
Recommended Configuration
The recommended configuration has been derived
from the minimum configuration by adding redun-
dancy where economically justifiable.
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM,EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY
Equipment
Name
S-Band Ant Sys •
S-Band Sw/Tplxr
S-Band Xcvr
UHF Ant Sys
UHF Ant Sw
UHF Xcvr
TACAN Ant Sys
TACAN Ant Sw
TACAN Xcvr
C-Band Ant Sys
C-Band Alt
Ku-Band Ant Sys
Ku-Band Xcvr
Sig Processor
Audio Center
Cmd Decoder
Beacon &
Recorder
Minimum
Config.
. (A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
'(A)
(A)
(A)
(A)
2
2
2
1
1ea
Req'd
CS
(FS) (B)
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
2
0
0
Req'd
MS
0
0
1
2
2
2
1
0
Additional Redundancy
Cost Model
Mkl
R-S-1C
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
BRB
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
Mkll
R-S-1C
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
BRB
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
Payload Model
. Mkl
R-S-1C/BRB
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
Mkll
R-S-1C/BRB
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
GAC
Recontm
Config
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
3
3
2
,1ea
Notes: A, Indicates Fail Safe Characteristics Inherent in Design
B. Voice Link and Landing Aids Are the Only Crew Safety Functions
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The EPS is composed of two electrically isolated,
independent fail safe sections (left and right sides)
with each section servicing one half the vehicle. Each
section is designed to be fail safe as a minimum. Crew
safety primary equipments are powered from one
EPS section and the backups from the other section.
The application of cost-effectiveness criteria to
the minimum configuration resulted in no additional
redundancy required. Because of the degree of func-
tional redundancy, a substantial portion of the EPS
components can fail before an abort becomes neces-
sary. The components required to permit a safe abort
are:
Either one of two fuel cells and one of two
inverters or one of four APU/generators and
one of two forward TR's
• And one of two aft T/R's (because of the
isolation scheme, only a T/R can be powered
by any given APU/Generator.
Loss of both fuel cells prior to completion of
the-orbital phase necessarily results in a mission
abort. Since the APU hydrazine fuel supply is sized
for the aerodynamic flight phases, totaling a few
hours, sufficient fuel for generating electrical power
for sustained orbital operations is not available.
The major role of the emergency batteries is to
sustain vehicle loads during system re-configuration,
in the event of failure of a prime power source.
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ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM,EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY
Equipment
APU/Gen
Fuel Cell
Inverter
Battery
Battery Chgr,
Xfmr/Rect/Fwd
Xfmr/Rect/Att
Regulator
Minimum
4
2
2
(A)
(8)
2
4
2
Req'd
CS
(FS)
4
2
2
2
4
0
Req'd
MS
4
2
2
2
. 4
2
Additional Redundancy
Cost Model
Mkl
R-S-1C
0
0
0
0
0
0
BRB
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mkll
R-S-1C
0
0
0
0
0
0
BRB
0
0
0
0
0
0
Payload Model
Mkl
R-S-1C/BRB
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mkll
R-S-1C/BRB
0
0
0
0
0
0
Recomm
Config
4
2
2
2
2
2
4
2
Notes: A. Battery Required Only for Emergency Situations
B. Battery Charger Operates Only to Maintain Battery Full Charge Condition
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The Instrumentation Subsystem consists of sen-
sors and associated signal conditioning electronics nec-
essary to provide vehicle measurements information to
the crew and/or ground. It also includes a Flight Re-
corder with its associated electronics, and two Data
Log Recorders.
A general conceptual analysis has been perform-
ed. It has been assumed for this study that most sen-
sors will have no significant adverse effect on crew
safety (CS) or mission success (MS). In future studies
a number of measurements will be identified as nec-
essary for mission success and a portion of these MS
measurements will also be required for crew safety.
The recorders and associated electronics and non-crit-
ical sensors and conditioners have been omitted from
the CS and MS reliability models. No instrumentation
equipment has been included in the reliability opera-
tional redundancy model.
It is intended, by design and/or configuration, to
eliminate any adverse effect on CS and MS for all crit-
ical measurements. Future studies will determine
recommendations for operational redundancy. A re-
liability model will be completed for MS and CS for
each mission Phase Mil boost, orbital operations, and
deorbit/landing, respectively.
Finally, it should be noted that there is no mis-
sion success model for Phase III, since it is assumed
that during the down phase, the optimum mission
termination path would already be employed. There-
fore, all equipment would be configured for the safe
return of the crew and only a crew safety model is
valid for Phase III.
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INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM,EQUIPMENT
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY
Equipment
Name
Fit Recorder
Data Log
Recorder
Signal Condtnrs
Critical
Non Critical
Sensors:
Critical
Non Critical
Electronics
Fit Recorder
Minimum
Config
1
2
2ea
1ea
2ea
lea
1
Req'd
CS
(FS)
0
0
TBD
0
TBD
0
0
Req'd
MS
0
0
TBD
0
TBD
0
0
Additional Redundancy
Cost Model
Mkl
R-S-1C
TBD
TBD
BRB
Mkll
R-S-1C BRB
Payload Model
Mkl
R-C-1C/BRB
Mkll
R-S-1C/BRB
fc
GAC
Recomm
1
2
TBD
1
TBD
1
Note: The Identity and Number of Critical CS/MS Signal Conditioners and Sensors Will be
Determined as the Design Develops. Additional Redundancy and GAC Recommendations
Will Be Determined in Subsequent Studies.
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Program penalty costs for both program phases,
Mk I and Mk II, and for each booster, R-S-1C and
BRB, were calculated as a function of redundancy lev-
els. Costs were computed for each redundancy level
(FS, FO/FS, FQ2/FS) in addition to the selective re-
dundancy determined by the Cost/Payload models.
Reference to the histograms shows that the FS (min-
imum) configuration results in program penalty costs
of the order of 10 to 20 times those of the Cost/Pay-
load configurations. The FO/FS and FO/FO/FS con-
figurations incur penalty costs ranging from 20% to
60% greater than those for the Cost/Payload config-
urations.
The recommended configuration was developed
from the FS (minimum) configuration as follows:
Redundancy allocations were evaluated inde-
pendently for the Mk I and Mk II programs, since the
operational/vehicle parameters vary for each program.
Each program was evaluated using both the Cost and
Payload models to determine the economically op-
timum level of redundancy. The results of each
evaluation were virtually identical, i.e., where differ-
ences existed, engineering judgement was applied to
determine the final configuration.
The differences in cost among the various con-
figurations result from the interplay of three cost
factors:
• Abort Costs: Expected number of aborts
X cost per mission
• AEquipment Costs: The cost of the addi-
tional equipment due to the redundancy
added above the FS configuration
• AWeight Costs: The weight of the addition-
al equipment X Penalty cost per pound
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COSTS VS REDUNDANCY LEVELS R-S-1C
430i
Cost, SM
Cost = Baseline Abort Cost - ACost Savings
= = Mkl
=Mkl l
FS(Min) Cost Payload FO/FS FO/FO/FS
Redundancy
The FS configuration has the minimum redun-
dancy, and consequently, the lowest reliability and
the highest number of aborts. Since this is the mini-
mum configuration, there are no associated equip-
ment and weight penalties; the total FS penalty cost
is solely due to abort costs.
The FO/FO/FS configuration has the maxi-
mum redundancy, and consequently, the lowest
abort costs. The high redundancy level incurs the
maximum equipment and weight penalty costs.
The FO/FS configuration has a lower penalty
cost than FO/FO/FS since the higher associated a-
bort costs are more than offset by the reduction in
the equipment and weight penalties.
The Cost and Payload configurations yield
penalty costs which are essentially equal, and as
would be expected, the lowest of all the configura-
tions evaluated. In these configurations, redund-
dancy is allocated in accordance with economic
criteria rather than arbitrary rules, as is the case
with the other configurations. The differences be-
tween the Cost and Payload configurations stem
from the criteria used for adding redundancy. The
Payload model optimizes the probability of pay-
load delivery to orbit and reduces the effective pay-
load by the weight of redundancy added; the Cost
model minimizes the total program costs and main-
tains a fixed payload and allows the vehicle to
grow as redundancy is added.
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COSTS VS REDUNDANCY LEVELS, BRB
1180-
1140-
•^
420-
Cost, $M
380-
100-
60-
20-
Cost = Baseline Abort Cost - ACost Savings
I
I =Mkll
FS(Min) Cost Payload FO/FS FO/FO/FS
Redundancy
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MAJOR DECISIONS
• Aerodynamic Flight Control Computer
• Aerodynamic Flight Control Computer •
• Flight Control Back-Up
• Guidance & Navigation Computer
• Crew Size
• Data Bus
• Power Distribution, Condition &
Control
• Displays & Controls
Dedicated vs Integrated
Digital vs Analog
- Flv-by-Wire vs Mechanical
- Integrated vs Dedicated
- Two vs Three
- Acquisition Only vs Acquisition & Command
- Conventional vs Solid State
- Dedicated vs Integrated
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The horizontal flight test aerodynamics PCS
configuration is effectively decoupled from space
flight controls. This approach reduces development
risk for FHF and offers the potential for deferment of
space equipment costs if desired.
Orbiter and R-S-IC, booster are similar with
approximately 57% commonality. Both use a com-
mon digital primary flight control incremental com-
puter. The booster has a dissimilar backup in the
form of a hard Stability Augmentation System. The
orbiter uses a direct electrical analog backup based
on the inherent stable airframe characteristics of the
Phase B orbiter. (Augmentation may be necessary
for HO Orbiters if wind tunnel tests indicate stabili-
ty enhancement is necessary.)
An interim attitude and heading reference sys-
tem is included for the horizontal test program to
preclude need for inertial platforms in the early
phases of the test program. Rate gyros, linear accel-
erometers and air data sensors provide basic informa-
tion required for augmentation and autopilot mech-
anization. The microwave scanning beam system
is added late in the test program for IFR landings.
If unmanned vertical flight test is required, the aero-
dynamic portion of the flight is tested and evaluated
during the horizontal test program.
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FLIGHT CONTROLS
FHF
Linear
Accel
(3 Axis)
Digital
Flight
Control
Comptr
3
Vehicle
Orbiter
Booster
Common
(Orb & Bstr)
Key
67
For Mk I and II, the basic aerodynamic control
system for the horizontal test program is supplement-
ed with the addition of space flight hardware and
software. These include: the IMU's and Primary
digital computer; the control electronics for ACPS
control; main engines, and in the case of the orbiter,
the OMES control electronics. At this point the in-
terim attitude and heading reference used for hori-
zontal testing is removed.
If unmanned vertical flight test is required, ad-
ditional equipment is necessary. Space and aero
flight couplers are added to perform functions nor-
mally accomplished by the crew. Either direct com-
mands via up link or sequential commands from the
onboard computer are possible. The aerodynamic
flight portion will have been tested and proven
during horizontal testing. Either ground and/or air-
borne (chase plane) control would be provided for
approach and landing.
Auto land capability will be incorporated in
Mk II with IFR for Mk I and late horizontal flight
test. The need for hypersonic air data for entry and
transition is currently under evaluation.
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FLIGHT CONTROLS
$$&$& MARK I & MARK II
Crew
Control
Sensors
Body
Rate
Gyros
(3 Axis)
 3
Linear
Accel
(3 Axis)
Air
Data
Comptr
3
1 PrimaryComptrSpace
Fit Cent
t
IMU
^Display
•* Display 1
r
•^ Display
»
-¥
•*
-fr
»>
W$fa
H
Digital
Flight
Control
Comptr
J'
•^  Display
1
--»
F
Aero
Control
Elect.
3
ABE
Elect.
3
ACPS
Main
Engine
&
TVC
Control
Elect. 3
Vehicle
Orbiter
Booster
Common
(Orb & Bstr)
Key
R^
V777A
CZH
• • •
69
A digital primary flight control computer
backed up by a dissimilar redundant analog system is
recommended. The digital approach offers many ad-
vantages over analog, e.g., accommodates change
easily via software, has a wider dynamic range, is
lighter, cheaper, more precise, and can use existing
equipment and software specifically designed for
control applications. The prime disadvantage of the
digital approach is the question of software devel-
opment risk. This could be a problem using a gen-
eral purpose machine and developing software from
scratch.
The Grumman/Boeing recommendation is to
use an existing Variable Digital Incremental Com-
puter. This machine is specifically designed for con-
trol system applications and has been flight tested on
707 and 727 autoland systems. Programming is
simple and is analogous to programming an analog
computer. Supporting software in the form of as-
sembly and simulation programs exist. This combi-
nation of advantages offers a significant reduction in
software development risk.
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, MAJOR DECISIONS
DIGITAL AERO FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER
ADVANTAGES OVER ANALOG
A. Easier to Accommodate Changes
(Boeing SST Experience With
.Analog A Major Risk Factor)
B. Can Easily Accommodate Wide
Range of Performance Require-
ments. (Analog Autopilot May
Push State-Of-Art)
C. Better Control of Tolerances,
Errors and Limits; Especially
Important In Auto-Recon-
f igurable Systems (Fewer
Nuisance Interrupts)
D. Simpler Interface With G&N
Digital Computer
E. Common Equipment on Or-
biter and Booster (Analog
Would Require 2 Different
Developments) Reduces
GSE, Spares, etc.
DISADVANTAGES COMPARED TO ANALOG
A. Most Aero Flight Control Experience is
With Analog Implementation
B. Software Development Problems
C. Although Experience With Digital Equip-
ment is Minimal Several Programs Will Have
Gained Experience:
• F-14 Digital Wing Sweep Program
• NASA F-8 With Apollo Computer
• Boeing DASH 80 Auto Land
• Boeing 727 Auto Land
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, MAJOR DECISIONS
DEDICATED AERODYNAMIC FLIGHT CONTROL COMPUTER FOR
ORBITER AND BOOSTER
ADVANTAGES
A. De-Couple Risk (Central
Computer Not Required for
HFT Program)
B. Forces Software Modularization
C. Provides Greater Software
Visibility
D. Simplifies Test Programs
E. Uses Existing Hardware
DISADVANTAGES
A. May Add Weight to Final System
B. Less Flexibility
C. More Software Packages
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, MAJOR DECISIONS
FLY BY WIRE
ADVANTAGES
A. Saves Weight A.
- Orbiter 342 Lb
- Booster 760 Lb
B. Booster • Is Unstable and B.
Cannot be Flown by Cable
System Without an Electronic
Stability Augmentation
System
C. Control Column Not Required.
(Benefit to Orbiter Cockpit)
D. Less Concern About Vacuum
Welding: Bearing Lubrication;
Press. Vessel Penetration, ETC.
E. Secondary Weight Savings Can Be
Substantial for Control Configured
Vehicle, i.e., Reduced Tail and
Control Surface Areas, Loads, Power
DISADVANTAGES
Has Never Been Completely Done for A/C.
(All Spacecraft Are Fly by Wire and Some A/C
Partially, i.e., F-111, F-14 Spoilers)
Susceptible to Total Electrical System Failure.
(Total Electrical Failure Could be Catastrophic
For Many Other Reasons- Depending on
Where the Failure Occurs in the Mission.
Loss of APU Results in Loss of Hydraulic
Power)
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Past experience has shown that this particular
trade study generates considerable "emotional" as well
as technical discussion. The Grumman/Boeing studies
have attempted to filter out the emotional/subjective
considerations and have concentrated on technical/
objective factors.
Inclusion of a mechanical cable system in an PCS
design implies basic airframe stability. That is, for an
unstable airframe, a manual mechanical cable system
without electrical stability augmentation would be of
no value. Candidate mechanical longitudinal and di-
rectional flight control system designs for the booster
are schematically represented in the accompanying illus-
trations. All major mechanical components (cable,
control stick, trim actuators, etc.) are identified. The
total weight for a mechanical system of this type for
the orbiter is 481 Ib. Inherent to the design of any
mechanical cable system are the following problems:
• Cockpit pressure seals
• Mechanical jamming
• Friction
• Hysteresis.
When considering large and long vehicles, such as the
orbiter and booster, these mechanical system problems
are aggravated even more.
In recent years, a distinct trend away from mechan-
ical systems and toward fly-by-wire (FEW) control
systems has been observed. High performance military
aircraft, such as the F-lll and F-14 have fly-by-wire
control for their spoiler surfaces. In addition, the Air
Force F-4 680J program and NASA FRC F-8 program
are two experimental fly-by-wire test programs that are
currently underway.
Taking into consideration specific orbiter and
booster control system performance and flying qualities
requirements, a triply redundant digital primary fly-by-
wire control system has been baselined for both vehicles.
Concern over common mode failures led to the inclu-
sion of a dissimilar backup PCS. Since the orbiter is
inherently stable, two design options were available for
the backup PCS: 1) mechanical cable system or, 2)
direct manual analog electrical command, i.e. electrical
analog of mechanical cable system. .
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FLY-BY-WIRE (PITCH AXIS ONLY SHOWN)
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The backup FEW system positions the aerody-
namic control surfaces proportional to cockpit con-
troller displacements. Implementation of the dual
system is via dedicated hardware and direct wire
cable runs up to the actuation subsystem. The
backup system is integrated into the prime system
to provide minimum engage/disengage transients
with maximum isolation. A separate dedicated
power system supplies ac and dc power to the
dedicated components. Integral failure detection
and isolation, along with pilot warning, is provided
to indicate backup system status.
This dual redundant manual direct PCS weights
139 Ib and requires 298 w of power. When compared
to the mechanical system on a cost and weight basis,
the choice of the direct electrical analog command
configuration as the orbiter backup PCS is clearly
justifiable. The major objection raised with respect to
employing a backup FBW system has been concern
over complete loss of electrical power. This concern
is felt to be unwarranted based on data obtained from
Eastern Airlines and Boeing experience with loss of
electrical power in its commercial fleet to 1969. One
failure per 1,600,000 flight hours with almost negligi-
ble effects clearly indicate that loss of electrical power
through lightning strikes or any other phenomenon
should not be used as an argument against baselining
a complete FBW PCS. Eastern Airlines data augments
the Boeing data by indicating that their experience
reports only ten lightning strikes per million flight
hours with no reported power losses. An additional
fallout advantage of going FBW for both the primary
and backup PCS is that only one type of pilot rota-
tional controller (side stick) is required. If a backup
mechanical system had been incorporated instead, a
cockpit control stick would also have to be privided.
The basic booster airframe is unstable and as a
result requires a stability augmentation fly-by-wire
backup PCS.
The concept of using FBW/stability augmenta-
tion control techniques provides some very interesting
vehicle structural/aerodynamic design options. For
example, an airframe such as the orbiter, could be
purposely designed to be unstable (e.g., reduced wing
area) in order to save vehicle weight (possibly thou-
sands of pounds). Reliance would then fall upon the
FBW/stability augmentation system to improve the
basic airframe performance/stability. This approach
to airframe design is referred to as "control configured
vehicle."
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FLY-BY-WIRE:
WITH AERO MECHANICAL BACK-UP
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The spacecraft Guidance Navigation and Control
and Data Management Systems development will be
performed in phases corresponding to the vehicle
development. First horizontal flight (FHF) will use
the C-band radar for ground controlled area/landing
functions and a limited data acquisition system
which contains the caution and warning (C&W)
function.
Data controllers control the flow of data
from the remote acquisition units (RAU), perform
C&W processing, format and control the flow of
data to the telemetry and the flight recorder. The
RAU's as presently sized will have the capability
for handling 96 bi-level and 96 analog signals.
They will also include integral standard signal con-
ditioning.
Upon completion of the first phase of the
horizontal flight test program both subsystems will
be expanded as required to meet flight test ob-
jectives.
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The systems added for Mk I include the three
inertial platforms single threaded to three primary
(general purpose) computers. The inertial platforms
have four gimbals to avoid the imposition of
attitude restrictions on the vehicle through all
mission phases. The array of navigation aids added
to the Mk I avionics provide the potential for fully
autonomous guidance and navigation operations;
however, ground tracking (i.e., MSFM for space-
craft operations and C-band for area navigation
through approach) is incorporated leaving open
the option to include autonomy through software
modifications later in the program.
Navigation aids which can meet requirements
for several mission phases were selected. TACAN
is utilized for post-blackout area navigation and
rendezvous ranging. The Multi-Mode Optical
Sensor (MMOS), a fixed-base device, was selected
as a low-cost, highly reliable system to perform
in-orbit IMU alignments and rendezvous with the
option to include horizon sensing capability
as a viable means for performing orbit navigation.
The Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) is added
for line-of-sight control functions during terminal
rendezvous and as a back-up inertial system align-
ment device. The Microwave Scanning Beam
system is interfaced to the primary computers for
conditioning the information required for manual
IFR landings.
A data log recorder interfaced to the data
controller is added and the data acquisition sys-
tem is expanded to meet the full vehicle require-
ments for subsystem reporting and management.
Two data entry keyboards (with displays (DEK)
are added and the data controller is interfaced
with the primary computers to increase the
crews ability to perform their system manage-
ment function.
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GN&C and DMS Mark II
The Mk II GN&C and DMS are essentially
identical to Mk I in terms of architecture.
Those autonomous functions which will re-
place MSFN during Mk II are orbit navigation us-
ing the TDRS plus an option of using the Fixed
Base Optical Tracker (MMOS) in a back up mode.
The rendezvous maneuvers will be computed
based on MMOS and TACAN data. Terminal
area maneuvers (i.e., area navigation and landing)
will incorporate the FAA version of MSB (i.e.,
MSL) and an option for autoland, depending on
HFT Mk I flight test results.
RAU's and the ground based Data Ac-
quisition Controller used for ground checkout
during Mk I are incorporated into the onboard
data acquisition system^ This provides essentially
onboard checkout capability to an LRU.
The primary computers are expanded to
incorporate 48K of memory and interface with
two mass memories (tape) and two multi function
displays (MFD). Mass memory will be used for
storage of G&N, configuration management,
mission support, subsystem checkout, and MFD/
programs.
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, MAJOR DECISIONS
G&N FUNCTION IN CENTRAL COMPUTER VS. DEDICATED NAVIGATION
COMPUTER (INS AND COMPUTER PACKAGE)
CENTRALIZED (ADVANTAGES)
A. Increased Flexibility
B. Reduced Weight. Power and
Volume
C. Failure Monitoring Can Be
Automated
D. In-Orbit Alignment Inter-
faces Simplified
E. Reduces Ground Support
Equipment, Spares, etc.
DEDICATED NAV (ADVANTAGES)
A. Existing INS/Computer Packages Could
Save New Software Development
B. Could Readily Be Available for First
Horizontal Flight
C. Would Reduce Software Management
and Verification Costs
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COMPUTER MEMORY SIZING
DM/G&N
Fit
Control
Data Acq
c&w
Air Data
Computa
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Mass
Memory
(Mission &
Payload
Support)
Phase B
Orbiter
40K
8K
In DM/
G&N
In DM/
G&N
128K
Booster
40K
8K
In DM/
G&N
In DM/
G&N
FHF
Orbiter
-
2K
(Equiv)
4K
2K
Booster
-
2K
(Equiv)
4K
2K
Mk
Orbiter
32K
2K
(Equiv)
4K
2K
Booster
24K
2K
(Equiv)
4K
2K
Mkll
Orbiter
48 K
2K
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128K
Booster
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Mkl
Same
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Mkl
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Mkl
Same
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Mkl
All Numbers 32-Bit Words
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Crew station displays and controls subsystem
requirements were established consistent with low-
cost implementation economies being considered in
both the avionic and nonavionic subsystems. Func-
tional requirements for the displays and controls sub-
system were established through extensive review of
all on-board operational subsystem requirements. Par-
ticular emphasis was placed on the operational cri-
ticality of each functional requirement and the asso-
ciated crew procedures. Human engineering consid-
erations and pilot experience were key factors in es-
tablishing panel arrangements and determining crew
size. MSFN availability, particularly during launch,
was utilized to reduce crew work load. Hardware se-
lections were made based on functional characteris-
tics, cost, risk, and reliability. All avionic and non-
avionic D & C requirements are traceable through
computerized measurement and command lists and
controlled by subsystem functional set drawings (sub-
system functional schematics). Full-scale flat plan
arrangement boards and quarter scale mockups were
utilized to establish crew station panel arrangements
and geometry.
The selected design approach for the Mk I and
Mk II crew stations utilizes a two man crew in a side-
by-side arrangement. Aircraft and spacecraft func-
tions are integrated in a common crew station to re-
duce panel area and weight. Primary flight displays
and controls are duplicated to optimize crew equip-
ment interfaces and reliability while providing a one
man emergency return capability from either flight
position. The normal systems monitoring functions
are integrated into the side and center flight consoles.
Critical subsystem functions are centrally located
within the reach of both crewmen.
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DISPLAYS & CONTROLS -
FHF
Hvdmnd Ckt'ito Subsystem &
Data Acq Network
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For the FHF test program, only those displays
and controls required to monitor and control aero-,
dynamic subsystems are included in the crew sta-
tion. The Mk I/II crew station design is modular
such that a high degree of flexibility is provided
to insure maintenance of all components, and the
practical separation of aircraft and spacecraft display
and control functions while minimizing any con-
straints on the FHF test program. With the excep-
tion of the primary flight displays and controls
required for both aerodynamic and space flight,
this separation of functions is maintained.
All commands originating in the crew station
are hardwired to the subsystem functions under crew
control. Flight data displays are hardwired to data
sources. Subsystem and C&W data, with the excep-
tion of the data required for vehicle initialization,
is collected via a redundant data collection network
consisting of RAU's (Remote Acquisition Units)
located throughout the vehicle.
Approximately 695 data points are accessible
to the crew in the orbiter vehicle via the Mk I
dedicated displays. Measurement redundancy
is provided for subsystem status data utilizing the
two keyboards normally used to input commands
to the GN&C computers.
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The Mk II vehicle offers a high degree of auton-
omous on-board crew operation, management and
checkout of vehicle subsystems. To enhance the
crew's role consistent with operational requirements
of the Mk II vehicle, two CRT displays and a micro-
film viewer are added to the crew station for display
of subsystem and expendables status, and the display
of corrective action procedures following a sub-
system failure. Data will be presented in sufficient
detail to allow the crew to isolate subsystem mal-
functions to the LRU level.
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Displays and controls for FHF include:
• Aero flight displays & autopilot controls/SAS
• Primary and secondary aero flight controls
• ABES instruments and controls
• APU's & hydraulic system displays and
controls
• Auxiliary systems and controls
• Partial communication subsystem controls
• Partial ECS displays and controls
• C&Wdisplays
• Fire controls for ABES and APU's
• Timers
• Lighting controls
• CB panels
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FHF ORBITER DISPLAYS & CONTROLS
SUBSYSTEM
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Displays and controls for MKI include the follow-
ing additions required for space flight:
• Data entry keyboards
• Main propulsion subsystem displays and
controls
• ACPS displays and controls
• QMS displays and controls
• Rendezvous and re-entry displays and
controls
• Fuel cell and inverter displays and
controls
• Spacecraft ECLSS displays and controls
• Space GN&C controls
• System abort displays and controls
• C&W for space functions
• Pyro and system separation controls
(external tanks, etc.)
• External doors and compartment status
displays
• Payload deployment and retrieval
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MK I ORBITER DISPLAYS & CONTROLS SUBSYSTEM
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Displays and controls for MK II include the
following additions:
• Two CRT MFD's for on-board checkout
• Microfilm display for malfunction pro-
cedure and textbook data
• Display and controls for docking
• Controls for TDRS comm link, and ex-
tended EVA communications
• Payload monitoring and control
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MK II DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS SUBSYSTEM
1. FLIGHT IM5T PNL
2. FLIGHT IN5T PHI(SPACEMODE.)
3. EXT ENVIRONMENT
4. TTCA/ACA MODE SEL '
5. TANK 8ATT S£L
6. EXT TANK H/0 JETTISON
7. NAV/COMM PNLS
8 INSTRUMENTATION RCDR PNLS
9. INT/EXT LIGHTS
10. QMS/MAIN EN6INE START
II.WOSE WHEEL STEARINS
12. PAYLOAD DOORS CONTR PNL
13. EVENT TIMER CONTR PNL
14. BOOSTER MONITOR.
15. FIRE WARN SYSTEM
16. MISSION OISPL CONTR PNL
17. ACPS E.XPEN STATUS
16. CRT DISPLAY"!
B. CRT 015 PLAY '2
If). CABIN TEMP/PRESS
II. CAUTION ANNUNCIATOR
22.QMS STATU5/ISLN
23. AIR BOTH ENG 5TATU5
24. HYDOAULIC STATUS
25. ABORT PNL
26 ENG CHAMBER PRESS
27. MAIN PROPULSION ISLN
26 UICOOFILM DISPLAY
34 COMPUTER DISPLAY
35. WAV CONTR PNLS
36. COMM CONTR PNLS
37 FUEL'CELLCRYO ISLMtCONTR
35 PWR DISTROBUTION ISWICONTR
39. APU SYS I5LNICCWTR
DRAG CHUTE COWTR
AERO MODE YAW I BRAKES CONTR
LOG GEAR/GEAR CCWP SrAT/ANTI-SKID 4Q MASTER LIGHTING CONTR PNL
30 AERO SURFACE POSIND/RUHJERrciM 41 ACPS SYS STATUS tISLN
31. ACPS CMDt CONTR MODE PNL 42. ECS CONTR PNL
31 AIR ERTH ENG CONTR 43 THRUST TRADITIONAL CONTR ASSY
33. SAS/CMD -AUTO PILOT .44. ATTITUDE CONTR ASSY
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Common equipment have been utilized, where
practical, in the orbiter and booster crew station
designs. Typical examples of common equipment
include flight director attitude indicators, horizontal
situation indicators, air data displays, multipurpose
altimeter, C-band altimeter, turn and slip indica-
tors, engine instruments, data entry keyboards, and
subsystem instruments.
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MK I BOOSTER DISPLAYS & CONTROLS SUBSYSTEM
rO EftJ
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The Grumman/Boeing Mk I/II low cost base-
line system designs utilize dedicated flight instru-
ments rather than the multipurpose CRT displays
previously proposed during Phase B. The rationale
for this basic change evolves from the importance
placed on reducing initial development costs. CRT
displays, such as the EADI flight display, offer
features not attainable with dedicated instruments:
e.g., format flexibility, integrated primary flight
data, better resolution and accuracy. Displays of
the EADI type have been used in Grumman air-
craft, which include the A-6A series, the F-l 11,
and the F-14. Such a display was included in the
SST design by Boeing. Of these and the many other
designs which exist, none are directly suitable for a
space shuttle mission. The space shuttle, because of
its unique requirements, represents additional devel-
opmental costs. These costs together with pilot
reluctance to accept an EADI without mechanical
instrument backups makes the EADI less attractive
for a low-cost development program.
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, MAJOR DECISIONS
DEDICATED MECHANICAL FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS VS. ELECTRONIC
DISPLAYS CRT'S
ADVANTAGES
A. Two-Man Flight Crew Feasible With Con-
ventional Instruments (Additional
Booster Simulation Required)
B. Pilot Confidence Suggests Flight CRT
Displays Be Backed Up by Con-
ventional Instruments
C. Minimum Development With Conven-
tional Instruments/Parallel Develop-
ment Program for CRT Displays Not
Cost Effective
DISADVANTAGES
A. Flight Data Decentralized on
Several Instruments Requiring
More Panel Space
B. Reduced Display Flexibility
(Scale, Format)
C. Data Processing Required/
Instruments Can Not Be Driven
Directly From Sensors in All
Cases
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Conclusion:
Feasibility of an integrated two-man flight
crew established
Rationale:
• All D&C'S for all flight modes physically
contained in a two-man crew station
• Panel size comparable with current large aircraft
aircraft
• Cockpit geometry per Mil Spec. 1333
• Total required panel area can be further
reduced through optimized time-sharing
of panel space for non-contiguous flight
modes, i.e. orbital vs. ferry
The use of off-the-shelf D&C hardware
reduces crew training and operational
task demands thru confidence and famil-
iarity with standard equipment
Integrated orbital/atmospheric crew
station arrangement:
- Will enhance crew operations particu-
larly for the coordination required
during the transition phase
- Will allow a more optimized one-man
emergency return capability
- Will not constrain FHF
Primary flight display & control techniques
demonstrated by simulation
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HARDWARE SUMMARY DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
Fit
Subsys
Displays/
Instr
Data Entry
Display
Keyboards
Sys Config
Subsys
Control
Phase B
• Orbiter
- 4CRTMDS
• 16S/S
Inst
- Microfilm
Disp.
• Booster
- 4 CRT
MDS
20 S/S
Instr
2 CRT/
Keyboards
Keyboards
For S/S
Control
Sw's for
Vehicle
Initialization
FHF
• Orbiter
54 Fit &
S/S Instr
• Booster
- 57 Fit &
S/S Inst
None
Dedicated
Devices
Mkl
• Orbiter
- 82 Fit &
S/S Instr
• Booster
• 63 Fit
&S/S
Instr
2 CRT/ Key-
boards
(Simplified)
No Change
Mkll
• Orbiter
- Min Change
- 20BCMFD
- Microfilm Disp
• Booster
- No Change
No change
No Change
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HARDWARE SUMMARY DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS (Cont)
Caution &
Warning
Primary
Fit
Controls
Phase B
Annunciators,
Master
Alarm, &
Tone
• Orbiter
- Side Arm
ACA&
TTCA
- Pedals
- Throttle
Trim
• Booster
• Side Arm
ACA
- Combined
Thrust
- Throttle
Trim
Pedals
FHF
No Change
No Change
Mkl
No Change
No Change
Mkll
No Change
No Change
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This FHF telecommunications subsystem is re-
quired for First Horizontal Flights (FHF) to support
the demonstration of vehicle performance within the
atmosphere, for the substantiation of airframe per-
formance, such as takeoff, subsonic maneuvers, low-
energy approach, and landing. The flights will be con-
ducted with the aid of chase aircraft within line-of-
sight of test site telemetry and radar tracking systems.
UHF voice transceivers, an S-band DFI transmitter,
and C-band/L-band transponders support these func-
tions, respectively. Landing will be conducted under
VFR (visual flight rules) and is supported with the aid
of a C-band altimeter and ground control using the
voice link. In the event add-on requirements evolve
during the FHF program (aircraft ferry to alternate
test site, high energy landing, etc.), the additional tele-
communications capabilities necessary — for example,
area navigation - will be fulfilled with strap-on equip-
ment.
The telecommunications subsystem adopted
for FHF is common for the orbiter and reusable
booster.
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This Mk I telecommunications subsystem is for
both atmospheric and space flight. Initial objectives will
be a test program to demonstrate the performance of
the vehicle and the Mk I telecommunications subsys-
tems which evolve into a fully operational system.
During Mk I horizontal flight tests, area navigation
(TACAN), landing aid (MSB) and ATC communica-
tion capabilities will be demonstrated. These tests
will be augmented with L-band ATC and C-band
transponders (similar to FHF) to satisfy ground com-
merical and range instrumentation tracking require-
ments and are removed prior to Mk 1 FMOF.
During Mk 1 vertical test program, communica-
tions and ranging'with MSFN will be demonstrated.
Operational and DPI telemetry will be accommodated
via the USB (orbiter only) and S-band FM trans-
mitter, respectively. Rendezvous ranging with co-
operative targets is accomplished with TACAN (used
in area navigation) in an air-to-air ranging mode.
During operational flights, the DPI transmitters
can be removed; however, they have the inherent
capability of transmitting TV (LCRU quality) should
the requirement evolve. In addition, the inherent
capability of the dual UHF ATC transceivers will
allow communications with Apollo EVCS.
The Booster Mk I telecommunications subsys-
tem is identical to the orbiter with the following ex-
ceptions: it has no unified S-band communications,
includes C-band transponder for tracking, has only the
C-SCAN version of the MSB system, and has two
C-band altimeters.
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This Mk II telecommunications subsystem is for
both atmospheric and space flight. Initial objectives are
similar to the Mk I subsystem. The booster telecom-
munications subsystem remains the same as for Mk I;
however, added to the orbiter is a VHP TDRS termin-
al and EVA capability. The later is accomplished with
the UHF ATC transceiver operating in a full duplex
mode utilizing a wideband secure voice channel capa-
bility.
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Integrated vs. Overlay DPI Telemetry
Full overlay DPI telemetry (RF hardware) was
selected for the booster and partial for the orbiter.
An overlay approach enables the removal of DPI tele-
metry antennas and transmitters from the vehicles for
the operational flights. The resulting weight reduction
provides increased payload capability with minimum
vehicle scar. The orbiter DPI is partial overlay since
its telemetry transmitter shares (frequency multi-
plexed) the orbiter S-band communications antennas.
This approach minimizes orbiter antenna quantities
and enables multifunction considerations for this
transmitter during operational missions; for example,
TV or payload support.
Area Navigation/Landing Aid
Of the several area navigation/landing aids com-
pared, the TACAN/Microwave Scanning Beam (MSB)
combination was selected. Primary reasons for this
decision is that both equipments are available, pro-
vide adequate performance, do not depend on com-
plex software processing, and enhance pilot confidence
because of existing similar applications.
TACAN is a multifunction equipment (used in
a rendezvous mission) and interfaces with numerous
existing ground and shipboard stations located through-
out the world.
The MSB has been demonstrated in high glide-
slope and flared landings, both applicable to the shut-
tle, and is functionally compatible with the FAA mi-
crowave landing system (MLS).
Rendezvous Ranging Aid
TACAN was selected as an rf rendezvous aid be-
cause it has existing air-to-air ranging capability, is
multifunction (area navigation), has adequate per-
formance, available off-the-shelf hardware, and rela-
tively low cost. Furthermore, it has been demon-
strated in military aircraft refueling operations in the
air-to-air ranging mode and incorporates existing
digital interfaces.
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, MAJOR DECISIONS:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
KEY ISSUE DECISION
• Integrated vs Overlay DPI Telemetry • Overlay
- Payload Advantage
- Minimum Scar
• Area Navigation/Landing Aid-TACAN/MSB • TACAN/MSB
vs PRS vs VOR/DME/ILS vs Ground Precision - Minimum Risk
Radar
 - Pilot Confidence
- Computer Decoupled
- Demonstrated
• Rendezvous Ranging Aid-TACAN vs S-Band • TAG AN
vs ATC vs PRS - Multi-Function Use
- Demonstrated (Mil) Applications
- Adequate Range, Accuracy
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Orbital Communications/Navigation
Unified S-Band (USB) and VHP TDRS com-
munications/navigation with the ground were con-
sidered. Based upon the use of existing ground MSFN
facilities, which is assumed not chargeable to the shut-
tle program and proven capability, the USB was se-
lected for Mk I.
The implementation of the USB equipment con-
sidered transceivers from the LM, CSM, ERTS, and
SGLS programs. Selection of the LM transceiver was
made because it is available in the existing inventory
(which minimizes program cost), fully compatible with
the signal processor, man-rated, and satisfies link mar-
gins without a power amplifier. The Mark II avionics
will have an interface with the TDRS at VHP. This
will be the primary link to the ground while the USB
will be a backup, since MSFN is expected to phase
down. The VHP TDRS terminal will allow narrow-
band voice or data transmission and turnaround rang-
ing from the ground. Should wideband data or TV be
required through the TDRS, then a Ku-band terminal
is necessary.
Antennas/Radomes
Three key issues related to antennas/radomes
are flush-mounted versus protruding, high versus mod-
erate temperature antennas, and ablative versus re-
usable radomes.
Flush-mounted antennas are selected for both
the orbiter and booster because they have the mini
mum impact on the vehicle thermal protection sys-
tem, result is no aerodynamic drag, and require less
maintenance.
Moderate temperature antenna designs, with
high-temperature insulating radomes, are utilized since
they enable the use of conventional materials and ex-
isting design techniques. The vehicle thermal protec-
tion system design requirement to protect the bond-
line of the vehicle aluminum structure to a maximum
temperature of 300° F may enable the use of modified
off-the-shelf antennas.
The radomes (rf windows) selected for Mk I or-
biters are ablative (SLA-220) types because they are
compatible with the vehicle ablative (SLA-561) TPS.
Ablative radomes are low risk because they have been
successfully used on numerous reentry vehicles at
heating rates equal to and much greater (>10 times)
than those expected on the space shuttle. The ra-
domes for Mk II vehicles will be ceramic types similar
in material to the vehicle's Mk II external insulation
TPS. The booster radomes may be identical to the
orbiter if cost studies for detail designs show that
common antennas/radomes are cost effective.
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, MAJOR DECISIONS:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
KEY ISSUE DECISION
Orbital Communications/Navigation-S-Band * S-Band USB
USB vs TORS
Antennas/Radomes Flush Mounted vs Pro-
truding High/Moderate Temperature With
Ablative/Reusable Radomes
- Utilize Existing Ground Facilities
- Proven
- Low Cost
• Flush Mounted, Moderate Temp
Ablative Radomes (Mk I)
Reuseable Radomes (Mk II)
— Compatible with TPS
— Existing Design Techniques
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This diagram shows bulk power transmission
circuitry and switching requirements only and does
not indicate power distribution/control/protection to
utilization equipment; nor does it indicate the neces-
sary control-logic/control-circuitry or protective func-
tions incorporated for source, source transmission line
and bus protection. The use of the circuit protector
symbol (A) does not necessarily indicate a specific
type of protective device (thermal/magnetic circuit
breaker, remote control circuit breaker, fuse, limiter,
solid-state power controller etc.) but serves to indi-
cate a requirement for circuit protection at that point.
During ground operations, 115/200V-30-400
Hz power is supplied through an external power re-
ceptacle at the external power panel. The external
power panel includes an External Power Monitor
(XPM) which monitors external power quality (volt-
age, frequency, phase sequence etc.) and supplies pow-
er for the external power contactors. Since the ex-
ternal power contractors can only be energized by ex-
ternal power, during flight operations the EPS is con-
figured into two essentially independent systems that
are physically, electrically, and thermally isolated so
that single or multiple faults occurring on one system
will not affect or be propogated to the other system.
Alternating current power sources are not parallelled,
since parallelling involves additional circuit complexity
and switchgear/protection requirements which tend to
degrade reliability. Since parallelling circuitry is not
provided, inadverdent parallelling is avoided in the de-
sign and implementation of the system control logic.
A Generator Control Unit (GCU) is provided
for each generator, which:
• Monitors and controls the generator output
• Provides for generator protection in conjunc-
tion with current-transformer packages
• Provides for generator transmission line and
bus fault detection and protection in con-
junction with current-transformer packages
• Provides power for operation of the associa-
ted generator contactors
Each fuel cell is controlled by a Fuel Cell Con-
trol Unit (FCCU) which:
• Monitors and controls the operation of the fuel
cell
• Provides protection for the fuel cell, fuel cell
transmission line and fuel cell lines in con-
junction with line current sensors
• Provides power for operation of the associated
fuel cell contactors
The inverters (Inv 1, Inv 2) are integrally moni-
tored, controlled and protected. They also provide
power for operation of the associated contactors.
Inverter line and bus protection, is provided by line
current-transformers in conjunction with associated
time delay/logic circuitry.
Transformer-rectifier (T-R) output voltage is
monitored by its associated contractor which will not
pick-up unless the T-R output exceeds the minimum
specified voltage, T-R bus fault protection is provided
by line current sensors with associated time delay/logic
circuitry.
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POWER SYSTEM
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The baseline power generation subsystem (PCS)
for the orbiter satisfies the total electrical and hydrau-
lic power requirements of the onboard system and sub-
system utilization equipments with FO/FS system
redundancy. The PCS consists of a combination of
power sources, i.e., fuel cells, auxiliary power units
(APU), and batteries. The fuel cells supply prime
electrical power during orbital operation. The APU's
supply electrical and hydraulic power during the
transitional phases, both proceeding and after the orbi-
tal phase. The batteries are utilized to provide emer-
gency electrical power during all mission phases. Elec-
trical and hydraulic power for the ferry mission is sup-
plied by the APU's modified for JP/air operation.
Each fuel cell is sized to supply the total vehicle load
during orbital operation so that the mission is not af-
fected by the loss of one fuel cell. In the event of loss
of both fuel cells; the APU's are activated and elec-
trical power is supplied by the generators through a
power cross-tie between the forward and aft busses.
Each generator is sized for total vehicle load.
Utilization of ac generators permits minimum
conversion losses due to the high percentage of ac pow-
er required.
Hydraulic power is generated by constant speed,
variable displacement pumps driven by the APU
turbine. Each of the four APU's drive two pumps, with
with a total of four pumps required for safe return.
The hydraulic system pressure is 3000 psi.
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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM BASELINE
• Two H2/02 Fuel Cells @ 28vdc, 7 KW Continuous/1 OKW Peak
(Fwd Fuselage) (Note Below)
• Two Secondary Ni-Cd Batteries @ 28 vdc, 36 AH (Fwd Fuselage)
• Four N2H4Aux Power Unit (APU) Generators @ 115/200 vac,
3 Phase, 400 Hz, 15 KVA ( Aft Fuselage)
• Dedicated Apollo CSM Cryogenic Tanks for Fuel Cell Ho and On
and EC/LSS 02
• Dedicated Titan IMC N2H4 Tanks With LM A/S Helium Tanks for
Pressurization
• Power Transmitted at 115 vac and Power Distributed to Loads at
115 vac and 28 vdc
• Power Conditioning - Max Use of Existing Commercial/MlL/Space
Equipment, Located in Pressurized Cabin Area
• Power Control - Max Use of Conventional Electromechanical
Switches, Relays, Circuit Breakers, etc.
(Note: Mk I - 2000 Hr Life: Mk II - 5000 Hr Life)
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The primary electric r jwer system for the orbit-
er is significantly different from conventional aircraft
and/or spacecraft power systems. These differences
result from the nature of the vehicle mission and the
requirement to reduce the possibility (and the rate of
occurrence) of total loss of electric power during any
mission phase - with emphaiss on the minimization of
even momentary power interruptions during critical
phases of the mission.
Electric power is derived from three distinct
power source systems:
• For ground operations, 115/200V-30-400
Hz power is supplied from external source (s)
• During all flight phases, except orbital opera-
tion, 115/200V-30-400 Hz power, conform-
ing to MIL-STD-704A, is supplied by APU
driven generators
• During orbital operations, 28 vdc power is
supplied by H2/O2 fuel cells, with Ni-Cd
batteries for emergency and peak power re-
quirements
Hydrazine APU fuel is stored in dedicated Titan
IIIC RCS tanks. Pressurization for the APU fuel tanks
is provided with high pressure ambient storage of
gaseous helium. Three LM A/S helium tanks are
utilized for this purposes. The APU's and APU fuel
and pressurization storage are located in the aft sec-
tion, behind the payload module.
The H2 and 02 reactants for the fuel cells are
stored in dedicated cryogenic tankage. Four hydrogen and
and three oxygen Apollo CSM tanks provide the total
fuel cell requirement in addition to the EC/LSS oxygen
requirement. The fuel cells, fuel cell reactant storage
and batteries are located in the forward fuselage, aft
and below the pressurized compartment.
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POWER GENERATION - KEY FEATURES
• APU's Supply All Electrical and Hydraulic Power During All Mission
Phases Except Orbital Operation
- Fuel Cells Sized for Orbital Load
• Four APU's @ 210 shp Each
- Two 45 gpm Pumps and One 15 KVA Gen per APU
- Hydrazine Monopropellant APU
• Two Fuel Cells @ 7 KW Each
- Mk I Shuttle Fuel Cell
• Two Secondary Ni-Cd Batteries
- 36 AH Skylab A/WI Battery
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This chart depicts the flow of events in the
development cycle for the vehicle flight software
and is an idealization of the shuttle flight software
project. The timing and phasing of the critical re-
views - PRR, PDR, CDR and FSRR. and their
relationship to other major project events are
shown. The Software Development Plan outlined
is idealized in the sense that the shuttle flight
software will be implemented with a phase de-
velopment. Software will be developed for First
Horizontal Flight (FHF) and for Mk I and Mk II
Manned Orbital Flights. For each of these software
developments, there is a set of the above reviews
and the associated project events.
One significant review is the Preliminary
Design Review (PDR). This review is involved
with obtaining the concurrence and approval of
the preliminary software design. Preliminary soft-
ware design must be based on stable functional
requirements, algorithms, and control laws, etc.
The availability of stable functional requirements
at this stage of the program is a prerequisite to an
orderly software development. Final software design
is concluded with the Critical Design Review (CDR).
The preliminary scheduling of these major
reviews for the phased flight software development
are indicated.
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SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PLAN
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Successful development of the Space Shuttle
software requires a comprehensive management
effort. The shuttle software for the low-cost
avionics system is a multi-project operation de-
manding control and visibility of all software
elements.
To ensure technical, cost, and development
success for the Shuttle Program, it is necessary for
all these projects to be properly coordinated and
managed.
The accompanying chart indicates some of the
planning factors that must be considered in drafting
detailed management plans for the Phase C/D efforts.
In the future, these planning factors will be cate-
gorized into immediate and long-range management
tasks. The creation of the Software Management
Plan will be an iterative process reflecting the level
of detail required at various stages in the software
development cycle.
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SOFTWARE MANAGEMENT PLAN
• Identification and Definition of Major Software Elements
• Identification of Contractor, Associate Contractors and Subcontractors for Shuttle
Avionic Software Development
• Software Element Interface and Commonality Management Plan ,
• Identification of Government Resources to Be Applied to Program. Coordination of
All Program Resources Between Government, Contractor, Associate Contractors and
Subcontractors
• Monitoring of Various Software Development Activities
• Status Reviews and Progress Reporting System
• Acceptance Testing and Software Certification of Individual Software Elements
• Software System Integration Plan for Avionic Software Elements, i.e.,
- Phased Integration of On-Board Software Through ASDL and IATL
- Integration With Pre-Flight Ground Support Software .
- Integration With Post Flight Ground Support Software
- Integration of Flight Test Software
• Certification of Flight Software
• Post Acceptance Support
- Configuration Control •
- Documentation Control
- Operations Software Maintenance
- Identification of Government Resources Committed to Post Acceptance Maintenance
• Identification of Critical Milestones for All Major Software Elements
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The Software Development Flow Graph in-
dicates the role of simulation and test facilities
in the software development. The Shuttle Program
requires specialized real-time and non-real time
software to perform the following functions:
• Non-real time software to develop, verify,
and modify algorithms and control laws
• Real-time software to functionally verify
the control laws in a simulation environment
(Full Mission Simulation Laboratory - FMSL)
• Non-real time interpretative simulation soft-
ware to assist in flight program coding and
debugging (Avionics Software Development
Laboratory, ASDL)
• Real-time software to verify the hardware/
software interfaces on a subsystem func-
tional level (Integrated Avionics Test Labora-
tory, IATL)
The flight software development process from
algorithm development to end-item delivery is an
iterative process as illustrated in the chart. The
significant point of the graph indicates that in
order to avoid the major "glitch" path, emphasis
should be given to development of stable algorithms,
verified control laws, and a validated ASDL facility
before the "code/debug" effort commences. The
phased flight software effort (for FHF, Mk I and
Mk II) will greatly increase the likelihood of
achieving this goal in that modular software develop-
ment phasing will minimize the major software glitch
prospect.
NOTE:
Software Development cost figures, i.e., S17.5M for
algorithm and control law verification and S19.2M
for development and verification phases. Total Mk I
software costs of $36.7M are exclusive of facility
equipment costs and operating personnel, but rather
refer to costs associated with software efforts only.
Mk II software efforts add $10.7M for OBC and
MCC software efforts required.
728
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT FLOW GRAPH
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The Avionics Software Development Labora-
tory (ASDL) will be required for flight software
development and verification. Software verifica-
tion includes software-to-software and software-
to-flight computer integration and precedes the
subsystem/system integration effort utilizing the
IATL.
The ASDL facility actually contains four
functional areas-one for each of the following flight
software development efforts:
• Air Data Computer Flight Software
• Flight Control Computer Flight Software
• Data Acquisition Computer Flight Software
• Primary Computer Flight Software
Though not baselined as a result of this study,
the following additional ASDL capabilities will be
investigated for ASDL application:
• Commercial time-shared computer
• Terminals with interactive operations
Such capability may be particulaily effective
for the detailed module coding and debugging stage
where it can be assumed that many coding tasks are
being carried out concurrently by many individuals.
Programmer effectiveness is enhanced by significant
improvements in turnaround time. Extensive utili-
zation of such a capability during software integra-
tion and test, in conjunction with a full simulation
capability, is an area of further investigation.
Functionally, the ASDL facility will contain:
• Programming languages and assemblers/
compilers
• A software simulation system (i.e., Digital
Simulation Software Support System)
The utilization of a high level language com-
piler will apply to the Primary GN&C flight software
only.
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FLIGHT SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND VERIFICATION
FACILITY NEEDS (ASDL)
Programming Language & Compiler
• Code Generators for Flight & Ground Computers
• Compile Time Diagnostics, Compile Control Cross Reference Listings
Flight Software Development Facility
• Commercial Time Shared Computer
• Terminals With Interactive Operation
• Software Simulation System
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The Digital Simulation Software Support
System will vary in capability with each ASDL
functional area. The chart shows the general capa-
bilities required for the ASDL to be utilized for the
Primary GN&C flight software effort. The ASDL
functional areas will require the same general capa-
bilities with varying levels of detailed complexity
appropriate to each particular flight software
effort.
The next step in establishing the detailed
capabilities of the ASDL will be to investigate
available support software, particularly in the areas
of the "flight computer instruction simulation" and
the "run time diagnostics and debugging aids". Not
only will the availability of support software be an
important selection criteria for the onboard flight
computers but also the selection of the "host" ground
computer for execution of the "Digital Simulation
Support System". Implicit in the investigation of
support software will be a trade study to establish
the cost and schedule advantages of a Decentralized
vs. Centralized ASDL facility to support the four
flight software efforts.
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DIGITAL SIMULATION SOFTWARE SUPPORT SYSTEM
(ASDL)
• Flight Computer Instruction Simulator
• Run Time Diagnostics & Debugging Aids
- Edited Dumps
- Source Language Trace
- Timing Checks
- Breakpoints
• Environment Simulation
- Vehicle & Aerodynamic
- Universe
- Subsystems Interfaced to Primary Computer, Other Computers, IMU,
Displays, Controls
• Functional Simulation of Computer Interfaces
- Air Data, Incremental Digital Control, Data Acquisition
• Simulation Test Generation Support Software
• Recording & Post Run Editing Support Software
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To appreciate and properly utilize the costs
indicated on the chart, it is necessary to understand
the groundrules and constraints that apply.
Rather than initially presenting an all inclusive
Flight Software cost figure, it is perhaps more ad-
vantageous to start with the costs for the code/
debug effort first.
The projected cost of onboard code/debug
software effort (for FHF and Mk I) is $6.3M. How-
ever, this estimate assumes the ideal conditions of
well-defined algorithms and control laws at CPCEI
Part II approval and additionally, that no major
changes causing software redevelopment will be
imposed during the development cycle. However,
.experience indicates that total software development
costs, in many cases, approach almost twice the an-
ticipated development costs under ideal conditions.
This cost estimate reflects.only the coding/
debugging and the related costs of production and
operations phases for FHF and Mk I and does not
include algorithm development, control law verifica-
tion, ASDL and IATL software build-up costs.
The estimates were based on the following
software development efforts:
• For FHF: The Air Data, Flight Control and
Data Acquisition flight software efforts
• ForMkI : The Primary GN&C software
effort and the Data Acquisition flight soft-
ware effort associated with enhanced on-
board checkout processing.
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ONBOARD SOFTWARE COST SUMMARY, $K
(FHFand MK I)
• Avionics
Programming 2,400
Production 900
Operations 3,000
Total 6,300 (Idealized Cost)
• Assuming Stable Verified Control Laws
• Computer Machine Costs Not Included
• Algorithm Development Not Included
• Control Law Verification Not Included
• Software Development Experience Factor (Multiply Ideal Cost by 2)
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The estimated cost of total avionics software
development exclusive of GSE related software is
S47.4M. This does not include the costs associated
with computer hardware or machine time utilization.
The estimates were based on the following software
efforts (as related to the development cycle):
• The development, verification and modifica-
tion of algorithms and control laws using
non-real time software techniques
• The functional verification of control laws
utilizing real-time software techniques in
a simulation environment (i.e., the build-up
and utilization of a Full Mission Simulation
Laboratory, FMSL)
• The code/debug flight software effort in-
cluding:
- F H F a n d M k I
- Mk II software development which is an
incremental increase from Mk I incorpora-
ting significant additional OBC functions
and mission management functions
to be mechanized in flight software
Flight software verification/certification
utilizing the Integrated Avionics Lab-
oratory (IATL). The IATL costs reflect
IATL build-up and flight software ver-
ification/certification
Flight test software will be required during
the shuttle "flight test" program to aid
in evaluating and/or demonstrating the avi-
onics systems under test. Although the
definition of the shuttle reduction require-
ments has not been established, it was
possible to generate a possible software
estimate based on solid E-2C experience
(a total avionics system was evaluated on
this program) and the F-I4 instrumenta-
tion system.
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AVIONICS SOFTWARE COST MATRIX, $K
Category
• Onboard Software (6,300 X 2)
• Avionics Software Development Lab (ASDL)
• Integrated Avionics Test Lab (IATL)
• Flight Test Software
Subtotal (FHF.Mkl)
Subtotal (Mk II)
$12,600
3,420
2,280
925
19,225
10,700
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• Algorithm Development I 17
• Control Law Verification )
Total Software $47,425
• Computer Machine Costs Not Included
• Facilities Operating Personnel Not Included
• Flight Test Includes Only Avionics System Testing
Memory size estimates of the GN&C baseline
software functional components with estimates of
the storage impact on the Primary computer were
based on actual figures taken from an Apollo Command
Module Computer Program. The estimates for the
corresponding shuttle Primary computer program are
rounded to the next 500 words; each word represents
an equivalent AGC word of 15 bits plus parity. The
estimates as presented were derived by comparing
the equivalent Apollo and Orbiter GN&C functions
and making a positive or negative adjustment to the
Apollo word count depending on a judgement of the
scope and complexity of the shuttle function.
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SIZE AND SPEED ESTIMATES
Based on 15-Bit Word Size
Mission Control Programs
• Prelaunch
• Boost
• Orbital Coast
• Rendezvous
• Deorbit
• Transition & Landing
General Purpose Programs
• Orbital Mechanics
• Navigation
• Digital Autopilot
• System Function
Variables
AGC
580
480
9090
2080
3030
-
4010
930
4090
12410
36700
2050/
38750
GIM&C
1000
2500
9500
4500
3500
2500
5000
1500
7000
11000
48000
4500/
52500
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Before the memory estimate of the previous
chart can be extrapolated into real memory require-
ments, several additional factors must be taken into
consideration:
• It is recommended that the Primary
Computer tasks be implemented in a Higher
Order Language. This is likely to result in
a 20%-40% increase in the volume of machine
code over an all-assembly language ap-
proach
• The Apollo program is the result of a long
period of development during which the
AGC's limited memory and execution time
were fully exploited. A shuttle memory
size estimate should add another 10%-20%
over the equivalent Apollo word count to
allow for this fact (i.e., the shuttle Primary
computer will not have limited memory and
size restrictions)
• A pad must be added to any software es-
timate derived from such a comparison as
assumed here. A 25%-50% increment should
be allowed after the above efforts have been
accounted for
Accounting for the 32-bit word length, as re-
commended, will decrease the word count 50%-60%
of the extrapolated 15-bit total, due to half-word
instruction and floating-point arithmetic economics.
It should be noted that although 50K, 32-bit
words are baselined for Mk II the resident on-
board GN&C program will be somewhat reduced.
This is accomplished by utilizing overlay techniques
with serial execution of the various mission phases.
This technique will also be used for the enhanced
Mk II onboard checkout (OBC) and the additional •"
mission control processing (MCC) required. Serious
consideration for mass memory in the Mk I baseline
is under study in order to provide overlay processing
of Mk I GN&C functions as well as enhanced OBC
processing.
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SIZE AND SPEED ESTIMATES (CONT)
.Modify ing .Factors
• HOL Implementation 15,000
;, ~ • Non-Optimum Code Sharing . 5,000
• PAD 20,000
40,000
Total: Function Sizing Plus Modifying Factors .
"'. '
 : . . . " 52,500
40,000
92,500 15-Bit Words
Accounting for 32-Bit Word Implementation
Equivalent Words: 46,250 (Half as Many Words, Twice as
Many Bits)
Inefficiency Factor: 5,000 ,
 ;
5^250 V ' - . . . .
Grand Total 50,000 32-Bit Words
..14,1
The period just prior to landing may present the
most critical speed loading requirement for the
computer. At this time the computer may be re-
quired to perform all of the following four functions.
• Correct Position, Velocity by Incorporating
Radio Data - Assuming an eleven state filter
and an update interval of 5 seconds, 30,000
fixed-point equivalent adds (E-adds) per
update was estimated for the computational
burden. Accounting for the once per five
second duty cycle yields 6,000 "E-adds"
per second.
• Processing of IMU Data - The Delco Magic
III computer has approximately the same
add speed, but half the multiply speed,
as the AGC. We presume that it is 80% as
fast as the AGC. In processing Carousel
data it runs at about 75% duty cycle. The
AGC can process about 44,000 "E-adds"
per second. We therefore estimate that
the processing of IMU data will require:
.8 x .75 x 44,000 = 27,000 "E-adds"/second
Computation of Desired Heading, Elevation,
and Roll, and Control of Pitch, Yaw, and Roll
Rate- Based on AGC experience, it is reason-
able to expect an update rate of ten per
second and a doubling in complexity. These
functions, therefore, are estimated to re-
quire about 20,000 "E-adds" per second.
Computations for display should not re-
quire more than another 10,000 "E-adds"
per second.
Totals Item 1 6,000
Item 2 27,000
Item 3 20,000
Item 4 10.000
63,000 (Fixed-point
equivalent adds
per second)
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COMPUTER SPEED REQUIREMENTS
Period Just Prior to Landing
TASKS
Item 1 Correct Position, Velocity by Incorporating Radio Data
Item 2 IMU Data Processing (One IMU Only)
Item 3 Compute Desired Attitude, Attitude Errors
Item 4 Display Desired Attitude, Attitude Errors
.743
Floating-point operations, if performed by hard-
ware, are typically about twice as slow as single-pre-
cision fixed-point adds. Algorithm implementation,
utilizing floating-point operations, degrades approxi-
mately 10% when attendant fixed-point operations
are accounted for, based on a preliminary analysis
using the IBM 4ir AP-1 characteristics. However, the
estimates for items 2, 3 and 4 (below) involved extrap-
olating computation time based on executing similar
computations in other computers. It is likely that only
50% of the operations in items 2, 3, and 4 will actu-
ally involve operations that should be done in floating-
point. Item 1 on the other hand should be done essen-
tially completely in floating-point.. Therefore, to
extrapolate to a machine that executes floating-point
arithmetic at about a 10% speed disadvantage, the-
following table estimates the fixed-point equivalent
adds per second speed requirement: (reference chart)
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Total
6,600
28,350
21,000
10,500
66,450 (fixed-point equivalent adds
per second)
Finally, based on the aforementioned preliminary
analysis, software floating-point is about 10 times
slower than fixed-point arithmetic operations. In this
case, the numbers would total as follows:
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Total
60,000
135,000
100,000
50,000
345,000 (fixed-point equivalent adds
per second)
We now invert these numbers to obtain the
fixed-point add time required for the shuttle com-
puter:
• Case 1 - Everything in fixed-point arithmetic
16 microsec. add time
• Case 2 - Floating-point hardware
15 microsec. add time
• . Case 3 - Floating-point software
3 microsec. add time
Floating-point hardware is, therefore, baselined for the
Grumman/Boeing Avionics System. Although the
above analysis is somewhat immature, it clearly shows
a significant margin of safety in computer timing
utilization (approx. 15% utilized).
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COMPUTER SPEED REQUIREMENTS (CONT)
TOTALS
Casel: " All Fixed Point Operations
16_ jusee Fixed Point Add Time
Case 2: Floating Point Hardware
15 ysec Fixed Point Add Time
Case 3: Floating Point Software :
-\; ; , ''-3psec''Fixed Point'Add Time '"'
1.45
During the study period, Grumman investigated
the technical and cost benefits that would be derived
from utilizing several cost reduction techniques. The
net effect of these measures is implicit in the cost
analysis.
The following charts summarize the technical
aspects of these cost reduction measures considered
during the study.
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AVIONIC SOFTWARE COST REDUCTION ANALYSIS
• Centralized/Distributed Computer Systems
• Application of High Order Language Compiler
• Application of Floating Point
• Software Cost Drivers
• Software Development Risks
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In the course of the Avionics Study, several com-
puting configurations were examined. The system
selected and baselined is distributed with four com-
puting centers, as follows:
• Primary Computer (PC). The navigation,
guidance, and control computations, sensor
processing, OBC and mission control func-
tions
• Air Data Computer (ADC). The air data
sensor processing
• Flight Control Computer (FCC). The
digital flight control and inner loop auto-
pilot functions
• Data Acquisition Controller (DAQC). Rea-
sonableness tests and limiting checking of
data from remote acquisition units.
The distributed approach was selected based
on the groundrule of phased development (FHF,
Mk I and Mk II) and advantages obtained in minimi-
zing peak annual funding.
The technical rationale leading to the choice of
a distributed system is as follows:
• The distributed system leads to a high degree
of software modularity in that separate
functions are virtually self-contained
• The separation of the computing functions
into distinct computers permit a higher de-
gree of verification independent of system
integration
• Separation of functions forces early defini-
tion of system interfaces which can lead to
overall cost savings
• The distributed approach permits better
management visibility on cost and schedule
matters
• The distributed system is highly compatible
with the phased approach to avionics de-
velopment.
The following advantages of the centralized ap-
proach were assessed from the viewpoint of compati-
bility with the groundrules of the low-cost avionics
study:
• • More-flexibility and adaptability to change
is offered by a centralized system. In a dis-
tributed system, the major interfaces are
cemented in hardware
• A greater burden is placed on the systems
integration function
• Less equipment is added to the vehicle
which leads to a lesser number of failure
modes and "back-up" cases.
• A pitfall of defining system interfaces be-
fore system requirements, which can hap-
pen with distributed systems is avoided
with the centralized approach.
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CENTRALIZED/DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS
SOFTWARE IMPACTS
• Distributed System Selected
- Air Data Computer
- Incremental Flight Control Computer
- Data Acquisition Computers
- Primary On-Board Computer
• Rationale
- Software Development Management Is Improved by the Separation of Disciplines
Into Specialized Groupings
- Software Fault Isolation Is Enhanced During System Checkout and Verification
- Distributive Approach Permits Parallel Development of Separated Avionic Functions
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The use of a higher order compiler language
(HOL) is baselined for Shuttle software development.
Primary reasons for this recommendation are: 1. to
enhance communications among many contributors,
cooperating toward a common goal, and 2, to reduce
the amount of necessary verification by preventing
the occurrence of certain classes of errors in the first
place. Both reasons contribute significantly to a re-
duction in overall software development costs.
An Improvement in Communications
In this context communications are meant to
include requirements and specifications, descriptions,
all forms of documentation, methods of configura-
tion and change control, management visibility and
the technical exchanges, written and oral, that must
occur among engineers, analysts, and programmers.
Additional significant factors are included on the
chart.
Reduction in Verification Effort
The production of software can be divided into
two phases: preparation and verification. Any
method which can ease the verification burden will
reduce overall cost and improve reliability. An
organized approach to the prevention of errors is
such a method, and a HOL can be instrumental in
prevention. That this assertion is true can be seen
by comparing the probability of error when using
assembler and compiler coding techniques. Addi-
tional major advantages of a compiler language are
the-ability to perform extensive checking at compile
time and the opportunity to structure and modula-
rize programs.
Compiler Disadvantages
The skilled assembly programmer produces
better assembly language code than HOLwould in the
orgininal coding phase. But, following the inevitable
patching of programs during first system checkout,
the HOL (which regularly recompiles the model) gen-
erated Code has suffered less deterioration in coding
efficiency. The overall effect is that HOL program
efficiency is not appreciably degraded compared to
assembly language program. Typically, real-time
control and I/O interface programs require special
code to function effectively. HOL is not well suited
for this purpose. Therefore, real-time systems coded
in HOL will inevitably have assembly language sec-
tions.
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HIGH ORDER LANGUAGE COMPILER APPLICATION
• Advantages of Higher Order Language Compiler:
- Clearness and Readability of Higher Level Language Improves Communications
Between Problem Definers, Software Designers and Programmers
— Better Enforcement of Standards and Conventions
— Better Documentation (Automatic Flow Chart Generators)
— Easier to Learn, Write, Understand, and "Think-In"
— Easy to Modify and Debug - Better Detection of Problems and Clerical Errors
— Operate on System Model at a Higher Level of Abstraction
— Easy to Vary System Model
- Reduction in Verification Effort by Elimination of Certain Errors
• Disadvantages:
- All Real-Time Control Module Can Not be Written Completely in a Higher
Level Language
- Programmer is Usually Prohibited From Applying Whatever Knowledge He
Might Have of the Object Machine
- Efficiency of Object Code Execution Usually Lower Than Assembly Language
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During the course of the study, the utilization
of floating-point vs fixed-point computation was ex-
amined. Implementation of fixed and floating-point
was evaluated by examining hardware and software
mechanizations.
The results clearly indicate that cost reduction
(approximately 10%) is obtained by utilizing hard-
ware floating-point for the Primary computer.
Floating-point hardware was selected over software
based upon the timing utilization advantages offered.
Emplementation of a high order language
compiler is also improved by the availability of
floating-point instructions in the object computer.
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FLOATING POINT APPLICATION
• Advantages of Floating Point Arithmetic:
- Scaling Analysis Greatly Eased
- Simplifies Program Development
- Eliminates Error
- Simplifies Program Changes and Maintenance
- Increased Feasibility of Utilizing Higher Level Languages
- Memory Requirements Lessened
• Disadvantages:
- Increased Hardware Costs
- Increased Computational Time Requirements
— Software Floating Point
— Hardware Floating Point
Hardware Floating Point Application Selected;
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The study attempted to identify those items
which could impact the development cycle and
which would tend to act as high cost drivers.
These items were culled from the experience
gained from Apollo by Grumman/Boeing and its
associates and from the Grumman experience on
the F-14A, E-2C and A-6E Projects.
Both the number of delivered software
articles and the number of software impacting
hardware configuration changes directly bear on
the software development costs. Every major
change to an established software article precip-
itates a complete testing and verification cycle
for the system software.
A significant cost driver is "Man-Rating
vs Interim Operational Capability" and deals
with the introduction of the astronaut into the
onboard processing loop. This cost driver refers
to changes to the program to satisfy unique
operating mode requested changes, rather than
to changes that modify or expand the software
computational functions. To offset the effects
of this cost driver, it is recommended that the
man-machine interfaces be defined early in the
program and be treated with the same rigidity as
any other interface.
The remaining cost drivers are summarized
on the chart and are self-explanatory.
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HIGH COST DRIVERS-SOFTWARE
• Number of Delivered Software Articles
• Number of Hardware Configuration Changes
• Orderly Development/Avoid Saturation, Peak Loading
• Man Rating vs Interim Operational Capability
• Adequacy of Computer Size, Speed
• Adequacy of Support Software
• Failure Detection/Switchover/Configuration Management
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Software development by its very nature provides
risks because its delivered form is a unique end-item.
This fact is particularly true of Shuttle avionics soft-
ware since no directly related effort (even Apollo)
provides applicable off-the-shelf software. Individual
hardware elements may each be truly shelf items;
however, their combination interfaced to a computer
causes a unique configuration for software implemen-
tation. The chart indicates some of the more signifi-
cant risks in avionics software since they are dependent
upon early decisions in the development cycle.
• Computer Speed/Size - The selection of the
flight and ground computers of necessity
must be made early in the program. It is,
therefore, important to base these selections
upon carefully derived processing estimates in
order to avoid redesign of software or the
more serious reprocurements of larger, faster
processing capability. The risk associated
with under-sizing memory and speed is one of
increased costs and program delays caused by
major redesign activities
Hardware Incompatibility - The mix of
equipments required for onboard functions
introduces hardware/software compatibility
problems. Interface design and the coordina-
tion of the proper interchange between hard-
ware systems, computing hardware, and
executable software represents an important
development risk. The Integrated Avionics
Test Laboratory (IATL) and its ability to
exercise all subsystems, and their interfaces
with the flight software shall provide the
means to minimize risk. An orderly and rig-
orous system checkout of all combinations of
subsystem functions is required to establish
hardware/software compatibility
Level of Autonomy - The level on onboard
autonomy required for checkout represents
a significant development risk. The greater
the amount of independent autonomy on-
board compared to ground dependency, the
greater the development risks. Criteria of
crew safety and mission criticality must be
rigorously applied to minimize this risk
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SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT RISKS
• Speed/Size
• Level of Autonomy
- OBC
- MCC
• Software Reliability
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It should be recognized that this report does
not conclude the software requirements effort for the
Low-Cost Avionics. Many areas of additional activity
have arisen as an outgrowth of this study. Some of
the more (Dressing of these are outlined. The past
experience of Apollo and of the other Grumman
flight software efforts indicates that the software
activities can never be started too early. The bulk of
the high cost and risk drivers outlined in this report
can be offset by proceeding with these software inves-
tigations now.
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AREAS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
• Selection of Flight Computers
• Definition of Simulation Facility Requirements
• Redundancy, Failure Recovery Implementation
• Definition of Data Interfaces Between Computers
• First Layout of Software for Flight Computers
• Define Software Configuration Management Plan
• Executive Structure
• Software Reliability
• Utilization of KSC Facilities for Flight Test
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MAJOR ELEMENTS OF ORBITER DESIGN DEVELOPMENT TEST & EVALUATION PLAN
System Design System Development System Operations
Scientific Computing
(Non-real Time)
System Simulation
(Real Time)
Dual Seat Motion Base
Breadboard Testing
Electrical \
„ . ,. > Test BenchsHydraulic
Avionics Software Develop-
ment Lab (FHF & FMOF Mk
I, Mk II)
Full mission Simulation Lab
(FHF & FMOF)
Flight Control/Hydraulic
Test Lab (FHF)
Integrated Avionics Test
Lab (FMOF Mkl, Mkll)
ASDL (FHF, FMOF, MKI, MKII)
FMSL (FHF)
FCHTL (FHF)
IATL (FMOF, Mk I, Mk II)
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LOW COST AVIONICS INTEGRATED DESIGN
DEVELOPMENT TEST SCHEDULE
Dual Seat Motion Base
(DSMB)
72 | 73| 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 ,78 , 79 , 80, 81, 82 , 83 , 84
• Design & Fabrication
^^•Engineering Simulations
Full Mission
Simulator Lab.
(FMSL)
iDesign & Fabrication
•^•Engineering Simulations
FMSL + FCHTL iFHF 6 DOF Tests (Phase II)FlightTest Support
FMOFFCS Tests
Flight Control/
Hydraulic Test Lab
(FCHTL)
FHF 6 DOF Tests (Phase I)
! Flight Control System Design Evaluation Tests
f Design & Fabrication
Integrated Avionic
Test Lab
(IATL)
i Design & Fabrication
••FMOFMk I 6 DOF Tests
^•••FMOF Operations Support
••MklJ Avionics Installation
^^Mk II 6 DOF Tests
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Software development is an iterative process of
analysis design, verification and modification. This
flow graph serves to indicate the ordered repetitive
process of flight program software development. This
repetitive process is necessary since the software re-
presents a potential single-point failure during its
development cycle, in an otherwise redundant
system.
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SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT FLOW GRAPH
Program
Specification
Algorithm
Control Law
Formulation
(FMSL)
Code/Debug
Interpretive
Simulation
(ASDL)
Flight Computer
Hdw/Sftw Verific
(IATL)/(FCHTL)
Off-Line Simulations
Design Phase
Major Glitch
Development & Verification
Phases
End Item
FSRR
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• Existing GAC facility
• 3 DOF motion capability, roll-pitch-heave
• 6 DOF virtual image displays
• 6 DOF all math model hybrid computing
facility (GAC/NASA)
• 2 seat cabin mockup with functional con-
trols and displays
TEST CAPABILITIES AND OBJECTIVES
• Full aero capabilities from 400K alt to
touchdown
• conceptual design and design trade-offs
• Flying/handling qualities evaluation
• Displays and controls evaluation
• Flight control system design evalua-
tion
• Guidance and navigation system design
evaluation
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DUAL SEAT MOTION BASE SIMULATOR
2 CRT & Pancake Windows
(ONE For Each Window)
3D OF Hydraulic
Motion Device
2-Place Crew
Enclosure
TV Camera
Range Drive'
Electronics Console
To
Computers
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• Avionics - math modeled
• Non-avionics - math modeled
• Flight controls - math modeled
• Controls & displays - simulated/flight
hardware
TEST CAPABILITIES AND OBJECTIVES
• Full mission, 6 DOF, man-in-the-loop
simulations
• Design constraints and requirements
• PCS algorithm and formulation
• G&N algorithm and formulation
• Controls and displays formating and trade-
offs
• Flying/handling qualities evaluation
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FULL
(FMSL)
MISSION SIMULATION LABORATORY
Pancake Window & CRT
Display
Terrain Model
3-Axis Gantry
TV Camera &
3DOF Optical
Head
Operating &
Monitor Console
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• Avionics - FHF flight set
• Non-avionics - math modeled
• Flight controls - flight set
• Controls & displays - flight type/simulated
• Dimensionally true structural mockup (aft 70 ft)
of flight control surfaces, actuator hinge points,
hydraulic distribution system and FHF avionics
ships set with 6 DOF dynamics capability
• Phase I testing - Design evaluation testing of PCS.
Subsystem avionics integration tests. Subsystem
6 DOF verification tests.
• Phase II testing - FCHTL & FMSL integrated for
FHF combined subsystem hardware/software ver-
ification and mission performance certification.
• Flight test operations support - FHF flight test
anomily and engineering change proposal investiga-
tions
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HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT ARRANGEMENT ON FCHTL
Nose Gear Hydraulic Sys
Forshortened for Demand
Tests
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• Avionics - Mk & Mk II ships set
• Non-avionics - math model
• Flight controls - flight type/math model
• Controls & displays - Mk I & Mk II ships set
TEST CAPABILITIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR FMOF
MKI&MKII
• Hardware/software verification
• Malfunction and reconfiguration studies
• Avionics system hardware interface evaluation
• Avionics to Non-avionics system hardware interface
evaluation
• Avionics system performance verification
• Mission performance verification
• Final crew training, max one week
• FMOF flight test operations support, real time and
post-flight
• FMOF flight test anomaly and system modification
evaluation
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LOW COST AVIONICS INTEGRATED DESIGN DEVELOPMENT
TEST TOTAL COST ESTIMATE
| 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84
FCHTL 46 91 66 45
FMSL 17 67 45 39
FMSL + 65 65 65
FCHTL
DSMB 25 27 13
IATL 89 75 60 60 85 60 32
Totals 88 185 125 84 154 140 125 60 85 60 32 S24.53M
(Man Yrs)
Material 2.5 3.5 2.75 2.0 5.0 3.5 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.5 S25.75M
O&M
($M)
Program Total S50.28M
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II
Operational
GSE C/0
Required for vehicle management
- Operation (turn ON/OFF)
- Redundancy selection (system level)
— Caution/Warning surveillance
70% of operational measurements required
to monitor and operate non-avionic sub-
systems
Required for pre/post-flight requirement to
fault isolate to the lowest replaceable assem-
bly
— Additional data points are needed, over
and above operational, to fault isolate
beyond system level
62% of GSE c/o points required for avionics
subsystems LRU fault isolation
- Maximum potential for pre/post-flight
checkout transfer to vehicle for Mk II
(checkout autonomy) configuration in
avionics subsystems
Dedicated DPI
• Dedicated development measurements are
added to meet specific test objectives. Se-
lected operational data points are used in
conjunction with dedicated DPI for verifica-
tion of vehicle system performance
Measurement sizing data contained in this docu-
ment have been generated over the period of the low
cost study and therefore minor differences in summa-
tion tables exist. Effort has been made to reference
the baseline measurement list data on each table and
to use the most current information available for
sizing purposes.
Measurement list configuration control docu-
ments will be in effect for the orbiter/booster vehi-
cles. A continuing effort of update and refinement
will be expended in order to provide essential sizing
information for the Data Acquisition Systems and to
provide vehicle system configuration.
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ORBITER/BOOSTER
MEASUREMENT REQUIREMENTS
Operational Dedicated
DPI
GSE C/0
FHF
Orbiter
Booster
334
400
700
1056
«730
«800
Mkl
Orbiter
Booster
1050
650
967
1760
1596
1350
Mkll
Orbiter
Booster
1060
650
389
200
1596
1350
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Phase B vs Low Cost Avionics - Comparitive Mea-
surement Data
The Phase B measurement requirements were
sized to fault isolate to the LRU for pre/post-flight
checkout purposes.
The low cost avionics measurements derivation
review resulted in a comparable total number of mea-
surements required (2818 vs 2652) to accomplish the
same level of fault isolation. Sequential studies were
performed that identified the following operational
measurements:
• Those required by the crew, inflight, to
operate the vehicle systems
• Identified critical measurements to be moni-
tored for system fault detection
• Provide the crew with sufficient data to en-
able system redundancy selection
A second phase of the investigation was initi-
ated to identify measurements that are required, in
conjunction with operational measurements, to fault
isolate to an LRU for pre/post-flight checkout. To
minimize the total number required, operational
measurements were used as a baseline for system
level fault detection and measurements added to
fault isolate to an LRU.
A subsystem measurement comparison will
evidence a considerable difference in total measure-
ment numbers. In many cases, these differences are
due to a basic design change in the measured sub-
system (i.e., EPD).
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LOW COST AVIONICS SYS, ORBITER MEASUREMENT
COMPARISON (PHASE B vs LOW COST AVIONICS)
Subsystem
Aux Mech Systems
Cryo & Prop. Tanks
Elect Pwr Dirt
Elect Pwr Gen
Hydraulics
Turbo Jet Prop.
ECS/Life Support
Orbit Man. Prop.
Primary Prop.
Attitude Control Prop.
Structure & Thermal Protection
Crew Provision
Aero Surfaces
Payload
GN&C
Flight Controls
Telecommunications
Instrumentation
Data Management
"Primary Prop. Recorded Measurments
**TPS & Structural Recorded Measurements
Subtotal
Total
Phase B
(150)
12
695
164
65
123
167
236
277
253
89
24
(75)
13
102
(210)
163
_
2383
(435)
2818
Operational
30
24
39
76
17
69
46
28
68»
109
18"
_
6
72
61
79
48
8
2
800
(244)
(12)
1056
GSE
-
62
39
39
-
6
-
68
96
332
-
-
-
-
170
692
84
—
47
1596
1596
2652
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ORBITER/BOOSTER VEHICLE CHECKOUT
FHF
ONBOARD Onboard checkout functions con-
CHECKOUT sist of status monitoring to a veh-
CAPABILITY icle function accomplished by pro-
grammed limit checking of data.
ThJs will be mechanized along the
following lines:
• A large percentage of the avionic
equipment present in the first
horizontal flight vehicle is of
recent commercial or military de-
sign, and incorporates some de-
gree of built in test capability.
• Programmed limit checking
provided by the data acquisition
controller.
• The caution and warning display
panel and dedicated displays
provides crew and/or ground
checkout personnel with status
display
While in flight, the above capability
will display system status, detect
failures, isolate to a functional path,
assist in redundancy management,
and provide telemetry and record-
ing of data. During ground checkout
the onboard capability will be used
as an adjunct to the process of main-
tenance, repair, and preflight ac-
ceptance testing.
Mkl
At the time of the first manned
orbital flight, onboard checkout will
provide expanded status monitoring
and fault isolation to include sys-
tems added for the orbital mission.
• Onboard fault isolation will be
improved by the addition of
more sophisticated techniques
such as cross correlation of data
from redundant subsystems and
"time rate of change reasonable-
ness tests
As orbital missions are extended and
insufficient communications cover-
age creates a need for greater vehi-
icle autonomy, ground based check-
out functions will be added to the
vehicle as needed. For ground check-
out, the onboard capability will func-
tion as an adjunct to maintenance
and acceptance testing.
Mkll
During the Mk II program,
there will be a gradual trans-
fer of checkout authority
from the ground complex to
the vehicle, accomplished on
a subsystem by subsystem
basis. The vehicle will evolve
towards semi-autonomous
checkout, with the evolution
based upon flight, operational
and ground test experience
gained in earlier program
phases.
In the Mk II configuration, the
GSE data acquisition control-
ler formerly part of the CSE,
will become part of the vehicle
data acquisition system. This
change, along with increased
computer capability, will per-
mit increased onboard isolation
to the equipment replaceable
assembly. Additionally it will
provide automation of check-
lists, and command initiated
self-test during flight.
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ORBITER/BOOSTER VEHICLE CHECKOUT (Cont.)
GROUND
BASED
CHECKOUT
EQUIPMENT
FHF
Ground checkout equipment will be
required for two functions:
• As a supplement to the onboard
determination of system "Go/No-
Go" status, permitting a greater
depth of test
• To provide fault isolation to an
equipment replaceable assembly,
• since the onboard checkout will
usually isolate only to a func-
tional path, and built-in-test in
individual equipments will not
isolate to black box in all cases
• Onboard non-redundant GSE
RAU's and a ground based data
acquisition controller will acquire
and condition GSE measurements
required for fault isolation to the
equipment replaceable assembly.
Mkl
The ground checkout complex will
perform a semi-automated checkout
of the vehicle, and in the event of a
malfunction will fault isolate to
the equipment replaceable assem-
bly. As orbital flight experience
permits, ground based checkout func-
tions will be gradually transferred to
the vehicle, and more autonomous
vehicle functions will be progres-
sively proved out.
M k l l
The ground checkout equip-
ment will continue to func-
tion as a tool in the mainte-
nance and preflight checkout
of the vehicle providing:
• A greater depth of test
than the onboard function,
to assure isolation to the
replaceable assembly in
cases where the OBC or
BIT are limited
• Testing of the vehicle and
its systems by exercising
them in an "end-to-end"
• Trending analyses of vehi-
cle systems
• Control of service equip-
. ment and other GSE
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Dedicated/Integrated Instrumentation
Dedicated DFI
Accommodates low (PCM) and high (FM)
frequency data requirement.
• Advantages
— Qualification, procurement, installation
and data reduction independent of oper-
ational programs
- Maximum flexibility to respond to vari-
ous requirements as identified
- Generally lower black box costs
per measurement channel.
• Disadvantages
- Normal implementation techniques im-
pose weight/penetration penalties for
electrical harness
— No operational application for develop-
ment equipment after flight test pro-
gram completion
Integrated DFI/OFI
Accommodates operational requirements, (dis-
play, caution and warning, TM), low frequency DFI
and high frequency data (FM).
• Advantages
— Optimized (weight and data handling
techniques) to recover both operational
measurements and development data.
• Disadvantages
- Type and data requirements (frequency)
of DFI measurements preclude a practical
integrated system being proposed that
will be cost effective.
-- FM data recovery is not required for
the operational configuration and
would represent a major portion of
the integrated system.
- Necessary flexibility of development
test program would impose an un-
warranted impact on operational data
recovery requirements.
Common Hardwire (Recommended Concept)
Use operational hardware when possible to re-
cover DFI data. High frequency DFI data (FM) is
recovered with dedicated DFI equipment.
• Advantages
- Reduced program procurement and
qualification costs
— Return to inventory as operational spares
for further cost effectiveness
- Reduced impact of conventional DFI
electrical harness weight and penetrations
- Maintains flexibility for modification in
a development program
• Disadvantages
- Allocation of DFI measurements must be
made within type and range limitations
of operational equipment thus it may re-
quire some unique implementation for
special data recovery requirements.
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DEDICATED/INTEGRATED INSTRUMENTATION
DATA RECOVERY SYSTEMS
OPERATIONAL, DEVELOPMENT, AND GSE CHECKOUT
(MK I CONFIGURATION SHOWN)
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DEDICATED/INTEGRATED INSTRUMENTATION CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation of dedicated vs integrated in-
strumentation systems indicates that common data
recovery system hardware used for operational and
selected (low frequency) development requirements
will be effective in simplification of procurement prac-
tices and implementation techniques thereby yielding
on overall reduction in program costs.
Implementation of a common data recovery sys-
tem (RAU) is extended to the GSE checkout require-
ments to resolve the immediate problem of GSE ac-
cessibility (i.e., numerous GSE cables to black box
connectors) enhancing the total preparation cycle re-
quired for pre/post-flight checkout. Common GSE
equipment will substantially reduce the integration
impacts associated with transferring fault isolation to
the lowest replaceable assembly requirement from
ground dependence on Mk I to near atonomy in the
Mk II configuration. Transferral will be an evolution-
ary process and minimal vehicle impact is expected
due to the existence of compatible hardware installa-
tion.
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(MEASUREMENT REQUIREMENTS
The following tables break down measure-
ments required for checkout of the low cost
avionics orbiter. These are in two groups:
• Operational measurements required to deter-
mine that vehicle systems are functioning
properly
• GSE measurements required to troubleshoot
a malfunctioning system or systems, to per-
mit isolation of a defective replaceable as-
sembly
Within each group, measurements have been summa-
rized by system into categories:
• Analog values to be measured
• Digital values
• Discrete events
Additionally, for each system, we have estimated the
typical sampling rate, and the worst case (or maxi-
mum) sampling rate which will be required of the
data acquisition hardware. i
The measurements presented in these two tables
were obtained by experienced spacecraft checkout !
personnel in consultation with cognizant Grumman .
design engineers for the various orbiter systems, and '
are of interest to the support effort for the following'
purposes:
• Overall measurement counts and their analog/
digital/discrete subsets are indicative of the
required capacity for the checkout system, j
Thus, in estimating the technical scope of
our four alternate concepts, we have used \
these dimensions to "size" the ground check-
out system
• Estimated sampling rates are indicative of the
required bandwidth'and general form for the
data acquisition system and its correspond-
ing checkout system interface .
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SHUTTLE OPERATIONAL MEASUREMENTS REQUIRE-
MENTS (ORBITER VEHICLE) EXCLUDING GSE
MEASUREMENTS
Auxiliary
Cryogenics ft Propulsion Tankage
Electrical Power Distribution
Electrical Power Generation
Guidance, Navigation & Conuol
Hydraulics
Turbojet Propulsion
Date Management
Environ Control/Life Support
Navigation Aid!
Primary Propulsion
Attitude Control Propulsion
Struct & Thermal Protection
Telecommunications
Crew Provisions
Display & Control
Instrumentation
Aero Surfaces
Flight Control
Payload Deployment & Retrieval
Orbit Maneuvering System
Total ..
•Accounted for in Other Entries
Total
Maes
30
30
38
98
61
17
57
27
46
28
*
312
104
30
20
"
•
8
6
87
72
1049
Analog
3
2
24
SI
38
13
44
24
33
14
0
168
SB
IS
11
0
0
1
6
39
SO
582
Dig
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
-
-
-
IS
24
Disc-
rete
27
28
14
47
20
4
13
0
13
14
0
144
46
15
6
0
0
7
-
48
7
443
Telmetry
30
0
0
0
61
17
0
27
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
6
29
7
185
SPS
Sampl'g
Rate
(Max)
1
10
10
1
TBD
100
1
100
1
100
-
100
1
t
Clock
-
_
1
1
SO
t
IOO/
SPS
Sempl'g
Rate
ITyp.l
1
1
1
1
TBO
1
1
100
1
1
-
10
1
t
1
-
_
1
1
1
1
1
• Maturiment tW 1
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SHUTTLE GSE MEASUREMENTS REQUIREMENTS
(ORBITER VEHICLE) USED FOR SYSTEM
FAULT ISOLATION
Auxiliary
Cryogenics ft Propulsion, Tankage
Electrical Power Distribution
Electrical Power Generation
Guidance, Navigation & Control
Hydraulics
Turbojet Propulsion
Data Management
Environ Control/Life Support
Navigation Aids
Primary Propulsion
Attitude Control Propulsion
Struct & Thermal Protection
Telecommunications
Crew Provisions
Display & Control
Instrumentation
Aero Surfaces
Flight Control
Payload Deployment & Retrieval
Orbit Maneuvering System
Total . *"
Total
Meas
.
62
39
•
170
•
6
47
*
•
96
416
-
84
•
•
•
•
686
•
64
1670
Ami
0
50
39
0
103
0
0
2
0
0
96
416
-
79
0
0
0
0
360
0
64
1209
Dig
0
-
0
0
1
-
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
38
Bh-
creta
0
12
0
0
65
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
0
0
326
0
0
423
Telm-
Mry
0
0
0
0
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
SPS
Samprg
Riu
(M»)
1
1
_
1
-
-
Clock
-
-
1
1
-
1
-
-
1
_
1
-
1
10R
SPS
Sampl'g
Ran
(Typ)
1
1
_
1
-
-
Clock
-
1
1
-
1
-
-
1
-
1
-
1
'
"Accounted for In Other Entries
"•Meisuramant List Raf 2.5 Oct 1971
187"
This chart is intended to convey a conceptual
understanding of the relationship between orbiter or
booster systems, GSE, etc. The interface concept is
that nearly all vehicle measurements will be trans-
mitted to the checkout equipment in two PCM paths;
one from the onboard Data Acquisition Controller, the
other from the portable GSE Data Acquisition Con-
troller. There will be uplink stimuli and certain atypi-
cal system measurements which will not be suitable
for transmission in the PCM stream, so that tentative
provisions have been made for about 100 hard wires.
In addition to the PCM and hard wire interface,
the new equipment concept provides a receiver for
acquisition of telemetred measurements, and also pro-
vides a playback unit to make information from the
on-board recorder available to the checkout system.
(This permits trend analysis, evaluation of vehicle sys-
tems which cannot be operated on the ground, diag-
nosis of "intermittant" problems, etc.)
The interface between the checkout system and
mechanical, fluid, and gaseous/propellant support
equipment is tentatively defined as the UTE standard
digital interface mechanized by ground support inter-
face units (GSIU's) which are part of the UTE equip-
ment. As the program develops, this tentative con-
cept should be examined to see whether the service
equipment should be so modified to adapt to the
checkout equipment, or vice versa.
The major change in interface from Mk I to
Mk II occurs when the GSE Data Acquisition Con-
troller becomes part of the vehicle, and the onboard
data management system becomes more autonomous.
To the degree that this permits more onboard check-
out, ground requirements decrease.
The most significant feature of the vehicle to
ground interface as it is now visualized is that the
number of connect points are minimized in the inte-
rest of expeditious checkout. If all of the required
measurements had to be acquired by hard lines, there
would be a lengthy connection process with inherent
cable and connector reliability problems. It is diffi-
cult to imagine meeting peak flight schedules if the
ground checkout system were to be burdened with
these problems. By contrast, the present interface
concept offers a rapid and reliable means for getting
on and off the vehicle.
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ORBITER/BOOSTER GROUND
CHECKOUT INTERFACE (MKI)
(PCM) Operational
Measurements
Support
To Cen-
tral
Data
Facility
Modems
1
(2)
. Displav
* Contro
Aux Data
Module
MaK
 MMemory ™
Module
& (8)
1 Modules
Fila
)dule5
 Data
(3) Module
Recorde
Playbac
Haid Copy
Modules
(2)
1
Controller
r
k
M
Be
of
fo
k l
comes Part
Vehicle
rMkll
<
GSIU's
(2)
— *
^+
(Mech)
Fluid Support
Equipment
Gas Support
Equipment
189
Comparison of the Phase B configuration with
the low cost avionics configuration leads to the con-
clusion that a change to low cost avionics will not
materially affect vehicle turn-around. Assuming that
there are 30 available working days from recovery to
launch, our preliminary analysis indicates that the
avionic servicing will consume less than 6% of this
. time, so that other vehicle servicing requirements,
notably those associated with engines and thermal
protection system will continue to be of more signifi-
cance.
The 6% value was arrived at as follows:
• From reliability analysis, the overall avionic
failure rate is given as 12.439 x 10^ per
hour. For a 168 hour mission, we would
therefore expect a mean of 2.08 failures at
the time of recovery
• From experience, it is known that the rate
of maintenance actions will exceed the rate
of avionic system failure. This is true be-
cause:
— It is normal for a certain number of non-
defective avionic black boxes to be
changed as part of the troubleshooting
process
— Some avionic failures occur during the
checkout process
(To account for the above factors, and also
to allow for some degree of uncertainty in
the reliability data, we have (conservatively)
allowed a safety factor of ten between fail-
ure rate and maintenance action rate for
purposes of this analysis. This leads to an
estimate of 20.8 mean maintenance actions
per mission.)
• We assume that each maintenance action will
have an associated mean-time-to-restore of
four hours, which includes verification of
failure, fault isolation, removal, replacement,
and verification tests to ensure that the as-
sociated problem has been corrected. This
four hour value is consistent with aircraft
avionic practice
• Assuming a series-parallel repair process such
that 2/3 of the above maintenance actions
occur in parallel and the remaining 1 /3 are
constrained to occur in series, we estimate a
vehicle mean-time-to-restore of 27.8 hours,
or 1.74 days, based on a two-shift operation.
This is just under 6% of the available 30 days
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UTE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
Ute Sites
Hardware Development Lab
Software Development Lab
Orbiter Factory
Booster Factory
Space Environ Sim Lab (T/V Tests)
l/ortiral Pit Tact Qitp fl PUP! 1)
X/prtiral Fit Tpct *\ifp (I PUP! II)
Vertical Fit Test Site (Level 1)
Vertical Fit Test Site (Level 1)
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92i I i i i i i i i i i
IM
•
^1MB
H— M
• •
1
1
1
i i
I
1
4
—
—
—, ^ ^^^1
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1
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Development measurements
- Verify vehicle system performance
— Not used for real-time safety-of-flight
Measurement source
- Selected OFI Transducers or OFI/CU interface
— Dedicated DPI Transducers
— Data Management system
Data recovery
- All DPI PCM and FM data on-board recorded
• DPI PCM 100% telemetered
• DPI FM 30% telemetered (most critical
parameters)-cockpit selection of transmitted
data
General philosophy
— Share RAU& CU basic design with oper. instru.
and GSE
- Use F-14 FM system designs
- DFI pre-flight C/O thru use of dedicated C/0
carts
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FLIGHT TEST INSTRUMENTATION, DPI MEASUREMENT
REQUIREMENTS
Configuration
Mk(FHF)
(OrbiterNo. 1)
Mkl
(Orbiter No. 2)
Mkll
(Orbiter No. 3)
Oper Meas
Used
for DPI
216
898
SOI
Dedicated
DFI
Measmts
700
967
389
Total
DFI,
Measmts
916
1865*»
890"
No. of DFI
Measurements:
Recorded
On-Board
424*
1865
890
Tele-
metered
424
S58
172
No. of DFI Measurements
Required For:
Horiz
Fit
916
606
142
Vertical Fit
Boost/
Ascent
N/A
1477
760
Orbit
N/A
828
246
Entry
N/A
1331
S10
* Worst-Case Single Mission Requirement
* Total DFI Measurement Requirement; Final System
To Be Sized By:
1. Signal Patching or Reprogramming
2. Total System Recording, Data Reduction Strip-Out
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• Transducers/sensors for DPI utilization
— Utilize commercial equipment off-the-shelf
for the horizontal flight articles unique require-
ments; i.e., same approach used for military
aircraft test programs
— Utilize oper instru transducer designs for ded-
icated DPI measurements, when feasible to
affect hardware commonality/lower procure-
ment cost (fewer buys)
- Trade measurement requirements vs common-
ality to reduce transducer types and ranges
- Normalized output of DPI dedicated low-level
transducers by category/type to simplify sys-
tem calibration
— Redundant transducers are installed only for
measurements in non-accessible locations
• Data acquisition system (PCM)
- Data from dedicated DPI or OFI transducers
is conditioned and acquired by standard RAU
design
- DPI transducers not compatible with standard
RAU are pre-conditioned by dedicated signal
conditioning (15-20%)
- Operational data required for DPI merge is
obtained via OFI/CU - DFI/CU digital interface
- DPI CU outputs a parallel PCM stream for on-
board recording (1" dig. tape @ 30 min. record
time) and a serial PCM stream for telemetering
- Data channel scan sequence, gain and rate are
controlled by the CU which allows a flexible
system capable of expansion
• Data acquisition system (FM)
— Operational data required for recording will be
conditioned by DPI due to bandwidth require-
ments
- Standard IRIG proportional bandwidth & con-
stant bandwidth VOC's will be utilized. (13
tape tracks, 1" tape, track bandwidth 500KHz)
- When required, one tape track will be used for
wideband data (acoustic)
• Telemetry
- The system will merge the serial PCM stream with
one FM multiplex via pre mod mixer A; FM on
the baseband & PCM on a sub carrier.
— The second pre-mod mixer (B) will combine two
additional FM multiplex
- Each composite signal will deviate an S-band
solid state transmitter. The transmitters will be
combined by a diplexer and the resultant signal
will be transmitted
— A demodulator will be required on the ground to
strip out each data stream
- Any three FM multiplexers may be selected be-
fore or during flight.
• Time code system
- Standard IRIG-B time code format
- Modulated IKC for FM recording - SLO code also
available
- BCD digital time is supplied to CU for DPI time
on PCM recording and TM
— Time code will be synced with vehicle time
•^Calibration sequencer _
- All data channels will contain either a voltage
substitution or series/shunt RC stimulus
- Activation of stimulus maybe accomplished by
either cockpit control or during check-out by the
dedicated check-out cart.
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DPI SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Dedicated DPI check-out carts
- Modify design of existing check-out carts used
presently for F-14 test A/C
— Transportable carts permit system C/O &
validation at sub-assembly and assembly facil-
ities as well as launch site
— Carts truly transportable - approximately 10' x
2.5'x 6.5'
- Dedicated C/O carts permit DPI system C/O
independant of operational C/O
— C/O cart contains commercial off-the-shelf
hardware
— C/O via hardline or RF transmission
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S-Band
Rcvr
Scope
CHECK-OUT CART BLOCK DIAGRAM
\
Flight Test Instrumentation, DPI
Hard Line Coax
| Hard Line Coax
Calibration
Sequence
Initiator
DVM
Coax Patch
Sig. Distrib.
ACVTVM
Counter
Power
Reg & Dist
PCM
Decom
Programmable
via Card
(FM Data)
Switchable
Discrim PBW
CBW
Spectrum
Analyzer
*Mini
Computer
i
(
k
i — »
^_
b Printer
(Column)
I/O
Typewriter
Paper
Tape Reader
* Limit &Cal Check
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Equipment: Transducers/Sensors, Dedicated Signal
Conditions. Flight Recorders and Remote Acquisition
Units (RAU)
Transducer/Sensors
• Environmentally compatible with installation
location
— Benign environmental sensor installation
requirements will be implemented with
off-the-shelf spare qualified or delta
qualified commercial transducer sensors
- Unique implementation problem areas
-- Special Design will be required for the
following measurements due to envi-
ronmental factors: Quantity gaging
Cryogenics consumables and discrete '
switches and fire detection sensors
Integral RAU Signal Conditioning
• Accepts "standard" measurements in a raw
data format and converts directly to a serial
digital word for further data processing
• Wide range of standard sensor interface in-
puts (resistance thermometer, strain gage,
thermocouples, rpm, synchro/phase shift
LUDT, parallel digital words and precondi-
tioned 0 to 5 vdc)
Dedicated Signal Conditioning
• Provide normalization for unique measure-
ments that are unacceptable to the RAU in-
put requirements
• Normalize data for cockpit display require-
ments
- Quantity (capacitance, rf, or pressure)
- Volume/temperature (LOH)
— Angular velocity (wide range rpm)
• Design Requirements
— Unique electrical input/output matching
— Unique packaging (Hostile environments)
Data Recorders (3 Types)
• Flight Recorder (AR1NC 573 Data)
- 4 voice channels, locator beacon, data
- Mod comm/mil unit
• Maintenance Recorder (Boost and re-entry
data)
— Main Propulsion Data During Boost and
Thermal Protection environmental
history
- Space Qualified
• Telemetry Recorder (data log)
— Telemetry Compression
— Space Qualified
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OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM MK I/MK II
. -Opr InstrSubsys— __
| "
A • Analog
0 • Digital
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Sensor/Signal Redundancy Philosophy
Critical functions will be implemented to assure
that at least two isolated data recovery paths exist to
define the subsystem function status. Functional
status will be acquired using one or both of the fol-
lowing techniques:
• Simple Redundancy - Two sensors imple-
mented at the same point in the system to
recover the same data, i.e., two pressures,
two temperatures, etc. This method will be
used in cases where the second technique,
Functionally Related Measurements, is in-
adequate to provide basic redundant data
• Functionally Related Measurements - Dif-
ferent types of measurements, pressure,
quantity, temperature, that are functionally
related and can be used to deduce system
status in the event any single measurement
channel fails - (i.e., quantity of gas and
P/T using Boyles law)
Sensed information for critical measurements
will be processed through separate data channels and
presented to the crew as two separate pieces of in-
formation. For example, a discrete piece of data is
displayed to the crew via a caution and warning light
which can be verified through a related measure-
ment via a dedicated display.
Redundancy for Ease of Maintenance
In cases of severe impact concerning accessibility,
redundancy will be implemented if cost/weight ef-
fectiveness can be demonstrated for specific measure-
ments.
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LOW COST AVIONICS
INSTRUMENTATION
Functionally Related Measurementjr
Series Req
Vehicle
Tankage
OFI
Orifice
Check
Valves
Subsystem Status = Predicted Valve +
QJ or ?2 (Known Differences)
Simple Redundancy
Vehicle
Tankage
Isolation
Valve
Subsystem Status = Predicted Valve +
PA and/or PA'
203
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Life cycle cost estimates for the candidate avi-
onics system must be supplemented by cost impact
on the shuttle program due to added weight, etc. Es-
timating uncertainty and cost risk must be evaluated
to make an effective decision.
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COST RELATIONSHIPS
• Complex & Esoteric Techniques Not Possible Within Time Constraints
• Utilized Engrg Estimates for Life Cycle Cost Categories as Supplied by Grumman
Team Members
• Utilized Guideline CER's for Impact Cost Determination
Example:
Cost of Abort = Cost of Mission
207
In addition to avionics system life cycle costs,
the shuttle program costs are also increased due to the
impact of avionic system characteristics on shuttle de-
sign and expenditures.
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IMPACT COST AREAS
• Weight Penalty Costs to Orbiter & to Booster
• Cost of Mission Abort Attributable to Avionics System Failures
• Cost of Launch Delays Attributable to Avionic System Failures
205
Probability distributions for input cost and risk
driving parameters serve to reflect estimating uncer-
tainty by allowing for a range of estimated parameter
values. Risk is reflected by distribution skewness
and variance.
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MONTE CARLO SELECTION PROCESS
Existing Computer Program Allows:
• Development of Beta Distributions for Inputs
• Monte Carlo Sampling of Beta Distributions
• A Capability for Repetitive Sampling of the Alternative System Input
Distributions
213
The result of our study is a comprehensive com-
puterized technique which supplies point estimates of
cost and probability distribution reflecting risk and
uncertainty.
274
RESULTING COST DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CANDIDATE
AVIONICS SYSTEMS
0.3-i
0.2-
0.1-
0
b
f\
250 350 450 550
Life Cycle Costs, $M
150 250 350
Impact Costs, $M
500
Total Costs, $M
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The magnitude of the resulting costs can be
more accurately determined as input parameter values
are improved. However, relative measures of risk are
apparent from the current results. "Spaced proven
hardware" is clearly less risky than the proposed
centralized configuration, as can be seen in its rela-
tively narrow cost spread and variance. The Grumman
baseline system successfully combines the best attri-
butes of both to achieve a configuration with risk as
small as that for "space proven hardware."
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RISK ANALYSIS SUMMARY
0.25-
0.20-
0.15-
0.10
0.05
Probability Distribution
About the
Expected Value
Recommended System
Space Proven
Centralized
Cumulative Probability Distributions
About the
Expected Values
-100 -75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75 100
$M
-100 -75 -50 -25 0 25 BO 75 100
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Similar risk analyses should also be applied to
computer subsystems. Utilizing this risk analysis
technique will allow selection of a low-cost subsys-
tem with a hardware/software mix which minimizes
cost risk.
218
APPLICATION OF RISK ANALYSIS TO ORBITER COMPUTER
SUBSYSTEM
• Identify Candidate Configurations (Federated vs Integrated)
• Determine Pertinent Impact Cost Parameters for Computer Subsystem
- Weight, Power Reqmt, Reliability (Mission Abort/Delay), etc.
• Collect Data for Life Cycle Cost & Impact Cost Parameters With:
- High, Low, & Mode Reflecting Cost Estimating Uncertainty
- Beta Distribution Skewness & Variance Reflecting Risk
• Exercise Computerized Risk Analysis Model Resulting in Cost-Probability
Distributions for Candidate Computer Subsystems, Allowing Selection of
Candidate with the Associated Hardware/Software Mix which Minimizes
Cost Risk
219
Identification and collection of input param-
eter distributions for the computer subsystem hard-
ware and software and the application of our Monte
Carlo risk and uncertainty model to this problem
will allow for a quantitative measure of computer
subsystem risk.
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COMPUTER SUBSYSTEM LIFE CYCLE COST DISTRIBUTIONS *
- Federated
Integrated
Prob Prob
Prob
HW DOT&E $
Prob
HW Prod $
SW DDT&E $
Prob
LCCS SW Prod $
Prob Prob
HW Oper $
'Similar Curves for Impact Costs
SW Oper $
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Ground rules describing major schedule mile-
stones are derived from NASA documentation.
The assumption regarding support of first hori-
zontal flight by Contractor personnel is based upon
a combination of experience on other programs and
the maintenance concept associated with first hori-
zontal flight.
Flight schedules are in accordance with Tech-
nical Directive GAC 4.
The assumptions that all launches will be from
one site and that maintenance operations at that site
will be conducted on a two-shift basis are based upon
considerations of minimum support hardware adequate
to the maintenance workload implied by the flight
schedule. Similarly, the assumption that Level II
maintenance will be conducted at the launch site was
made to minimize logistic problems which would re-
sult from remote Level II maintenance.
224
GROUNDRULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
• First Horizontal Flight Supported by Contractor Personnel
• First Horizontal Flight Program - June 76 Through Jan 78
• Nik I Program - Sept 78 to Sept 89
• Mk II Program - Sept 83 to Dec 91
• Level II Maintenance Conducted at Operating Site
• All Launches (Mk I and Mk II) From One Site
• Flight Schedule in Accordance With Technical Directive GAC4
225
The use of existing DTE/FTE and commercial
test equipment for support of first flight aircraft is
a normal procedure on aircraft programs. Use of this
concept for the Shuttle program would remove the
GSE from a critical path leading to first flight and is
considered desirable for that reason. Secondly, this
concept is implemented at minimum expense. Thirdly,
as the normal GSE becomes available, it can be phased
into the program gradually with minimum difficulty
of implementation, since the horizontal flight equip-
ment remains available during the transition.
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MAINTENANCE CONCEPT FOR FIRST HORIZONTAL FLIGHT
• Level I
- Interim Line Test Sets and Procedures (Factory Test Equipment, Commercial
Test Sets, Breakout Boxes)
- Mechanical Systems Maintained With Approved GSE
- Gradual Phase-In of Mk I Maintenance Concepts and Equipment
• Level II:
- Maximum Use of Existing Support Equipment and Factory Test Equipment
- Mechanical Systems Maintained With Approved GSE
- Gradual Phase-In of Mk I Maintenance Concepts and Equipment
227
We have considered those possible combinations
of GSE which are most likely to be implemented for
the Shuttle program. Cost projections derived for
each of the four competing GSE concepts are for the
life of the Shuttle program and, essentially, contain
all of the major life cycle cost elements which will
be encountered over the projected 20-year program,
with the exception of NASA costs for operating the
support system. (NASA costs are considered later,
by means of a relative estimate of labor required to
operate each of the four conceptual systems.)
With respect to costs given in the accompany-
ing chart, the most significant findings are as follows:
• Minimum costs are obtained with new check-
out equipment
• Maximum costs will be encountered if exist-
ing ACE equipment is used in the beginning
of the program, followed later by the intro-
duction of new equipment
To obtain a realistic evaluation of the four
competing concepts, it is necessary to consider the
relative values of NASA manhours required for the
operation of each of the conceptual systems.
225
GSE CONCEPTS CONSIDERED
• Use ACE for Mk I Support, Followed Concept A *- $510.4M
by New Equipment for Mk II (Mk I
Level II With Existing GSE)
• Use New Equipment for Total Pro- Concepts +~ $458.7M
gram (Mk I and Mk II, Level I and
Level II)
• Use ACE For Total Program at Concept C ^ $466.9WI
Level I, With Existing Test ,
Equipment at Level II
• Use ACE for Total Program at Concept D ——*- $494.8M
: Level I, With Existing Test
Equipment at Level II, But .
Modify the Method of Test- (
ing (Use ACE More Auto- '•••<
: matically) : ; ,
Note: The above projected costs are for contractor activities and do not include
NASA costs for operating personnel.
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Total estimated support costs were 458.7 mil-
lion dollars, including Grumman, Boeing, and G. E.
estimates for all equipment and services associated
with a 20-year concurrent program.
If the Phase B estimate had been made on the
same terms, and for a program of equal length, then
a 394.6 million dollar estimate would have resulted.
Comparing this Phase B normalized value with the
low cost avionic estimate, the low cost vehicle con-
figuration should lead to a support cost increase of
64.1 million dollars over the 20 years of program
life. (An increase in support program costs would be
expected to follow as a consequence of reduced on-
board checkout in the vehicle, particularly in view of
the fact that labor, not GSE acquisition cost, is the
major driver of support life cycle cost.)
Some discussion of the normalization of Phase
B support costs is in order at this time:
• In the Phase B estimate, it was assumed that
checkout equipment would be government
furnished. Thus, there were no ACE or new
equipment costs in that estimate. To permit
comparison between the Phase B and low
cost study estimates, we must go back and
normalize the Phase B estimate by adding
the cost of new equipment
• Another normalization is required to convert
the above resultant into a 20-year program
cost. This was accomplished by adding 1986
through 1991 costs from the low cost study
into the Phase B estimate to obtain the final
normalized value
230
OVERALL SUPPORT IMPACT OF LOW COST AVIONICS
Phase B Study (Normalized) Support Costs From
Support Costs Low Cost Avionic Study Incremental Change
S394.6M S458.7M +S64.1M
(For Concurrent Program
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This chart is an explanation of the cost elements
contained in the low cost avionics support cost estimate.
All costs associated with the major ground checkout
system (UTE) are treated as subcontractor costs and
have been derived in detail in a separate cost package
from General Electric.
software required for testing of Orbiter systems, for
publications, and for maintenance and support of
ground equipment and facilities. (Note: Applications
programs distinguish themselves from General Electric
software costs, which are for preparation and main-
tenance of the checkout system compiler/executive.)
Grumman costs presented are associated with
development, manufacture, modification, etc., efforts
relative to non-UTE support equipment. Additionally,
Grumman costs are included for applications program
Boeing costs contained in this estimate are those
which were estimated as required for Booster support
and are of the same categories as those included for
Grumman.
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COST ELEMENTS
• General Electric Cost Package
-ACE, ACE Modified, and New Equipment (UTE) Costs
- Hardware and Software Development, Equipment Manufacture
- Maintenance and Operating Costs Including Site Readiness
• Grumman Costs
"—Support Engineering Development and Sustaining Effort for GSE, DTE, FTE
- Manufacture and/or Modification of GSE, DTE, and FTE - (Excluding ACE
or New Equipment)
- Software Development, Maintenance, and Control - Applications for Vehicle
System Tests and Data Reduction)
- Publications Costs, Including Operations Updating
- Maintenance and Support of Ground Equipment and Facilities - (Operations
Support)
• Boeing Costs
- Same Categories as the Above Grumman Costs
233
The accompanying chart shows projections of
NASA manhours required to staff each of the four
alternative support systems over the life of the shut-
tle program. For a realistic tradeoff, the dollar costs
of the preceeding chart should be considered along
with the "ownership costs" implied by operating
manhours. From this frame of reference:
• Concept B is the most economical choice
• Concept D ranks second in desirability
• Concepts C and A are comparatively expensive
Projected operating manhours were developed
by using the number of checkout stations, number
of years of operation for each, a two-shift operation
for each, and typical staffing levels appropriate to
each of the four alternative concepts under consid-
eration:
• For concept A, we used ACE staffing for
manual checkout (as in concept C) followed
by introduction of the new equipment, with'
a 60-man staff, later in the program
• For concept B, we estimated that a two-
shift operation of new automatic checkout
equipment would require only 60 men.
This is a conservative estimate; depend-
ing upon operating philosophy, the actual
system could require a smaller staff
• For concept C, we assumed that ACE stations
would be used with an "Apollo" checkout
philosophy, which would lead to a two-
shift staff of 140 men
• For concept D, we estimated that a more
automatic mode of operation for ACE would
reduce the above staff by approximately 46%.
From past studies of the Apollo checkout
effort, we believe this is a conservation esti-
mate of staff reduction
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PROJECTED NASA OPERATING PERSONNEL
• Concept A- 9.7M Manhours
.•Concepts- 4.8MManhours
, , . . ; . . : - . - . • Concept C - 14.8M Manhours
• Concept D - 7.7M Manhours
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Concept A requires a transition from ACE to
new checkout equipment at a time when Shuttle
operations are intensive. This could present oper-
ational difficulties in getting the new system "on-line"
without compromising vehicle turn-around or mis-
sion availability. At the same time, concept A is
potentially the most expensive approach to Shuttle
support. For these reasons, it was eliminated from
the tradeoff.
Concept B is clearly the most economical ap-
proach, and does not suffer from the technical dis-
advantages of A or C. It was selected for use in the
low cost avionics study.
Concept C assumes essentially manual oper-
ation of ACE, as in the Apollo program. In view of
planned Shuttle mission schedules are implied vehicle
turn-around-times, it is doubtful that manual testing
is fast enough to suit the application. Again, from
the cost frame or reference, concept C is expensive.
We therefore eliminated concept C.
Concept D is slightly more expensive that B, but
overcomes the transitional and test time disadvantages
of A and C. Although it was not selected, we believe
its merits further study,along with B, as a candidate
for eventual implementation.
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TRADEOFF
• Concept B Is the Cheapest of the Alternatives, Both to Implement and to Operate
• Considering Implementation and Operating Costs, Concept D Is the Next Most
Desirable
• Concepts A and C Are Both Relatively Expensive, by the Above Criteria
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Support Cost Distribution By Year For Concept B
This curve represents the probable yearly distribu-
tion of the 458.7 million dollars estimated for support
of the low cost avionics configuration under concept B;
it was developed on the basis of development, manu-
facture, and operation cost spreads extrapolated to
include G.E., Grumman, and Boeing costs.
Support Cost Distribution By Year For Concept D
The next curve is a similar projection of con-
cept D support costs by year.
Comparison
The smaller concept B life cycle costs peak in
1975-76 at approximately 38 million dollars per year.
By comparison, concept D costs peak later, at approxi-
mately 41 million dollars per year.
Significantly, D takes about two years to reach
its average funding level of about 25 million dollars per
year. On the other hand, B reaches its average value
of 23.5 million dollars per year in about ten months
from go-ahead, giving it the appearance of a "crash
program."
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SUPPORT COST DISTRIBUTION BY YEAR
SO-.
40-
30-
SM
I ' I
72 74 76
New Test Equipment
Concurrent Program
(Concept B)
I ' I ' I ' I
78 80 82 84
1 ' I ' I
86 88 90
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SUPPORT COST DISTRIBUTION BY YEAR
$M
ACE With Modified Testing
Concurrent Program
(Concept D)
, ' I ' I ' I
72 74 76 78
, ' I ' I ' I ' I
80 82 84 86 88 90
241
At this point, our best judgement is that the
risks, life cycle costs, peak yearly costs, and staff
levels implied by concepts B and D should be the
subject of further study. As the program develops,
concepts B and D should receive further consideration
for a number of reasons:
• Technical risk was not closely evaluated.
We assume that either ACE or new equip-
ment could be developed in the available
time
With respect to ACE, it is not at all certain
that equipment of 1963 design can be re-
furbished and maintained in operation eco-
nomically in the 1985 to 1991 technology.
If it should become necessary to replace
ACE with something new at that late date
in the program, there would be a substantial
and unprogrammed cost increase
This above tradeoff was based largely upon
life cycle costs. As we will show later, con-
cepts B and D show significantly different
peak costs and yearly cost distributions
242
CONCLUSION
• Concept B Appears Most Desirable, But Requires Further Study
•Technical Risk?
- Peak Yearly Costs?
• Concept D Merits Further Study
- Could Have Lower Peak Costs and Less Technical Risk
- Practicality of Using 1963 Equipment Beyond 1985?
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The ground data system associated with mission
operations represents a significant cost factor in the
shuttle avionics development. The low-cost avionics
approach requires a reduction in the onboard data
system capability. Four baseline configurations for a
low-cost avionics system were evaluated to determine
the degree of impact in program cost of accomplishing
certain types of data processing and evaluation using
the ground data system of the MSFN and MCC. The
approaches evaluated in this process used 1) commer-
cially available avionics equipment, 2) space and mili-
tary avionics equipment, and 3) newly developed
avionics equipment. A fourth configuration consisted
of a recommended system which is a combination to
produce the best low-cost approach to the problem
solution.
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STUDY OBJECTIVES
• To Examine the Characteristics of Each Baseline System & Determine
the Impact on the Ground Data System
To Establish the Support & Differentials for Ground Data System Support
of Each Avionics Package ' " .
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STUDY APPROACH
The approach used to develop the ground data
system cost impact is given below.
Develop a Ground Data System Baseline
A ground data system exists which will be mod-
ified to support space shuttle. The Manned Space-
flight network and Mission Control Center can be
accurately predicted for configuration for 1 January
1974 (SKYLAB completion). Factors such as an in-
tegrated network (MSFN plus STADAN), and a TORS,
DOD (SGLS), and a MCC terminal system and data
base were also considered in the missions operations
baseline.
Determine Common Evaluation Criteria
Evaluation criteria was established to insure
that each configuration was weighted equally. Cri-
teria was established using functions which are subject
to a ground-onboard trade-off or which are currently
being accomplished by ground data systems. Criteria
was established in systems management, trajectory
management, aeromedical management and mission
management.
Establish Groundrules and Assumptions
The groundrules and assumptions were consistent
with the baseline. Special groundrules for cost criteria
included 1) Maintenance and operations cost of the
MSFN and MCC would not be charged to the shuttle;
2) engineering, hardware and software development
and implementation associated with supporting the
shuttle would be charged to the shuttle cost.
Major Cost Drivers
Technical areas were defined which would contribute
significantly to cost impacts if implemented.
Develop Ground Data System Concept
Each configuration was evaluated and require-
ments developed. A ground data system concept was
generated for each configuration from these require-
ments.
Determine Technical Impact for Each Configuration
The requirements and concepts were placed in
matrix form and compared for hardware and software
impacts; A delta for each configuration was estab-
lished.
Provide Cost Comparison for Each Configuration
A baseline cost was established for engineering
and software for the configurations.
Recommend a Level of Autonomy
A group of functions were evaluated to deter-
mine their impact on ground data system processing.
Those which produced the largest ground system
impact were recommended.
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STUDY APPROACH
• Develop Ground Data System Baseline
• Determine Common Evaluation Criteria
• Establish Ground Rules & Assumptions
• Develop Major Cost Drivers for Ground Data System
• Develop Ground Data System Concept for Each Configuration
• Determine Technical Impact on the Ground Data System
Baseline for Each Configuration
• Provide Cost Comparison for Ground Data System Support of
Each Configuration
•.>- • Recommend a Level of Autonomy for a Realistic Space
Shuttle Program
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Tracking and Data Acquisition Systems Other Than Existing
Systems
Unified S-band provides the primary tracking
and data acquisition interface for the MSFN. While
certain sites have other capabilities, deviation from the
primary interface would result in upgrading each MSFN
site to satisfy the requirement.
Polar Oribt Missions During Flight Qualification Testing
Prior to TORS
Launches from the ETR using expendable or re-
coverable boosters generate a complex launch program.
The Mark I.vehicle can be supported as required for
nominal launch azimuths. Polar missions during the
system development and test phase would increase
the need for ground data system interface. Integra-
tion of the MSFN and STADAN will partially alleviate
the problem of extended periods of limited contact.
Use of the TDRS will eliminate the problem. If a high
level of ground support is required for the Mark I
Shuttle, the polar missions should be deferred until
TDRS availability or less ground dependency must be
designed into the vehicle. The alternative is to im-
. plement more sites in the network.
Noncompatible Shuttle Telemetry System
The ground data system has a flexible capability
to interface vehicle data types using the reprogram-
mable decommutator. Should the limitations of these
systems be exceeded in bit rate or format structure,
then a significant impact would exist throughout the
network. The baseline systems provided a compatible
51.2 KBPS data interface and an experimental (DPI)
data link not exceeding the capability of the sites.
Use of a Command Technique Other Than Apollo
The command technique developed for Apollo
has been proven through mission use. To introduce
a different method of command between the ground
and the vehicle would require the development and
validation of the new technique at considerable pro-
gram expense. The need for command capability
(word length, etc.) beyond the current capability has
not been identified.
Degree of Utilization of TDRS
The TDRS will become operational during
Mark II. This system adds the flexibility of "any
time access" to the ground data system. The con-
sideration for use of ground data system for extensive
processing functions becomes paramount. The TDRS
can provide an integrated system but the degree of
integration between vehicle and ground will have
significant cost impacts.
Integration of DOD and NASA Acquisition Systems
Information was consolidated concerning the
DOD and NASA systems. Inspection of these capabil-
ities indicates that integration of these facilities into a
common network would provide an additional cost
to the program.
Transmission of Secure Data Through MSFN and Processing
atMCC
The MSFN is not configured for handling secure
data.
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MAJOR COST DRIVERS
• Non-Compatible Shuttle Telemetry System (Rate & Format)
• Tracking & Data Acquisition Systems Other Than Current & Planned
• Polar Orbit Missions During Flight Qualification Testing Prior to a TORS
• Use of a Command System & Technique Other Than That Available
PostSkyjab
• Degree TORS Utilization (When Operational)
• Integration of DOD & NASA Data Acquisition Systems
• Transmission of Secure Data Through MSFN & Processing at MCC
257
In the analysis of the configurations for low
cost avionics, it was found that the three major disci-
plines of telemetry, tracking, and command were re-
quired to support each configuration. The input para-
meter rate to the MSFN and MCC was 51.2 KBPS for
operational telemetry and 500 KBPS for engineering
(DPI) data. These rates did not exceed the capabilities
of the remote site. The RF interface was unified S-
band for all cases. In the evaluation of the hardware
configuration, it was determined that the hardware
capability of the MSFN and MCC on 1 January 1974
could support the space shuttle. No new procure-
ments could be identified. Some modifications were
required to provide an acceptable support configura-
tion.
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RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY SUPPORT ANALYSIS
• Ground Data System Support Reqmts are Approximately the Same for Each
of the Avionics Configurations Considered in This Low Cost Avionic Study
• The Post Sky lab Ground Data System Will Have the Capability to Support
any of the Avionics Configurations Considered
• No Major Hardware Procurements Could be Identified as Required for
Ground Support of the Shuttle. Only Modifications to Existing Systems
Were Required.
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The software associated with the MSFN iemoted
site, GSFC communications interface and the MCC
were baselined at a functional level. The effect on the
software was that of introducing a new vehicle, such
as the ATM on SKYLAB, into the system. The tele-
metry processor at the remote site was capable of
handling the 1050 parameters associated with opera-
tional telemetry. This number is somewhat larger than
the CSM, but does not exceed the AM/ATM of SKY-
LAB.
The baseline telemetry processing was the same
functionally with changes required for input formats,
input sampling rates, scaling, changes, limit sense
changes, event drivers, etc. The functional program
was not altered.
Command processing was required for Shuttle
computer loads associated with flight dynamics and
real time commands associated with data retrieval. No
new concepts would be identified. While program
changes will be required, a major software impact
could not be defined. The SKYLAB command tech-
nique was adequate for the requirement. An increase
in command requirement will exist for an unmanned
vehicle but is within the capacity of the ground data
system.
The trajectory processing will be impacted by
an increase in launch complexity (launch azimuths
from 0 to 90 degrees) and a conceivable dog-leg launch
to polar orbit from ETR. A recoverable booster must
be considered and a new sequence of abort modes with
the orbiter and booster landing capability. The entry
phase will present a new entry profile with precision
trajectory management required. The baseline trajec-
tory program will need to undergo extensive change
to satisfy the requirements. The manned mission sup-
port requirements were compared with Apollo 8 and
the unmanned requirements with AS503. The base-
lined ground data system could support the known re-
quirements at the functional level.
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RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY SUPPORT ANALYSIS (CONT)
No New Major Software Developments Could Be Identified. Modifications &
Rework of Existing Programs Can Meet Reqmts
The Level of Ground Data System Support Required for the Mk I Configuration
Was Determined to be Approximately the Same Level as Earth Orbital Apollo
Flight
The Effect of an Unmanned Orbiter is not Considered to be a Major Cost
Impact Except in the Area of Command. The Effect of Automatic Landing
System Must be Examined . . .
The Major Cost Impacts Associated With the Ground Data System Will Result
From Implementation to Meet the Support Reqmts for Mk I
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A phased approach was considered for each con-
figuration. The growth profile for each avionics pack-
age was designed to meet only those requirements of
the mission. A First Horizontal Flight (FHF), First
Manned Orbital Flight (FMOF) or Mk I and a final con-
figuration (Mk II) were evaluated. A ground data sys-
tem transition from each configuration was developed.
The degree of autonomy achieved by the configura-
tions varied with the recommended configuration
achieving an excellent compromise. The analysis of
these transition profiles led to the conclusion that the
Mk II orbiter will not require less ground support hard-
ware, but rather will result in using less of the Mark I
ground data system hardware and software capabili-
ties. The Mk II ground data system requires the same
ground support configuration except that a TDRS with
any time access capability has been combined with the
integrated MSFN/STADAN, and the MCC will have
fully-implemented terminal system and data base.
These added capabilities to the ground data system
add to its flexibility and make it attractive for use in
accomplishing the non-system functions of the shuttle.
The Integrated Network and MCC will be multiple user
systems. The impact of Mk II on the system will be
similar to the transition from one Apollo vehicle to the
next. Normal M&O of hardware and software should
be adequate for the transition. A completely different
Mk II would not exceed the cost impact of a Mk I.
The results of evaluating the various configura-
tions indicated that the ground system was insensitive
to the degree of autonomy of the vehicle. All the con-
figurations reviewed established requirements for tel-
emetry processing, trajectory support and command
load and RTC support. A basic configuration of the
ground system in hardware and software is required to
provide support in these disciplines. The degree of
mission time data use will provide the major reduction
in ground data system cost unless one or more of the
major disciplines is deleted. The cost differential be-
tween all configurations considered was minor, and
the engineering and software of the ground system
.could not be used as a cost driver in selecting an avion-
ics configuration.
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RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY SUPPORT ANALYSIS (CONT)
• Transition to Mk II Will be a Minimum Cost Impact on the Ground Since it
Involves Primarily the Deletion of Ground Support Functions Provided for
Mkl
• The Ground Data System Cost Differences Between the Avionics Configuration
is Not an Influencing Factor in the Choice of Low Cost Avionics System
. Approach
• The Ground Data System Cost is Relatively Independent of Autonomy in
the Phased System Approach
• The Shuttle; Avionics Design, Regardless of the Cost Approach/Should be an
Integrated Effort With Full Assessment & Consideration Given to the
Capabilities of the Ground Data System & TORS
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The ground data system was evaluated to a func-
tional level to determine the degree of characteristics
of a vehicle and its onboard processing functions which
would have the most significant impact on the ground
data system. The impact will be primarily in the user
facilities of the processing and the required time frame
for processing. The vehicle characteristics included as
a minimum:
• Does not rely on ground data processing
which involves real time processing in the
decision making functions
• Does not rely on the ground to process data
associated with immediate vehicle, mission
and payload deployment problems
• There is a telemetry exchange between vehi-
cle and ground. The vehicle format should
be selectable by the ground or crew. (On-
board compression should be examined as
one method for transmission of normal oper-
ational transfer of telemetry)
• The uplink to the vehicle involves the trans-
fer of command loads and data acess real
time commands to the Primary computer
• Flight control programs are dedicated to vehi-
cle systems and are refined programs which re-
mains fixed
• Data management programs have program
flexibility and are used as the growth side of
the system. As vehicle autonomy increases,
the data management capability is increased
with the growth profile established to accom-
plish the total real time processing of the
vehicle (excluding payload) to manage the
vehicle environment as the autonomy goal
• The flight control and data management soft-
ware address only the space shuttle and the
control of its systems and its environment.
All other processing functions are accomplished
on the ground or by equipment charged to
payload
• The general ground support concept for such
a vehicle provides a flexible data retrieval
capability for both the flight crew and ground
support personnel
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GENERAL CONCEPT FOR MK II SHUTTLE
GROUND DATA SYSTEM
Data
On-Board
Primary
Computer
^ nequesis ^
- Formats ^
* or TLM f
\
\
Loads
Comm (US
And/Or K
Band)
t
^ Computer Words
i i
B »
i \. '
Crew Control
of Access or
Use
t Orbiter Contractor
• Payload Contractors
• Booster Contractor
• NASA Centers
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The addition of the TDRS to the network and
impact of payloads must also be considered in con-
sidering the degree of autonomy.
Degree of Use of TDRS
The TDRS introduces a positive and negative
element into the program. The "any time" access
would allow a greater reliance on ground support. The
goal of autonomy dictates less reliance. The allocation
of data system functions as discussed above provides
a meaningful use of TDRS with the space shuttle. Pro-
cessing functions associated with the vehicle systems
and its immediate mission environment should be al-
located onboard. Other processing functions which
tend to cause mission to mission software changes
should be allocated to the ground with the TDRS used
to access the data in the time interval required.
Allocate Payload Operations and Checkout to the Ground
Payload varies from mission to mission and so
will the payload operations and checkout software.
Use of the shuttle capability to bring the payload back
if it does not work must be considered in conducting
data system trades in this area. Crew training associ-
ated with payload checkout and operations must also
be addressed. A software package for each payload
will complicate the onboard system which has the pri-
mary function of delivering or returning payload to or
from orbit. Software for vehicle function can be contin-
ually refined and improved. The introduction of ex-
ternal systems software for payload checkout and oper-
ations will only complicate the onboard software de-
velopment. Processing associated with checkout and
operations of payloads should be allocated to the
ground data system because of
• Crew training
• Software development of onboard systems
from mission to mission
• Any time access of TDRS
• Availability of experts for assistance
• Calibration standards
• The ground must interface the payload for
data retrieval anyway
• Use the "any time access" capability of
TDRS as a major item of trade when assess-
ing ground data processing vs onboard data
processing
• Allocate payload checkout and operations
functions to the ground data system (De-
ployment and its associated functions to the
vehicle)
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AREAS OF CONCENTRATION FOR MK II AVIONICS
CONCEPT WHICH IMPACT GROUND DATA SYSTEM
• Allocate Certain Systems Mgmt Functions Onboard
• Allocate Certain Trajectory Mgmt Functions Onboard
• Transfer Only Those Mission Mgmt Functions Onboard Which are
Considered Mandatory
• Use the "Any Time Access" Capability of TORS as a Major Item of Trade
When Accessing Ground Data Processing Versus Onboard Processing
• Allocate Payload Checkout & Operations Functions to the Ground Data
System
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Preliminary analysis concerning trade-off of ma-
jor ground support functions both on this study and
previous studies conducted in mission operations in-
dicate that certain functions could be allocated to the
onboard data system which would contribute to the
autonomy of the shuttle vehicle and increase its in-
dependence from the MCC. While much additional
study is required to establish a positive position in
terms of cost, safety and reliability, the following pre-
liminary results are submitted:
Mission Management
• Allocate those functions associated with man-
agement of the vehicle and vehicle systems to
the onboard data management system (crew
activities scheduling, contingency planning
(problem immediate), Reentry scheduling)
• Allocate functions associated with overall
mission objectives with the ground data sys-
tem (mission planning, mission scheduling,
reentry and landing coordination, weather,
biomedical monitoring and diagnostics).
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MISSION MANAGEMENT CONCEPT - MK II
Allocate Functions Associated With Mgmt of the Vehicle & Vehicle Systems to
the Onboard Data Mgmt System
• Crew Activities Scheduling
• Contingency Planning (Immediate Vehicle Problem)
• Reentry Scheduling (Emergency Entry)
Allocate Functions Associated With Overall Mission Objectives to the Ground
Data System
• Mission Planning
• Mission Scheduling
• Reentry & Landing Coordination
• Weather
• Biomedical Monitoring & Diagnostics
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Systems Management
• Allocate the mission time systems manage-
ment functions to the onboard data manage-
ment system (system checkout (priority
item), system monitoring (priority item),
real time control (priority item), system con-
figuration control, communications control,
and consumables control).
• Allocate the long term system management
to the MCC (maintenance planning, trend
analysis, consumables management, communi-
cations access, failure analysis, and payload
operations).
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SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT - MK II
Allocate the Mission Time Systems Mgmt to the Onboard Data Management System
• System Checkout
• System Monitoring
• Real-Time Control
• System Configuration Control
o Communications Control
• Consummables Control
Allocate the Long Term System Mgmt to the MCC
• Maintenance Planning
• Trend Analysis
• Consummables Management
• Communications Access
• Failure Analysis
• Payload Operations
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Trajectory Management Concept
• Allocate those trajectory areas which deal
primarily with preprogrammed functions to
the onboard data management system (IMU
alignment, maneuver planning, vehicle ephem-
eris, rendezvous planning, and entry and land-
ing).
• Leave those functions associated with mission
time trajectory to the ground support system
(multiple ephemerides, ephemeris calculations,
navigation updates, guidance updates, retro-
fire maneuver updates, time updates, EMU up-
dates, and abort trajectory analysis).
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TRAJECTORY MANAGEMENT CONCEPT - MK II
Allocate Trajectory Areas Which Accomplish the Following Functions to the Onboard
Data Management System:
• IMU Alignment
• Maneuver Planning
• Rendezvous Planning
• Entry & Landing
Allocate Those Functions Associated With Mission Time Trajectory to the Ground
Support System:
• Ephemeris Calculations
• Navigation Updates
• Guidance Updates
• Retrofire Maneuver Updates
• Time Updates
• EMU Updates
• Abort Trajectory Analysis
• Vehicle, Target & Payload Ephemerides
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The first of four pressure-fed boosters studied is
the Model 979-141, - an expendable two-stage booster.
The first stage consists of three strap-on tank/engine
modules which are expended and dropped at a veloc-
ity of 2315 fps. The second stage, is expended and
dropped at a velocity of 5157 fps. Thrust vector
control of up to six degrees per engine is effected by
ON-OFF injection of N204 into 16 nozzles (LITVC)
located around the throat of each engine expansion
chamber. This control capability precludes the need
for tail fins that might otherwise be required to mini-
mize upsetting moments that occur when boosting
through the high wind shears often found at about
30,000 ft altitude.
Navigation, guidance, and control intelligence
is obtained from orbiter-borne equipment. Triple
thread redundant control signals are hardwired from
the orbiter avionics bay to the TVC voter where the
dominant ON-OFF signal is selected for activation of
the TVC valves.
A multiplexed instrumentation system is
employed for developmental, operational, and pre-
flight checkout instrumentation. This instrumentation
system is also used to feed data on booster status to
the orbiter. Abort decisions and sequencing are ef-
fected by the orbiter guidance computer and crew.
Squib-activated, silver-zinc batteries are used in
the booster stages to power the instrumentation,
telemetry transmitter, destruct system, and to power
the LITVC valves.
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MODEL 979-141 UDMH/N204
2-Stage Expendable, Pressure Fed Booster
GLOW
BLOW
OLOW
Wpb
VSTG.
BOOSTER WT.
INERT
ORBITER WT.
INERT
LANDING
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
1ST STAGE 2ND STAGE
6,530.000 LB
3.834.000 LB. 1.398.000 LB.
1.350,000 LB.
3.289.000 LB. 1.097.000 LB.
0.847
2.315 FPS 5.170 FPS
545.000 LB.
211.300 LB.
168.500 LO.
19S.OOO LB.
THRUST/ENGINE
2.72 x 106LB(SLI
NOTE: ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
UDMH TANK
66« CU. FT.
SECOND STAGE
MODULE (t PLACE)
260" DIAMETER-» •»
271
The Model 979-142 pressure-fed booster is
identical to the two-stage 979-141 described on the
previous page with one major exception: the first
stage only is soft-landed by parachutes and recovered
from the sea for reuse. Since the average life of a
booster motor is about twenty uses, the older boost
modules, previously used on the first stage, are ex-
pended as second stages, because the cost of recovery
of the older motors is not justified.
The requirement to recover the 979-142 adds
the following requirements to the booster avionics,
as described for the 979-141:
• A parachute sequencer, using thrust chamber
pressure decay as the initiating signal, is
added
• A UHF recovery beacon is added to each of
the three boost modules, to aid the recovery
ship in locating the units after splash-down
• Special salt water protection techniques are
used on cable connectors and electronic
packages. The added cost of using 0-ring
seals, corrosion resistant metals, and potting
of cable connectors is estimated to be
$25,000 per booster
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MODEL 979-142 UDMH/N2O4,
2-Stage Recoverable Pressure Fed Booster
<Q^
^-l
;S
s ~^
., —
\_
>.
>v
. ..: XJ
fJ
iL
hfJ-U
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
1ST STAGE 2ND STAGE
GLOW 6,853.000 LB.
BLOW 4,132,000 LB 1.370,000 L.B
VSTG 2'279 FPS 5'165 FPS
INERT 702,000 LB 233.000 LB.
IMPACT- 682,000 LB
ORBITERWT.
INERT 211,300 LB.
LANDING 168,500 LB.
THRUST/ENG. •
V" 2.88 x 106 LB (S.L.)
NOTE: ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
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SECOND STAGE
MODULE (1 PLACEI
260" DIAMETER •*• —
The Model 979-143 is a single-stage booster con-
sisting of seven identical engines fed by a single tank
assembly of UDMH and N204. The entire stage is re-
covered by deploying drogue and main parachutes
after a controlled re-entry at 70° deg angle-of-attack.
Recovery of the attitude control system, recovery
beacon, destruct receivers, TVC and RCS drive elec-
tronics, telemeter receiver and instrumentation is
aided by special salt water protection techniques that
minimize refurbishment costs.
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UDMH/N204, SINGLE STAGE, MODEL 979 - 143
/
1 ^- ~ "7
^^ ~^~
,'
^v
61
|
OIA. N2<H LINE
\ I
\ \
,<\
t \ ^
TOR" nia .707
ELLIPTICAL
BULKHEAD (TYPI
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
:
12O4 TANK
14.810 CU. FT.
UDMH TANK
31.975 CU. FT.
260" DIA. ORBITER
DROP TANK
BOOSTER NOSE
STA 2145
GLOW
BLOW
OLOW
PROPELLANT
WEIGHT
"STG.
BOOSTE R WT.
INERT
IMPACT
7.592.000 LB.
6.242.0OO LB.
1.350.000 LB.
5.280.000 LB.
5.O29.000 LB. ASCENT
251.000 LB. LITVC
O.Mf
5.354 rrs
3,765"
/Tx~t
\
j.
7' '
<;
SEPARATION
STA. 2270
If
LITVC
(N2O4 INJECTIONI
• THRUST / ENGINE
1.36 x 106LB(SL)
NOTE: ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
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The Model 979-144 like the Model 979-143, is
a single-stage booster consisting of seven identical
engines fed by a single tank assembly. The major dif-
ference between the 979-144 and the 979-143 is that
LOX-RP propellants are used instead of the UDMH
and N204 propellants used in the 979-143. The LOX-
RP propellant, although lacking the storability feature
of UDMH - ^64, is free of the toxicity problem of
UDMH - ^04, and is a lower cost propellant to manu-
facture.
The avionics and recovery techniques for the
979-144 are essentially identical to that selected for
the Model 979-143.
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LOX/RP - 1. SINGLE STAGE, MODEL 979 - 144
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
58" DIA. LOX LINE
396" DIA. v.707
ELLIPTICAL
BULKHEAD (TYPI
GLOW
BLOW
OLOW
PROPELLANT
WEIGHT
VSTG
BOOSTER WT.
INERT
IMPACT
ORBITER WT.
INERT
LANDING
LITVC
(LOX INJECTION)
• 6.945.000 LB
• 5.59S.OOO LB.
• 1.350.000 LB.
4.700,000 LB.
4.476.000 LB. ASCENT
224.000 LB. LITVC
0.840' :
5.372 FPS
895.000 LB.
'866.0OO LB.
^THRUST/ENGINE •
1.24 I 106 LB (S.L.I
NOTE: ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
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BOOSTER TRAJECTORY MODEL
300-
200-
Altitude,
K FT
100-
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REENTRY TRAJECTORY
6-,
qr 1.000-1
800 H
600 H
I 400^
CD
Q 200-
0J
4j
3'
2
1
Main
Chutes
roguev >/ M
Chutes Impact
= 150fps
100 200
Time From Staging, Seconds
300 f
Impact
335 Sec
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RECOVERY SEQUENCE
REENTRY/
DECELERATIONORIENTATION
Boaster Oriented , Broadside • Two 4-Ft Dia
by Reaction Control Reentry(a= 70°) Pilot Chutes
• Balanced By Mortaf Deployed .'
Dyhedral
Fins
PITCH DOWN
• Two 45-Ft Dia Drouge
Chutes Deployed at • Six 120-Ft Dia Main
M = 1.2 and 50,000 Ft Chutes Deployed
Reefed At M = 0.6 • 0.8 and
38,000 Ft De-Reefed 4
Seconds Later
• Bridle Attached
For -30° Water
Impact
RETRIEVAL
DECELERATION AND
LET - DOWN
at Impact
• Detach
Fins at
Impact
Impact
V = 150fps
W = 895 K
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A Monte Carlo analysis was conducted on
statistics of BRB wear-out and attrition. All cases
analyzed assumed 445 flights and assumed that the
probability of loss was independent of the flight
history or design life of the booster. One hundred
simulations were run at each point analyzed to provide
a reasonable sample size.
Parametric results are shown on the facing page.
These results provided the basis for determining the
number of boosters required for the operational pro-
gram. The total number of boosters required is based
on the following assumptions:
1. The booster has a useful life of 20 flights.
2. The booster reliability is 0.99.
3. The recovery system reliability is 0.98.
4. The probability of favorable weather in the
recovery area is 0.995.
5. The number of boosters can be based on 50%
probability of completing the 445 reusable
launches without depleting the booster stock-
pile.
The required number of boosters for each of the
four programs is shown in the table below.
NUMBER OF BOOSTERS REQUIRED FOR 460
FLIGHTS
(Loss Probability = 0.035 per flight)
PROGRAM DESIGNATION
No. of Boosters -141 -142 -143 -144
460 127 45 45
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DETERMINATION OF REQUIRED NUMBER OF BALLISTIC
REUSABLE BOOSTERS
P = 0.025 (Loss Probability
Per Flight)
0.50 ( Probability of Completing
445 Flights Without Running
)ut of Boosters)
30 n
0.80
0.90
P= 0.05 (Loss Probability
Per Flight)
0.50
i 10
20 30 40 50 20 30' 40 50
No. of Boosters No. of Boosters
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Major avionics trades for the ballistic recover-
able booster involve the difference in redundancy
requirements between the boost and recovery phases.
The orbiter G&N equipment has the capability to
effect control of the mated vehicles and to do so
with the required level of redundancy.
When considering recovery of the pressure-fed
booster, one of the techniques involves an active
attitude control system employing reaction control
jets, requiring some booster-located guidance and
control equipment, albeit crude compared to the
boost phase G&N requirements. Equipment costs
favor the selection of orbiter-located G&N for the
boost phase function, with a simple single thread
attitude control system to effect a high drag re-entry
prior to chute deployment.
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AVIONICS TRADES
• G&N Redundancy
- Boost? - Reentry?
• Boost G&N
- Orbiter vs Booster
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Considering the redundancy question by itself,
independent of the "orbiter versus booster G&N for
boost phase" issue, two basic techniques are available:
(1) Triple masking redundancy employing simple
majority vote, and (2) dual standby redundancy using
computer interdiagnostic techniques. Although the
dual standby redundancy technique is basically ca-
pable of providing higher reliability with less hardware
than the triple-voted method, greater experience
exists with the voting method, thus it was selected at
this time because of its lower development risk factor
Since this reasoning applies for either the orbiter or
booster avionics, it follows that triple redundancy is
recommended whether orbiter-located or booster-
located G&N equipment is used for the boost phase.
Redundancy of the booster avionics for the re-
entry phase can be relaxed relative to the boost phase
because the man-rating requirement is removed at
orbiter-booster separation. With the re-entry attitude
control phase lasting approximately five minutes,
the failure rate for single-thread redundancy is con-
sidered adequate.
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G&N REDUNDANCY
• Boost
- Dual Monitored "Off-Line-Redundant" Higher Risk and Lower Cost is Not Obvious
. • . •: Re-Entry
- Single Thread Redundancy Contributes Approximately One Failure in 1000 Hr
of Flight
- Vehicle Uses System 3 Min Each Flight Max No. of 20 Flights
•t
- Therefore Probability of Vehicle Loss Due to Avionics Is 1 in 10 vs Assumed
: Vehicle Loss Due to Recovery of 1 in 20
• Recommendation
,
 i
 . - Single Thread Redundancy Required for Re-Entry
- Triple Voted Required for Boost
287
Boost Phase G&N in Booster
Beginning with the requirement that an attitude
reference unit (or platform) and a flight control com-
puter (or G&N computer) are required in the booster
for attitude control during re-entry, then two addi-
tional platforms and two additional G&N computers
are required to meet the triple redundancy require-
ment for the boost phase. (Note: The re-entry
attitude control system will require simpler equip-
ment than a single-thread of the boost phase G&N
equipment; however, since the re-entry controller
has not yet been fully defined, and as an aid to
getting a first-cut on price comparison, a boost phase
G&N system was assumed for the re-entry controller.)
Boost Phase G&N in Orb'rter
The additional memory and software required
in the orbiter prime computer for engine sequencing,
abort logic, and thrust vector control of the booster
induce additional costs to the orbiter that are traded
against the cost savings in the booster. An additional
75 Ib of inert weight, added to the orbiter over a ten-
year life of the program (assuming a traffic model of
445 missions), moderates the advantage of using the
orbiter G&N equipment for the boost phase control
of the booster.
The recommendation resulting from this
technical trade is to utilize the orbiter's G&N equip-
ment for boost phase guidance of the mated vehicles;
and a dedicated special-purpose controller for the
re-entry phase of the booster.
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IMPLEMENT G&N IN ORBITER OR BOOSTER?
• A In Booster
2 G&N Platforms @ 83K = 166K
2 G&N Computers @ 45K = 90K
Subtotal = 256K
46 Ship Sets @ 256K per Ship = 11,776K
100 Lb @ S5K per Lb in Booster = BOOK
Booster Total =12,276K
• In Orbiter
G&N Platforms and Computers in Orbiter = 0
*0rbiter Program Cost = 5,500K
*75 Lb @ S32.4K per Lb in Orbiter = 2,430K
Orbiter Total = 7.930K
Life Cycle Cost Would Appear to Reinforce the Trade.
*See Interim S-IC in Final Report
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The navigation, guidance and control intel-
ligence is obtained from orbiter-borne equipment,
which is triple-threaded using the simple majority
voting technique for redundancy management. The
control signals for the LITVC function in the aft of
the booster are voted at the input to the single-thread
electronics required to drive each of the ON-OFF
LITVC valves.
The recovery technique selected for the Model
979-144 requires a reaction controlled attitude con-
trol system: the booster has two aerodynamically
stable modes during re-entry, one at 0 deg angle-of-
attack, and another at 70 deg angle-of-attack. As a
means to minimize the parachute development pro-
blem the 70 deg mode was selected because it has a
much lower ballistic coefficient (W/Cj-jA) than the
0 deg re-entry attitude. However, in order to achieve
the 70 deg attitude for re-entry and to dampen oscil-
lations during re-entry, an attitude reference plat-
form (or its equivalent) is required. A simple analog
or special-purpose digital computer is adequate to
signal the reaction control system (RCS). The base-
line RCS is a bi-propellant, operating at a thrust
chamber pressure of 98 psi; however, an alternate
RCS which uses the ullage gas (100 psi) available
from the main fuel tank, is attractive. The RCS
consists of two, 500 Ib thrust engines in pitch, two,
500 Ib thrust engines in yaw, and four, 250 Ib engines
in roll. A parachute sequencer, utilizing total and
static pressure sensors, deploys the two drogue chutes
at 50,000 ft (M 1.2) altitude and the six main chutes
at 56 psf(M 0.6-0.8).
A multiplexed instrumentation system is em-
ployed for developmental, operational, and preflight
checkout instrumentation. This instrumentation
system is also used to feed data on booster status to
the orbiter. Abort decisions and sequencing are
effected by the orbiter avionics and crew.
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BALLISTIC RECOVERED BOOSTER
BOOST GN&C IN ORBITER
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Using results derived from RCA's PRICE pro-
gram (a computer modeling technique for projecting
the cost of electronics) it is possible to quantitatively
evaluate the alternates of selecting FAA, MIL, or
Space Standards for space shuttle avionics. The
illustration compares costs of the several approaches
normalized to the development cost of an FAA
equipment. These results are typical of an all-
electronic equipment. Production costs are gen-
erated for a run of 34 units. The reliability associ-
ated with each standard is shown, normalized to
space reliability. Units to Maturity - reflects the
typical number of units for each class of construc-
tion needed to get a mature product. Mainte-
nance costs are developed assuming a 10,000 hr total
unit life with a 10% of unit cost attributed to each
failure. The remainder of the chart shows in sum-
mation several possible combinations of life cycle
costs for a given unit. The 20% development line
represents a good approximation to the cost of
an "off-the-shelP' equipment which requires some
modifications for the shuttle application. From
these results, one can compare the cost of vari-
ous strategies considering only the cost of equip-
ment and its maintenance. This is not the only
cost. Another cost is considered on the next page.
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FAA/MILITARY/SPACE COMPARISON
FAA1 MIL2 SPACE3
Development Costs 1.0 1.3 2.3
Production Costs (34) .8 1.2 1.9
Reliability (FR) 5.0 2.5 1.0
Units to Maturity 200. 50. 10.
Maintenance (10% per F) 1.6 1.2 .8
Prod + Maint 2.4 2.4 2.7
Dev + Prod + Maint 3.4 3.7 5.0
20% Dev + Prod + Maim 2.6 2.66 3.16
1. Standard commercial aircraft design standards (ARINC)
2. MlL-E-5400 (SST electronics probably fits here)
3. NASA Man Rated Equipment Standards
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To assess the true impact of failure, we must
consider vehicle aborts which result from equipment
failure. For purposes of example, failure rates for a
typical equipment have been selected. We assume
that the FAA equipment has a failure rate of 2000
PPM and has an absolute cost as indicated on the
previous slide. Under the conditions outlined, we
can then establish a cost penalty per vehicle and a
cost for a four-vehicle fleet which applies for
aborts resulting from equipment failure. Note the
significant differences between the various standards.
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FAILURE PENALTY
Example:
• Failure Rate (2000 PPM - FAA ^
{1000 PPM-Mil [
( 400 PPM - Space j
• 100 Missions for 100 Hours
• Triple Redundancy - Two Failures = Abort
• Abort Cost = $5 M
Then: Cost Per Vehicle, $K Four Vehicle Fleet, $K
FAA 450 1800
Mil 115 460
Space 25 100
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This table shows the results of combining the
figures derived in the previous two charts. Column
1 shows the life cycle equipment cost listed in in-
creasing order. Column 2 applies the abort penalty
derived for a four-vehicle fleet. Column 3 sums the
two figures. As can be seen, MIL standards is least
costly for new design. For modified piece, MIL
again is most effective but space is very close, and
finally, an existing space box is the least costly of
all. Thus, a policy of selecting MIL equipment for
the shuttle appears to make'economic good sense
unless an existing space design is available.
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FAA/MILITARY/SPACE COMPARISON (CONT)
Acq Maint, $M Abort, $M Total, $M
Existing FAA 2.4 1.8 3.8
Existing Mil 2.4 .46 3.0
Modified FAA 2.6 1.8 4.4
Existing Space 2.7 0.1 2.8
Modified Existing Mil 2.8 .46 3.2
Modified Existing Space 3.2 0.1 3.3
New FAA 3.4 1.8 5.2
New Mil 3.7 .46 4.2
New Space 5.0 .1 5.1
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CONCLUSIONS - LOW COST RISK AVIONICS
• Development Costs more than Shuttle Production
• The Management & Systems Engineering for Redundancy Cost More than
the Added Hardware
• FO/FS Makes Economic Good Sense
• Autonomy Principally Affects On-Board Software Costs
• Autonomy Must Be Defined on a Mission Basis
• Software Dominates DM Hardware Costs by at Least 4:1
- Do What it Takes in the Hardware to Minimize Software Cost
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CONCLUSIONS - LOW COST RISK AVIONICS (CONT)
• Data Bus Should Be Used for Data Acquisition & Probably for G&C
• Digital Technology, in the Long Run, Will Be Cheaper, Lighter Than Equivalent
Analog Function
• Derived Low Cost Avionics Reduces Risk More Than Identified Cost
• No Hardware Technology Breakthroughs Required
• Ballistic Recoverable Booster Will Significantly Reduce Avionics Cost
• Avionics is an Expensive Place to Reduce Weight ($100 - 500K per Lb)
• Large Computer Complex not Required for First Horizontal Flight
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COST/
RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS
SPACE SHUTTLE STUDY COST/RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
• Redundancy Analysis
• Ground Support Impact
• Reliability Tradeoffs
• Life-Cycle Cost Evaluation
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The degree to which redundancy is applied to
the onboard shuttle avionics is a direct determinant
of hardware and software program costs. Thus, the
use of redundancy on each avionics function and each
LRU must be justified on a basis of program needs
and economy. An effective way of accomplishing
this is to assign each avionics function (and each
LRU) one of the three critically levels listed. As a
function of criticality, the basic definition of re-
dundancy requirements is as shown. This represents
a minimum level of redundancy in each criticality
level. Any additional redundancy must be justified
on a life cycle cost economical basis. General Elec-
tric studies have shown that approximately 40% of
shuttle avionics LRU functions are crew safety
critical, 45% are mission critical, and 5% are for crew
convenience. In this manner redundancy (and cost)
is significantly reduced when compared to the ori-
ginal FO/FO/FS requirement for all functions.
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LRU CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT IMPACT
ON REDUNDANCY
Critical ity
1
(Crew Safety)
2
(Mission Critical)
3
(Convenience)
Redundancy Impact
Continue Mission with Two or More Units Operative;
if Only One Unit is Operative
Continue Mission if One Unit is Operative; Option to
if No Units are Operative
Abort
Abort
Continue Mission if No Units are Operative
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The degree of criticality for LRU's inpacts not
only the the redundancy as described, but also the
degree of testing required, i.e., the higher criticality
LRU requires more qualification testing. This shows
the testing impact for each criticality level taking into
consideration that off-the-shelf equipment unmodified
or modified, or new development equipment meeting
either FAA, airborne military, or space requirements
may be used for the shuttle avionics. Thus, via LRU
criticality assignment the resultant testing impact
reduces the overall avionics testing costs.
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LRU CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT IMPACT ON TESTING
Criticality Testing Impact
1
(Crew
Safety)
2
(Mission
Critical)
(Convenience)
Full Qua! for New Developments; For Off-the-Shelf
Hardware Qual Test Only Parameters Where SSS Environ-
ment is More Severe
Full Qual for New Developments; Certification by Similarity
for the Off-the-Shelf Equipments
Use Only Certification By Similarity or Based on Development/
Acceptance/Flight Test Experience
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General Electric investigated the cost/perform-
ance relationship of using existing ACE, modifying
ACE or developing a new Ground Checkout System,
Unified Test Equipment (UTE).
Conclusions reached are that UTE is the most
cost effective system, Ground Checkout costs are a
significant driver, approximately S120M for the
DDT&E and delivery of approximately ten systems to
the field.
Of special interest is the fact that UTE costs are
independent of the four onboard avionic systems
considered.
UTE can be designed to minimize the number
of consoles and operators. Through modular building
block techniques and common designs, each system
installation can match the particular site require-
ments.
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GE AVIONICS GROUND SUPPORT SYSTEM
• Potential Avionics Cost Driver
• UTE is Cost Effective Versus ACE
• UTE Cost Not Sensitive to Onboard Avionics Configuration
e UTE Cost Advantages
- Low First Cost
- Comparatively Low Operating Costs
- Cost Effective Growth Capability
• UTE Functional Advantages
- Automation
- Modularity
- Commonality
- Flexibility
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In 1962, 1 T. Duane, at the General Electric
Motor and Generator Department examined the per-
formance of electromechanical and hydromechanical
products (such as motors, generators, turbines, water-
wheels, etc.) which had undergone many thousands
of test hours. His efforts resulted in the formulation
of a technique for predicting the reliability growth of
complex equipment as given by the log-log equation
on the illustration. The main axioms determined as
a result of this study are shown. In 1968 General
Electric's Aerospace Electronics Systems Depart-
ment initiated a study to determine the applicability
of the Duane MTBF growth equation to aerospace
electronics equipment programs. GE-developed
avionics on the F-l 11 and P-3C programs and histori-
cal data on various Air Force and Navy programs for
specific avionics equipments were studied and the
results confirmed the applicability of the Duane re-
liability growth model. During 1969 and 1970 GE
tested and verified this model by implementing its
principles on several current avionics programs. The
evaluation results from the Reliability Planning and
Management (RPM) technique which is briefly de-
scribed next.
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RELIABILITY GROWTH MODEL
• MTBF = at + b On Log-Log Scales
• Axioms
- Reliability Improvement of Complex Equipment Follows a Mathematically
Predictable Pattern
- Reliability Improvement is Approximately Inversely Proportional to the
Square Root of Cumulative Operating (Test) Time
- For a Constant Level of Corrective Action Effort & Implementation, Reliability
Growth Closely Approximates a Straight Line on Log-Log Scales
- These Relationships Permit use of a Simple Technique for Monitoring Progress
Toward a Predetermined Reliability Goal
• Data Source
- Initial Patterns Developed in Early 1960'sfrom Data on Five Divergent Groups
of Products Based on Typically 50,000 Hours Operating Data
Two Hydromechanical Devices, Two Complex Aircraft Generators,
One Aircraft Jet Engine
- Pattern Confirmed by AESD to be Applicable to Avionics from Data On
Four Programs
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Reliability Planning and Management (RPM) is a
new methodology developed by GE to relate reliability
criteria to program planning options and constraints.
It incorporates predicted reliability growth rates and
demonstrated reliability growth rates, the latter based
on visible evidence of performance, enabling the di-
mensioning of time, resources, assets, and facilities re-
quired to bridge the gap between the sterile specified
reliability requirements and the practical reality of pro-
gram execution.
Based on GE evaluation and application experi-
ence, certain axioms must be accepted to apply RPM:
• That no design is ready to release for prod-
uct manufacturing until (using MIL-Hand-
book 217A failure rates) a reliability pre-
diction of 125% or more of the specified
MTBF requirement is established
• Based on historical data, initial product per-
formance will be approximately 10% of the
predicted value
• Reliability growth is predictable and alpha
varies from approximately 0.1 when a con-
tract has no specific reliability improvement
requirements to approximately 0.6 when an
ambitious reliability improvement program is
implemented
• Where the min/max alpha growth lines in-
tersect, the required MTBF determines the
max/min reliability demonstration test hours
required to meet the specification.
• The option (reliability program, number of
units to be tested, facilities, etc.) which best
meet program needs economically and within
the program constraints is planned in detail,
implemented and managed.
These axioms permit the portrayal of RPM on one
simple chart as shown here. This is the Reliability
Planning and Management Model as presented by GE
to government and industry.
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RELIABILITY PLANNING & MANAGEMENT
• Initially Released Design - Approx 10% of Predicted Inherent Capability
• Growth-Plan Program Based on Duane Growth & RPM Tradeoffs
• Prediction-Simplify Design Until MIL HDBK-217 Prediction is 125% of Reqmt
• Screening/Processing-Adjust Levels to Meet MTBF Reqmt
u
*E
• 100%
£ 10%
a= Growth Rate
Prediction
Reliability Growth
a=.6
Max Rate
-Hi Rel -;
As
Released.. a=.1
Min Rate
No Specific Rel
Evaluation Exposure, Hrs (Logarithmic)
Max
Prog Planning Options
• Equipments
• Facilities
• Level of Corr Action
'Min Option
Prog Constraints
• Chg Limitations, i.e., Config Control
• State of the Art
• Dollars
• Time
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Shown here are the actual RPM results on APQ-
113 Attack Radar used for the F-l 11 program. RPM
was applied about midprogram and there was excel-
lent model correlation as shown. The initial equipment
configuration had 16,000 parts, a predicted MTBF of
90 hr compared to the 137 hr minimum requirement,
and an actual initial demonstrated 9 hr MTBF. RPM
analysis indicated that this initial configuration would
not meet the specified MTBF within the program time
and funding constraints. Thus, the equipment was re-
designed into a reduced parts count configuration now
having 10,000 parts, a 180 hr MTBF prediction, and a
plan for extended parts and product screening. As can
be seen, the initial demonstrated MTBF was approxi-
mately 18 hr (10% rule) and the actual reliability
growth rate was an alpha of 0.5 (high reliability pro-
gram effort). The specified MTBF was achieved after
approximately 9,000 hr of Reliability Demonstration
testing and consistently improved thereafter. Note
when configuration change constraints were applied
via implementation of configuration control on pro-
duction units, this lower flexibility also resulted in
an expected lower reliability growth rate as shown.
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RPM MODEL - PROGRAM 1
200-
2100-
1 80-i • •
u.- 60-
oa
5 40-1
20-
10-
• Analog/Digital
• 10,000 Components
• LRU Burn-In
Specified MTBF, 137 Hours
• Component Part Screening
• Reliability Demo & Acceptance
PerMIL-R-26667 . P r o d Accept
Config
Chg Constraints"
446 Units
cce  I
'a =.50
-(10% Reqmt & Prediction)
I
2 4 6 8 10 20 40 60 80100 200 400
Time, Hours x 100
LRU Environmental & Reliability Demonstration Hours
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The RPM model for the AN/APQ-113 Attack
Radar as shown on the previous page was applied by
GE into a major design improvement program. This
improvement represented a 20% design-modified ver-
sion of the AN/APQ-113 Radar, forming the new AN/
APQ-114 Radar. Using RPM planning analysis, a com-
posite model based on the predicted performance of a
mixture of changed and unchanged parts resulted in an
initial MTBF estimate of 33 hr. A conservative reli-
ability growth slope of alpha equals 0.375 was selected
yielding a required 3,750 hr test program. This plan
was negotiated as part of the contract with incentives
and was implemented. As can be seen, correlation
between performance and plan was excellent. The
actual alpha was 0.48. After completing the 3,750 hr
demonstration, the 21 production systems which were
subjected to Reliability Acceptance Testing measured
212 hr MTBF, substantially exceeding the specified
MTBF.
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RPM MODEL PROGRAM 2
EVENT HISTORY
1
•»
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Dev Models
3 Systems
Prod (20% Change
84 Systems Hardware)
Test & Fix (3750 Hours)
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21 Sys
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4000
1/1/69
When applying general RPM analysis to the
Space Shuttle low cost avionics objectives, certain
guidelines become apparent as follows when also the
low production volume is considered:
• New equipment designs should be avoided as
much as practical in order to eliminate the
cost and time needed to grow the reliability
from the initial 10% of prediction (b) to full
specified MTBF
• Achieve the Shuttle program time constraints
by timely attainment of the required MTBF
via optimum tradeoff between the reliability
design/implementation, accelerated testing
(step stress, overkill, etc.) and selection of
number of units to be tested simultaneously
• Be certain that the predicted MTBF exceeds
the actual Shuttle required MTBF by at least
25%
• Include in the RPM implementation plan an
aggressive program of reliability problem
identification, corrective action, and test
validation
• Include in each Shuttle avionics equipment
specification the requirement to plan and im-
plement a reliability program using the RPM
technique
• Measure and manage the Shuttle avionics
reliability growth using RPM for the overall
avionics system, each subsystem, and each LRU
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RPM APPLIED TO SPACE SHUTTLE
(WITBF = at + b
• Beware of New Equipment Designs
Where Reliability Will Be Approx 10% of Prediction
• Address Time Constraints
Through Accelerated Testing (Step Stress Overkill)
• Accelerate Reliability Growth
Through Aggressive Problem Identification, Corrective
Action &. Test Validation .
• Assure That Substantive Rel Predictions Exceed Reqmts
By Sufficient Margin to Enhance Achievability & Allow
for Uncertainties
• Optimize Level of Screening Tests
Commensurate With Reliability Reqmts
(b)
(t)
( a )
(MTBF)
(MTBF)
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RPM can readily be used to tradeoff whether to
grow an existing equipment otherwise meeting require-
ments to also meet the specified MTBF or to select a
new development. A mature existing equipment would
have an alpha of about 0.15 and a new development
would have an alpha of about 0.5. As shown, in the
example, the required MTBF is 1,000 hr, the existing
equipment has an initial MTBF of 600 hr and the new
equipment has an initial MTBF of 150 hr. The new
equipment and existing equipment, respectively, re-
quire 5,000 and 2,000 testing hours to achieve the
required MTBF. If, for example, program timing is
such that the testing has to be completed in 3,000 hr
then two new development equipments must be tested
in parallel. The cost of the two testing programs and
two reliability programs along with other recurring and
. non-recurring costs may be now compared and evalu-
ated for selection of the best candidate.
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RPM APPLICATION EXAMPLE FOR SPACE SHUTTLE
10000-1
Required MTBF
1000 2000 5000 10000
Test, Hours
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100000
GE has developed a Life Cycle Cost model for
Shuttle avionics cost comparison for any two can-
didates taking into consideration such factors as
non-recurring development costs, unit recurring pro-
duction cost, MTBF, redundancy, maintenance cost,
mission abort probability, vehicle loss probability,
cost of mission abort, cost of vehicle loss, number of
missions, number of vehicles, mission duration/
phases, weight penalty, power penalty, ground support
cost, etc. This illustrates the results using the model
to compare two candidate IMU's used in the Shuttle
without redundancy. Candidate 1 has an MTBF of
3,000 hr and a hardware/software cost of SAM.
Candidate 2 has an MTBF of 5,000 hr and a hard-
ware/software cost of $6M. After 445 missions the
3,000 hr MTBF equipment has a life cycle cost of
about $80M compared to a cost of about $50M
for the 5,000 hr MTBF unit, showing that the higher
MTBF unit is much more economical. In this example
further analysis must be made on testing candidates
with redundancy using the same model.
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LIFE CYCLE COST-RELIABILITY EXAMPLE
80-i
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60-
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u
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1
IMU. MTBF = 3000 Hrs /<# '1 I <*> i
IMU2 MTBF = 5000 Hrs
10 100
No. of Flights
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1000
General Electric as a Grumman team member has
concluded in its studies that redundancy requirements
should be determined by functional criticality in com-
bination with LRU reliability assessment. In addition,
once LRU candidates are identified, it is recommended
that an early well-planned test program implementing
the Reliability Program Management technique can
significantly improve the reliability and hence the
operational availability of each LRU and result in
lower risk and lower life cycle costs.
New ground checkout equipment is most cost
effective for the Shuttle program and the costs to
develop this test equipment is insensitive to the on-
board avionic systems considered.
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AVIONICS STUDY LESSONS LEARNED
• LRU Criticality Assignment Reduces Redundancy and Testing Requirements
• UTE for GSS is Cost Effective
• UTE Insensitive to Variations in Configurations
• Reliability Program Management Techniques Can:
- Enhance Equipment Tradeoffs
- Reduce Risk
- Increase Schedule Confidence
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RECOMMENDED FOLLOW-ON EFFORT
• Confirm Major Architecture Decisions
- Dedicated Flight Control Computer
- Digital Flight Control Computer
- Fly-By-Wire
- G&N Function in Central Computer
- Dedicated Flight Instruments
— Further Study to Determine Technical Possibilities vs Over-All Program
Cost for Development of Common Use RAU
— Further Study to Determine Best RF Transmission Means/Bands for
DFI Due to Quantity of Data to Be Transmitted
- Phased Growth Program (FHF, Mk I, Mk II)
- Crew Size
- SST Flight Control Actuators
- Review Candidate Equipments With NASA RQ&A
• Define Mission Reqmts to Ensure that the System Designed Will Satisfy the
Ultimate Reqmts
• Define the Avionics System to the Next Level of Detail (Prel Equipment
Procurement Specs, Interface Control Documents, etc)
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RECOMMENDED FOLLOW-ON EFFORT (CONT)
• Conduct Tech Tradeoff Studies in the Following Areas:
- Auto-Landing Aids
- Software Sizing
- Redundancy Levels
- Extent of Cross Strapping
- Ground/Flight Interface,. Reqmts
- Mk I On-Board vs Ground Checkout
• Conduct In-Depth Reviews of the Siutability of the Low Cost Equipment
Candidates for Space Shuttle Application. Define and Cost Delta RQ&A
• Study the Reqmt for Unmanned Vertical Flight Test
• Define Safety & Mission Success Reqmts to Next Level of Depth & Verify
Redundancy Meets these Reqmts
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